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ABSTRACT
MATERIALISM AND THE SELF
Kathleen Shirley Micken
Old Dominion University, 1993
Director: Dr. John B. Ford, IV

Materialism has been called the most significant macro development in
m odern consumer behavior. Despite its importance, research about die construct
is rather new. Two scales have been developed to measure materialism, one
proposed by Belk, the other by Richins and Dawson.
The purpose of this dissertation is threefold. First, it extends the
materialism research program by investigating the relationship between
materialism and one's self concept. Hypotheses which drive the research posit
that people who are more materialistic have lower self-esteem, are less likely to
be self-actualized, are extrinsically rather than intrinsically motivated, and are
likely to be high self-monitors. The second purpose is to assess the reliability and
validity of the two scales. Third, the definition of materialism itself is addressed.
Data were collected via a questionnaire distributed to adults. Hypotheses
were investigated with correlation analysis. The reliability of the two scales was
assessed by calculating Coefficient Alphas and item -to-total statistics.
Confirmatory factor analysis and the hypothesis tests were used in assessing
validity. A profile of materialists was developed by analyzing the top and
bottom terciles formed from scores on the Richins and Dawson scale.
All hypotheses were confirmed. People scoring high on the materialism
scales were found to be less self-confident and to rely on the opinions of others.
While materialism was equally distributed across categories of gender and ethnic
background, materialists tended to be younger, to not have a college degree, and
to have either relatively high or relatively low household incomes.
The Richins and Dawson scale was found to be the more reliable scale.
Validity assessment also suggested that it may be superior to the Belk scale.
Finally, a distinction was drawn between materialism and other constructs
such as consumerism and conspicuous consumption. The importance of the
self-concept to an understanding of materialism and the resulting implications
for the definition of materialism were explored.
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CHAPTER ONE
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

LIVING IN A MATERIAL WORLD
Madonna sings about being "a material girl." Andre Agassi tells viewers
that "image is everything" in his promotion of Canon's EOS Rebel camera.
Marketers and advertisers are blamed for fostering pernicious materialism
among consumers (e.g. Schudson 1984). America has been dubbed the
"consumer society" and consumption motives have been identified as dominant
in our culture. As early an observer of the United States as de Tocqueville noted,
"I know of no country, indeed, where the love of money has taken stronger hold
on the affections of men" (1961, p. 43). More recently, Arensberg and Niehoff
(1980) suggested that materialism is a core American value. On a more global
scale, Nava (1992) argues that materialism
has become a powerful and evocative symbol of contemporary
capitalism and the modem Western world. Indeed, in the climate of
1991, faced by the crisis of the environment and the radical
transformations in Eastern Europe, it is perhaps the most resonant
symbol of all (p. 185).
Evidence such as this leads to Belk's (1987b) pronouncement that materialism is
the "dominant consumer ideology and the most significant macro development
in modern consumer behavior" (p. 26). Is he right?
Various authors (e.g. Horowitz 1985; McCracken 1988; McKendrick,

1
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Brewer, and Plumb 1983; Mukerji 1983) trace the origins of materialism and a
consumer culture to the industrialized nations. Others (for example, Mason 1981)
suggest that materialism, or conspicuous consumption, has almost always been
present in some form or another and should be expected to be found in societies
in the future. Regardless of its genesis a n d /o r dispersion, whenever it is
discussed materialism is routinely criticized as a bankrupt life style. As Miller
points out, "Materialism has virtually no defenders" (1991, p. 130). For example,
both Scitovsky (1976) and Leiss (1976) suggest that materialism carries with it the
seeds of its own destruction, concluding that consumption is, by itself, ultimately
unfulfilling. Others (e.g. Boorstin 1973, Duming 1991, Lasch 1979) have
suggested that materialism, fostered by marketing (with advertising often cited
as the prim ary culprit), is responsible for overconsumption, which in turn is
leading to the depletion of the world's resources and pollution of the
environment. Materialism is also said to result in the alienation of people from
each other and from the real purpose of life (Csikszentmihalyi and RochbergHalton 1981; Fromm 1947,1956,1976; Halton 1992; Rochberg-Halton 1986).

Materialism and Religion
These criticisms are not surprising, since "all major religions" include some
exhortation for followers to forego earthly pleasures for the sake of rewards in
the life hereafter (Belk 1985, p. 265). Historian Arnold Toynbee's research led him
to the conclusion that, while the founders of the world's religions "disagreed
with each other [about] the nature of the universe, the nature of the spiritual life,
the nature of ultimate reality.... they all said with one voice that if we made
material wealth our paramount aim, this would lead to disaster" (quoted in
Wachtel 1983). In the Christian tradition it is easier for a camel to pass through
the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven (Matthew
2
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19: 23-24). Modern day apologists have suggested that this parable was not
meant to be as harsh as it sounds; that Jesus was only trying to make a point.
After all, one really can't be expected to give up one's possessions, can one?! In
its way, Martin Luther's rebellion against the Catholic church was
antimaterialistic. He was opposed to several "materialistic" practices within the
Catholic church, such as acquiring large tracts of land and impressive quantities
of items fashioned from precious metals, as well as sometimes withholding
absolution for sins unless lands were willed to the church (Williams 1991). He
declared that it was not good works (doing good deeds, living a righteous life,
making gifts to the church, purchasing indulgences) that saved one's soul, but
rather faith (Luther 1517/1883).
Similar ideas are found in the Koran, the sacred writings of Islam, "But as
for him w h o ... longs for wealth, and calls the good a lie, we will send him easily
to difficulty! And his wealth shall not avail him w hen he falls down (into hell)!!"
(Chapter of the Night). In Asian religions, the middle way is advocated. In the
Buddhist tradition, "whoever in this world overcomes his selfish cravings, his
sorrows fall away from him like drops of water from a lotus flower"
(Dhammapada, 336). The Bhagavad-Gita admonishes adherents of Hinduism that

the "person who lives completely free from desires, w ithout longing... attains
peace" (n.71). A common thread seems to be the admonition inscribed at the
Oracle of Delphi,1 "Nothing in Excess." The premise is that it is okay to get
enough, but more than "enough" is sinful, wasteful, and to be avoided.
Three exceptions to this general condemnation of materialism should be
noted. The first is a religious tradition from Calvinism. John Calvin was a firm

1 The oracle of Delphi was the spokeswoman for the god Apollo. Actually, "she" w as one
of three priestesses who resided at the temple at Delphi, Greece. She provided advice on politics,
morality, law, and justice. This location is also referred to as the Oracle of Delphi (Durant 1939).

3
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believer in the doctrine of predestination, the idea that one's salvation or
damnation was fixed before s/h e was born. Unlike some religious leaders of the
time, especially the Catholic bishops, however, he "was well disposed toward
business and finance" (Durant 1961, p. 335), since material success in this life was
evidence of a heavenly reward in the next. The second example, as personified
by some televangelists, might be labeled the "gospel of prosperity" (Barnhart
1988; Cardwell 1984). It is more recent but flows from the Calvinist perspective
that earthly success is a reflection of God's pleasure. This movement is
considered to be a reaction to the secularization of life in the United States, to the
perceived decline of America's prestige and power in the world, as well as to a
perceived decline in the standard of living (O'Guinn and Belk 1989). The
explanation which has been offered by some televangelists is that if the U.S.
would only return to a moral, Christian way of life, then God w ould once again
reward the country w ith material bounty. As O'Guinn and Belk (1989) put it,
"the consumption imperative of the New Right is that wealth and conspicuous
consumption are not only acceptable, they are desirable as evidence of God's
pleasure" (p. 229). They quote Jerry Falwell, a Baptist minister who not only
founded Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia, but also initiated a
wide-reaching television program of evangelism, as saying that "Ownership of
property is biblical. Competition in business is biblical. Ambitious and successful
business management is clearly outlined as part of God's plan for His people" (p.
229). Thus the link between Protestantism and capitalism that Weber (1958)
offered almost 100 years ago is still being promoted today. The third example is
Mormonism, which seems to have successfully blended religion and materialism
(Wright and Larsen 1992). Church leaders are selected, in part at least, on the
basis of their material achievements. However, positive attitudes toward
possessions and the consumption of material goods are tempered with cautions
4
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about subordinating material goals to spiritual ones. Mormons may enjoy the
materials-intensive society in which they live, but wealth should be used in the
service of the church and the poor (Ozanne, Hill and Wright 1992).

The Spread of Materialism
That materialism is prevalent in industrialized nations, then, is not
surprising. Belk (1988b; Ger and Belk 1993) reports that the consumer culture,
and hence, materialism, is being emulated at an increasing rate in the Third
World. There, however, the path to materialism is being reversed. In the West, a
consumption ethic followed the development of wealth. In Third World
countries, the consumption ethic is preceding wealth. Because of tourism
(Buzzell 1968; Belk and Costa 1991; Leontiades 1986; Walters and Toyne 1989),
the penetration of marketing messages via satellite television2 (Clemens 1987,
Eger 1987, Killough 1978), and other means, citizens of developing nations
acquire a desire for products well before the products are available, or before the
means to purchase them is at hand. For example, after the Berlin Wall fell, a
study by Landor Associates (reported in The Economist 1990) ranked East
European perceptions of 400 of the m ost famous Western brands. Rankings were
based on familiarity and the esteem in which the brands were held. Overall,
Eastern Europeans were familiar with the names of between 100 (by Russians)
and 252 (by Hungarians) brands, many of which they had never even seen.
Landor Associates concluded that its survey pointed to a "tremendous hankering
after luxury and the more visible symbols of capitalism" (p. 71). This finding is

2

O'Guinn, Lee, and Faber (1986) make the point that the pictorial mass media also
"teaches" immigrants in the U.S. about the consumption ethic, instructing them on how and what
to consume. They suggest that the media influence is so strong that it should be incorporated in
models of acculturation.
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consistent with Levitt's (1973) prediction that the same types of products would
be desired by consumers everywhere: "everyone... wants products and features
that everybody else wants.... The same countries that ask the world to recognize
and respect the individuality of their culture insist on the wholesale transfer to
them of modern goods, services, and technologies" (p. 96,99).
In the West, materialism has been linked to the Protestant Work Ethic
(Weber 1958). But recent studies (e.g. Furnham and Muhiudeen 1984; Tallman,
Marotz-Baden and Pindas 1983) suggest that the ethic is now stronger in
developing countries (regardless of the dominant religion) and weaker in the
post-industrial nations. One possible reason for this switch is that for citizens of
industrialized nations, once wealth is achieved, the desire to achieve further is
dampened (see Campbell 1987; Fox and Lears 1983; Horowitz 1980).

Materialism and M arketing
It would seem, then, that an understanding of materialism would be useful
for domestic as well as for international consumer research. Nevertheless, within
the marketing discipline the investigation of the phenomenon is relatively
young. This is not surprising since the investigation of the wider field of
possessions and ownership is itself of relatively recent interest. Furby's (1991)
perspective on the broader issue of possessions is also appropriate for the more
narrow focus on materialism.
We remain a long way from the ultimate goal: A thorough
understanding of the nature of possession and ownership.... Yet
there is hardly a more ubiquitous phenomenon in our daily lives
than possession. The more we can understand about the many
forms of, motivations for, and determinants of, possession and
ownership, the more we will understand about many other aspects
of human cognition, behavior, and attitudes" (p. 463).
Perhaps the greatest proponent of the study of materialism has been Belk
6
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(1983,1984,1985; Ger and Belk 1990,1993). His seminal Journal of Consumer
Research (1985) article on materialism is one of the most cited articles from that

journal (Cote, Leong, and Cote 1991). In it Belk identifies five issues related to
materialism:
•

whether materialism is a positive or negative trait

•

whether marketing creates or exacerbates materialism

•

whether materialism is an egoistic trait

•

the impact of materialism on interpersonal relationships, and

•

the relationship between materialism and positive self-identity.

Thus, Belk set the research agenda for materialism in the marketing
discipline. However, he cautions that before such topics can be appropriately
addressed, the nature of the phenomenon and its dimensions m ust be identified"
(Ger and Belk 1990, p. 192). The work in this area is addressed next.

DEFINITIONS
The American Heritage Dictionary defines materialism as "undue regard for
worldly concerns." Marketers, however, tend to expand the definition to include
its impact on consumer attitudes and behaviors. Early researchers into the
phenomenon, W ard and Wackman (1971), defined materialism as "an orientation
which views material goods and money as important for personal happiness and
social progress" (p. 422). This definition was adopted until Belk (1984) proposed
an even more expanded one. He suggested that
materialism reflects the importance a consumer attaches to worldly
possessions. At the highest levels of materialism, such possessions
assume a central place in a person's life and are believed to provide
the greatest sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in life (p. 291).

7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Since then, m ost marketing researchers have adopted this definition. [While it is
stated a bit differently, the definition employed by Richins and Dawson (1992) is
consistent with Belk's: "materialism is a set of centrally held beliefs about the
importance of possessions in one's life" (p. 308).]
There is an important distinction that should be emphasized here. A
consumer society is not the same as a materialist society (Harris 1981). Schudson
(1984) explains the difference, which is critical to this dissertation. It is important
to "distinguish materialistic values—placing material above social or spiritual
goals—from a materials-intensive way of life, which may use goods as means to
other ends" (p. 143). W hen the term "materialist" appears in this dissertation,
unless otherwise noted, it is used in the sense of Belk's and Richins and
Dawson's definitions which are consistent with Schudson's distinction. A
materialist is one who believes that "the ultimate goals of personal life can be
fulfilled by things" (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981, p. ix).
Possessions become the objects of desire and the ultimate goal. That we all live in
a material world and like material things, that possessions carry social meaning,
is not materialism.

Descriptions of a M aterialist
Having defined materialism, the next step would be to provide a fuller
description of a materialist. Materialism might be termed the "George Carlin"
phenomenon—an emphasis on one's "stuff" (Carlin 1981).3 Not only are
possessions im portant and central to one's existence (Belk 1984,1985,1988a;
Richins 1987; Richins and Dawson 1990,1992), but the processes of acquiring and
3

The comedian George Carlin does a routine about our possessions, our "stuff." He pokes
fun at the importance w e attach to our possessions: w e have special places for them, w e may
even move so that w e have a larger house in which to accommodate them, and when w e travel
w e have to carry som e of them with us.

8
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maintaining them are also important. The focus then narrows to questions such
as, w hen acquisitions are central, what other activities are "required"—and,
conversely, because of time, energy, and resource constraints, what activities are
limited or unattended? Some answers from the literature are discussed below.
Fournier and Richins (1991) solicited commonly-held conceptions of
materialism and materialists from a sample of twenty-nine respondents (11
residents of a blue collar suburb, 11 airline travelers, and seven undergraduates)
via an open-ended survey. Materialists were thought to be "possession-focused
in thought, word, and deed.... [they] view the world through a lens focused only
on possessions, and evaluate themselves and others in terms of what is owned"
(p. 408). Important motivations for materialism were identified as "status display
and self-affirmation through ownership of statused possessions," as well as the
"use [of] possessions" to connote success—the more you have, the more
im portant you are (Fournier and Richins 1991, p. 408).
Ger and Belk (1993) also provide descriptions of a materialist based on
focus group interviews of MBA students in the United States. The student
conceptions are consistent with those reported by Fournier and Richins (1991).
Materialists are characterized as selfish and self-indulgent, as being attached to
things more than to people, and as evaluating themselves as well as others on the
basis of material possessions.
Because of this possessions focus, being a materialist is a tim e- and
attention-consuming orientation. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-FIalton (1981)
speak of the considerable "psychic energy" which individuals invest in
possessions. Leiss (1976) addresses the time-consuming nature in an example.
[OJne who drapes the latest sartorial splendour over a properly
deodorized frame, and then treats his locks with an old-fashioned
pomade rather than the newest lacquer spray, will quickly learn
what it really means to be an inattentive consumer. The point of all
9
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this is quite simple: the fragmentation of needs requires on the
individual's part a steadily more intensive effort to hold together
his identity and personal integrity. In concrete terms this amounts
to spending more and more time in consumption activities (p. 19).
One m ust not only acquire possessions, but acquire the "right" possessions
and in the right combination.4 The acquisition m ust be timely (one cannot wear
last year's fashion). Further, the acquisition must be cared for and, perhaps, even
surrounded by companion possessions. Thus, the materialist is forced into a
constant environmental scanning process. Accordingly, a materialist might be
expected to be more media oriented, to belong to more social clubs or groups,
and to spend more time shopping not only for goods, but also to keep abreast of
what is available.
The results of the Fournier and Richins (1991) study support these ideas.
Materialists are described as continual information gatherers,
constantly scanning the environment for material offerings ...on the
lookout for more ...figuring out what to acquire n e x t... reading
catalogs and magazines, observing what others have acquired,
visiting shops to see what is available. Always thinking about
future purchases so that thinking about buying involves pleasure
and happiness" (p. 410).
Accordingly, materialists are more likely to engage in behaviors such as ongoing
search and shopping to prepare them for future acquisitions.
In m any of these respects, the materialist exhibits characteristics of the
opinion leader (Bloch and Richins 1983) or market maven5 (Feick and Price
4

A materialist must be certain to maintain a consistent set of goods which have what
McCracken (1988) refers to as "Diederot unity." That is, certain goods "go together" by virtue of
their correspondence with the same set of cultural categories. McCracken employs the example of
the consistency of Rolex watches and BMWs for Yuppies. There is no inherent reason w hy these
two products should carry similar cultural meaning, other than the influence of advertising and
the fashion system which have attached similar cultural meanings to these objects.

5

Both opinion leaders and market mavens are thought to mediate the flow of information
from mass media sources to individuals. They influence the (Continued on the next page.)
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1987)—except that the materialist is an opinion follower. The views of others are
more important than his/her own views, since the approval of others is critical.
W hen the views of others take precedence, then some would say that the
materialist lacks self-esteem and is not becoming self-actualized (Fromm 1976,
Maslow 1950,1970). Snyder (1987; Snyder and Gangestad 1986) has labeled this
tendency to shape one's behavior to the views of others "self-monitoring."
Further the materialist cannot engage in these activities and do everything
else as well. What, then, is likely to suffer? Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg-Halton (1981) provide one answer.
If things attract our attention excessively, there is not enough
psychic energy left to cultivate the interaction with the rest of the
world. The danger of focusing attention exclusively on a goal of
physical consumption—or materialism—is that one does not attend
enough to the cultivation of the self, to the relationship with others,
or to the broader purposes that affect life (p. 53).
Additionally, life satisfaction and happiness are thought to be beyond the grasp
(and reach) of materialists. Relationships with others, happiness, and cultivation
of the self are each briefly addressed next.
Some (c.f., Fournier and Richins 1991; Fromm 1956,1976; Ger and Belk
1993; Heilbroner 1956) have suggested that activities which build true
relationships between people are neglected by materialists. It is a bit paradoxical
that while materialists must understand and seek the opinions and approval of
others, they may also allow personal relationships to suffer. A materialist must
be a social individual. To learn "what's in" and to gain approval, the materialist
m ust participate in socially visible activities, such as group memberships, having

5

(Continued from the previous page) opinions and choices of other individuals about
products, political candidates, and ideas. The distinction between the two is that the influence of
opinions leaders is thought to derive from their involvement with a particular product class,
while market mavens have knowledge expertise and influence about the marketplace in general.
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people over to one's house, etc. As Veblen (1899/1979) suggested, consumption
must "concentrate upon the lines which are m ost patent to the observers whose
good opinion is sought" (p. 112). A materialist, however, is likely to be interested
in social connections as means (to gather information, to solicit praise, etc.) and
not as ends in themselves. Two characteristics of materialists seem to flow from
this consequence. First, materialists are more likely to be motivated by external
factors such as the approval of others—extrinsic motivation—than by internal
factors such as the enjoyment of a piece of sculpture or a game of golf for
itself—intrinsic motivation. Secondly, materialists may be more likely than other
people to be "self-monitoring" (Snyder 1979; Snyder and DeBono 1985). This
term describes individuals who are attuned to the opinions of others and who
mold their appearances and behavior to these opinions.
Materialists are also thought to be unhappy or dissatisfied. According to
Veblen (1899/1979), an individual cannot simply purchase items and then sit
back and receive the approbation of others. Standards keep rising and changing
so that round after round of accumulation is fueled (p. 31). More recently,
Brickman and Campbell (1971) make much the same point, calling the effect an
"hedonic trap," greater and greater pleasures are necessary to maintain a
constant level of satisfaction; hence, happiness is unobtainable. Eisert and Kahle
(1983) suggest another reason for the unhappiness. They argue that social and
emotional support which is found in close relationships with others is important
for long-term physical and emotional health. Materialists neglect these
relationships at the cost of unhappiness. In developing their scales to measure
materialism, discussed below and in the next chapter, both Belk (1984,1985) and
Richins and Dawson (1990,1992) address the correlation between materialism
and happiness.
Finally, the cultivation of the self suffers. Self-esteem and self-actualization
12
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are often cited as casualties of materialism. Bond (1992) explains that if one's life
is directed only toward "pleasure or the accumulation of wealth, there is no hope
of self-esteem" because the honor and recognition received from others will
"ring hollow" (p. 165). In discussing self-actualization, Maslow (1950,1970)
reports that to be psychologically autonomous and self-determined, a person
m ust be free of dependence on other people—which, as noted above, the
materialist is not. Fromm (1976) offers another perspective on materialism's
undesirable impact on the self. He speaks of the "marketing character," the
phenomenon of experiencing oneself as a commodity to be exchanged on the
"personality market." Pollay (1986) explains that the preoccupation w ith
acquiring and owning goods has "a social effect of displacing affect from people
to objects and an alienating effect where the self is perceived... as an exchange
commodity" (p. 25). This objectification (or reification) of people is a perspective
offered by several writers in the postmodern tradition (c.f. Baudrillard 1988, Firat
1991). Instead of being able to say, "I am what I do," people are reduced to
saying of themselves, "'I am what I have,' thus providing the direct link between
the search for the self and the consumption process in industrial societies"
(Kilbourne 1987, p. 229).

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND SCALE DEVELOPMENT
While there is agreement on the definition of materialism (and consensus
about the characteristics/descriptions of a materialist), there is no clear
agreement about how to measure the construct. Most acknowledge that
materialism is a complex phenomenon, comprised of several dimensions.
However, Belk (1984,1985; Ger and Belk 1990,1993) conceives of the dimensions

13
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as being personality traits. Richins and Dawson (1990,1992) argue that a value
orientation is more accurate. In adopting this perspective, they are following the
lead of Rokeach (1973) who defined a value as "an enduring belief that a specific
mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to
an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" (p. 5). In
other words, the acquisition of possessions is believed to be desirable in itself as
well as an acceptable means of attaining other desired goals.
Each "party" has developed its own scale to measure the construct. Belk
measures traits of possessiveness, envy, nongenerosity and preservation. Richins
and Dawson measure three domains of materialism: the centrality of acquisitions
in one's life, whether acquisitions are used to define happiness, and whether they
are used to define success. Each developer suggests that scores on the individual
subscales as well as overall aggregated scores may be correlated with measures
of attitudes and behaviors.
Because of its earlier appearance, Belk's scale has been more widely used
(see for example Dawson and Bamossy 1990; Ellis 1991; H unt et al. 1990; Rudmin
1988; and Wallendorf and Arnould 1988). However, research which has
investigated materialism using the two scales, indicates that the Richins and
Dawson scale is the more reliable (Cole et al. 1992; Othman 1989); validity
comparisons between the two scales has only been addressed tangentially.
Specific discussions of the two scales are included in the next two chapters.

Measures of Materialism and Consumer Attitudes,
Behaviors, and Motivations
Following Belk's agenda, various researchers have investigated the
relationship between materialism and considerations such as happiness, life
satisfaction, and interpersonal relationships. This research addresses the issue of
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the validity of the scales. Belk (1985) reports that, as expected, materialism
correlates negatively with satisfaction in life. Other researchers have reported
similar results. The Belk scale has also been used in assessing other issues as well.
For example, H unt et al. (1990) found moderate support for the hypothesis that
materialism and external locus of control were correlated. A cross-cultural study
by Dawson and Bamossy (1990) reported that the envy subscale had the highest
correlation life satisfaction. In his own cross-cultural study (Ger and Belk 1990,
1993), Belk reports inconsistent results. The factor solutions are the not the same
for samples from different countries. Scale reliability and validity also vary from
one country to another.
Richins and Dawson (1992) found that relationships between their
materialism measures and other constructs, such as life satisfaction, generally are
in the directions hypothesized. For example, materialism correlates negatively
with measures of voluntary simplicity, with satisfaction w ith family life, and
with self-esteem.
In a study using the two scales, Cole et al. (1992) investigated materialism
and three different measures of life satisfaction. Most correlations were
statistically significant and were in the direction expected, for example the life
satisfaction correlated negatively with materialism. However, they could not
reproduce Belk's factor structure.
While materialism has been a topic of "report and discussion" for some
years in various social science disciplines (Rudmin and Richins 1992), research is
still in its relative infancy, as evidenced by the continuing scale development and
exploratory research into connections between materialism and various
consumer attitudes and behaviors. As noted above, initial research has probed
the relationship between materialism and measures of life satisfaction. The
relationship between materialism and the self, however, has not yet been
15
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addressed directly. A number of articles, both empirical and conceptual, have
been written about the relationship between people and their possessions, yet
none were driven by considerations of materialism and the self.

THE PROPOSAL
W hat is the nature of identity in a consumer culture? More specifically,
w hat is the nature of the materialist "self"? If people construct their "selves," at
least in part, through their possessions, which have been given meaning by
culture, then the task is to learn in what ways the materialist constructs
him /herself that is different from the non-materialist. Lunt and Livingstone
(1992) provide some guidelines.
The construction of personal identities draws on conventionally
given class, gender, cultural and generational identities as well as
on individual biographical and family experience. The identities
which result reflect... people's feelings of security, their notions of
their needs and desires,... their response to social influence and the
way they conduct their social relationships. They give meaning to
everyday economic activities and experiences. These diverse
£
Certainly there has been much theorizing about the relationship between possessions and
the self. However, research guided by hypotheses about materialism and the self have not been
reported. Richins and Dawson (1990) administered a measure of self-monitoring to one of their
samples, but the results were not discussed. In a personal communication (May 20,1993) Richins
said that the correlation between materialism, as measured by an early version of the Richins and
Dawson scale, was moderately positive. In a later study (1992) self-esteem w as measured, but it
w as not the focus of the research. Belk (1988a, 1989a) has written about possessions being an
extension of the self, but did not directly address materialism and the self. In a cross-cultural
study, Wallendorf and Arnould (1988) assessed the role that favorite possessions play in self
definition. While they used a variation of the Belk materialism scale as part of their research, the
relationship between materialism and the self was not at issue. Finally, Ball and Tasaki (1992)
investigated attachment to possessions and the self. They also utilized a version of the Belk scale,
but hypothesized (and found) that there was no relationship between attachment and
materialism. The materialism consideration was not a major component of their study.
The one exception is Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton's (1981) work which
investigated the interaction between people and the household objects they consider special.
While materialism was a factor in this study, it was not the principal focus.
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aspects of personal identity are constructed through responding to
the challenge, opportunities and problems which modern
consumer culture presents to the individual" (p. 24-25).
This dissertation investigated materialism by considering the impact of
materialism on the self. Research into the aspects of materialism associated with
the self concept has been advocated both by Belk (Ger and Belk 1993) and Richins
and Dawson (1992), among others. The study specifically addressed hypotheses
about materialism and self-esteem, self-actualization, self-monitoring, and
intrinsic/extrinsic motivation. Investigation of the hypotheses involved the use
of both the Belk (Ger and Belk 1993) and Richins and Dawson (1992) materialism
scales.6 Those scoring high on the two scales are hypothesized to be more
self-monitoring individuals, extrinsically motivated, but with lower self-esteem
and less self-actualization than those who score low. This study also moves
forward the process of testing and refining the two materialism scales.
Additionally, knowledge about the validity for the two scales—do the measures
"behave as expected" (Churchill 1979)—has been advanced. Construct validity
has been assessed first, by the investigation of materialism along with measures
of the self constructs in a nomological network, and second, by assessing the
convergent validity of the two scales. Finally, the definition of materialism is
reassessed and an alternative conceptualization, based on the results of this
study, is proposed.

Organization
Chapter Two presents a literature review of the topics of materialism and
the self-concept. Historical reviews of these two topics as well as a consideration

While several other studies have used the Belk scale, this study employs the most recent,
unpublished version (Ger and Belk 1983), which reflects the revisions and refinements Belk has
made in response to earlier test results.
17
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of the role of possessions in self-definition are also included. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the relationship between materialism and the self.
Specific research hypotheses are presented in Chapter Three, as is the
research design. The instruments used to measure materialism and the four
constructs of self-actualization, self-esteem, self-monitoring, and
intrinsic/extrinsic motivation are discussed and defended.
Chapter Four presents the analysis of the data, tests of the hypotheses, a
discussion of the reliability and validity of the two materialism scales, and
develops a profile of materialists based on these results.
Chapter Five provides a discussion of the findings, drawing conclusions
about the definition of materialism and about the applicability of the two scales.
Additionally, implications for the marketing discipline, limitations of the
research, and suggestions for future research are addressed.

18

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter contains discussions of research about materialism and about
the self-concept. In so doing, it presents information about the historical
development of each construct and empirical research in each area. The chapter
begins with a consideration of materialism, then moves to discussions of the self,
and ends with an investigation of the relationship between the two.

DEFINITIONAL CONCERNS
The general denunciation of materialism reported in the first chapter
illustrated the negative connotations associated with it. Agreement about
materialism, however, stops there. There seems to be no agreed upon definition
or conceptualization of either materialism or of what it means to be a materialist.
Even within academia, writers and researchers are not always careful to define
terminology. When the terms "materialism" and "materialist" are used, they do
not necessarily carry the same meaning from one author to another. The situation
is both exacerbated and strengthened by the cross-disciplinary nature of the
research. Different disciplines have different terminologies for the same idea. At
the same time, however, different disciplines often use the same terminology to
express diverse ideas. For example, to investigate "materialism," a researcher
19
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should search for studies of "consumption," "conspicuous consumption,"
"consumerism,"1 "ostentatious display," and "material culture," among others.
In an attempt to sort out the situation, several authors have presented
thorough reviews of the history of consumerism in Western societies (e.g., Fox
and Lears 1983; McCracken 1986; Mukerji 1986); others have elucidated the
differences in perspectives across disciplines (e.g., Belk 1985; Fournier and
Richins 1991; Rassuli and Hollander 1988; Richins and Dawson 1990 and 1991).
Putting aside philosophical materialism, the idea that ultimately there is a
material explanation for all phenomena (see e.g. Lange 1865/1925), there seem to
be two general conceptualizations of materialism, one based in economic theory
and the other in anthropological/sociological theory. Proponents of the first
approach draw a distinction between using goods to satisfy "real" versus "false"
needs. Adherents of the second perspective take a more holistic approach to the
role of goods in society. The following discussion, which focuses on Western
notions of materialism, elucidates the two views.

The Dichotomy of Needs Perspective
Economists assume that people are rational beings who purchase goods in
order to maximize utility. Preferences enter this scenario in the form of
indifference curves which illustrate the points at which goods are considered to
be acceptable substitutes for one another. W hen consumers act to maximize
utility, they are assumed to consume goods which meet their needs (Benton 1985;
Hamilton 1989). Accordingly, one must look to need theory.
Perhaps the most famous theory is Maslow's (1954) which posits a
hierarchy with physiological and safety needs at the "bottom" and social and

^ e r e , "consumerism" refers to living in a materials-intensive world, It is not synonymous
with another use of "consumerism" which refers to protecting consumers' rights and interests.
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psychological needs at the "top." More recently, Hanna (1980) has proposed a
classification of needs which may be satisfied through consumption activities.
Yet this set, too, flows from physical safety "up" to personal growth. Given such
conceptualizations, it is easy to understand why the purchase and use of physical
goods to satisfy physical needs has been approved, but the purchase and use of
physical goods to satisfy social and psychological needs has been considered
inappropriate (c.f. Bell 1976; Fromm 1956,1976; Galbraith 1958,1974; Kilbourne
1987,1991). As indicated in the first chapter, the general religious emphasis on
self-restraint has also come down on the side of "enough" in terms of the
satisfying of physical and safety needs (Belk 1983). Individuals are admonished
to consume in moderation: enough, but not too much (Leiss 1976).
Inglehart (1981; Abramson and Inglehart 1987) utilizes this distinction
among needs in his research on values. His use of the term "materialist,"
however, is distinctly different. For Inglehart, materialists generally live in
countries which are still striving to satisfy their citizens' basic physical and safety
needs. Materialists can also be found in post-industrial societies; however, they
can be identified as those favoring social/political policies which emphasize
economic growth and security. Post-Materialists, on the other hand, tend to live
in post-industrial nations and favor "higher" quality-of-life goals such as
environmentalism. They do not view "ever increasing GNP" as a laudable,
primary goal. Roberts and Smith (1992) adopt this post-materialist perspective
for their postm odern development continuum. Post-industrial societies are
encouraged to take advantage of technology, but to continue to preserve
individual tastes and cultural distinctions.
Most scholars who approach materialism from the dichotomy of needs
perspective (real versus false or illusory needs), however, consider materialism
to be an "over- emphasis," on physical goods with insufficient attention paid to
21
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other objectives (e.g., Belk 1983,1984,1988a). This approach to materialism often
carries moral overtones. For example, the English essayist and historian Thomas
Carlyle warned against materialism, calling it the "Pig Philosophy" (Miller 1991).
This perspective illustrates the problematic nature of increases in the standard of
living (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Mason 1981). Leading comfortable, safe lives is
judged to be good; but comfort, it is argued, should not become luxury and
waste. The consumption of goods to satisfy "real"" needs is acceptable.
Consumption of goods for satisfaction beyond these basic needs is not. Wasteful
spending and consumption are decried. One is rem inded of President Bush's
remark about Democrats in his 1992 state-of-the-union address: "they lie awake
at night worried that someone else might be having a good time."
One of the most famous writers in this tradition was Thorstein Veblen, who
after finishing a Ph.D. in philosophy returned to school to study economics
(Murphey 1988). His work (1899/1979) on conspicuous consumption and
conspicuous leisure has been enormously influential. Not only did Veblen coin
the term "conspicuous consumption," but he connected it with the connotation
of "conspicuous waste" and excessive expenditure on superfluities (p. 97-98)
which characterizes this economic perspective. More recently, Bell (1976)
expressed concern over trends in U.S. culture which he views as the necessary
consequences of capitalism: Americans are becoming hedonistic, concerned with
play, fun, display, and pleasure (xi - xii; 70). One has only to turn on the
television and listen to politicians, preachers, and pundits decry the loss of "real"
values to know that this concern for wasteful consumption is alive and well.
From such a perspective, materialists are often considered in a similarly
negative light. A whole litany of bad traits are attributed to materialists (Fournier
and Richins 1991), as detailed in the first chapter. For example, they are viewed
as using goods to replace personal relationships or to compensate for bad or
22
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nonexistent personal relationships; they are accused of "worshiping" things and
of making a religion of materialism (Belk 1983,1985). In fact, Christmas, in the
United States, has been called the "National Festival of Consumption" (Boorstin
1973, p. 162), with Santa Claus as the supreme deity (Belk 1987a, 1989b). As an
illustration of this last point, Shlien's (1959) suggests that after Christ, Santa
Claus is the most sacred folk hero in America, even though, as Belk (1987a)
points out, the two represent almost polar opposites in societal values. "The
miracles of Christ provided health and necessities while the miracles of Santa
Claus provide toys and luxuries" (p. 91).
Belk's definition of materialism is consistent with this economically driven
perspective: materialism refers to "the importance a consumer attaches to
worldly possessions. At the highest levels... possessions assume a central place
in a person's life and are believed to provide the greatest sources of satisfaction
and dissatisfaction" (1984, p. 291). Other researchers agree. H unt et al. are even
more biting in their characterization of materialism as "an orientation that
equates symbols w ith substance and objects with essence" (1990, p. 1101).

The Social Science Perspective
In direct contrast, most anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and
some consumer behavior scholars eschew the economic view (e.g., Douglas and
Isherwood 1979; Horowitz 1985; Mason 1981; McCracken 1986,1988; Schudson
1984). Instead, the consumption of goods is considered to fulfill a societal
function. The role of goods in society is considered morally neutral. Several ideas
are inherent in this perspective.
•

Goods are one way we communicate with each other. As such, they

help us categorize the world (McCracken 1986,1988).
•

Instead of replacing human relationships, goods and attendant
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rituals, such as gift giving, often solidify them. Material goods often are used to
express and meet higher-order needs and values (Rook 1985; Belk 1987b;
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981).
•

Materialism is always with us in some fashion or another because of

the role it plays in society (Mason 1981). Consumption provides a way to make
status visible.
According to Douglas and Isherwood (1979), this perspective puts
materialism back into the wider social realm in which it belongs.
[T]he very idea of consumption itself has to be set back into the
social process, not merely looked upon as a result or objective of
work.... Goods, work, and consumption have been artificially
abstracted out of the whole social scheme. The way the excision has
been made damages the possibility of understanding these aspects
of our lives (p. 4).
Schudson (1984) and Miller (1991) w ould agree both in substance and in
implication.
In the tradition of Thorstein Veblen, sociologists and cultural critics
have thought it clever and damning to show of some social
behavior that its function is to display status rather than to serve
"basic" needs. But this view implicitly accepts the puritanical
prejudice, which neither Smith nor Marx succumbed to, that
whatever is not a fundamental material need is superfluous. The
assumption is that people care about status only because they are
vain, foolish, economically irrational, or in Veblen's view,
industrially unproductive. But that is not sociology, it is
economistic ideology (Schudson 1984, p. 134).
Thus, people use goods to say to themselves and to the world who they are.
People ascribe meaning to goods to make material their intangible values. As
McCracken said, "the premises of our existence are the premises of our
existence" (1988, p. 132).2 In other words, our homes, where we live, reflect the
2

Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton make much the same point. "One of the most
important psychological purposes of the home is that those (Continued on the next page)
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basic assumptions about our lives. Or, as Joy and Dholakia (1991) put it, "people
endow their homes with meaning and, in turn, use these meanings to define
themselves" (p. 386). Belk (1985) agrees with this conceptualization, saying that
since goods are one way in which we make the abstract concrete, they help
define who we are. He further suggests that the use of goods and the attendant
consumption rituals are often instrumental in meeting those needs and
expressing values (Belk 1985; Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Rook
1985). This perspective is amplified later in the discussion of the self and
possessions.
A corollary to the social science view suggests that materialism is more
<3

likely to be present in more stratified, complex societies than in more traditional,
less complex societies (Douglas and Isherwood 1979; Mason 1981; Triandis 1990).
Advocates for this position argue that once institutions lost their hold over
society, and as individuals became more mobile, new ways of identifying and
separating people were needed. Tangible goods assumed that role. A brief
discussion of this progression is presented next.

2

(Continued from the previous page) objects that have shaped one's personality and which
are needed to express concretely those aspects of the self that one values are kept within it. Thus
the home is not only a material shelter but also a shelter for those things that make life
meaningful" (1981, p. 139).
George Carlin (1981) takes a more prosaic view: "A house is just a pile of stuff with a cover
on it.... That's what your house is, a place to keep your stuff while you go out and g e t
more
stuff!"
3

In discussing cultural complexity, Triandis et al. (1988) distinguish among "extremely
simple societies (e.g. the Mbuti Pygmies)," societies exhibiting "higher levels of complexity (e.g.,
the Romans, Aztecs, Chinese)" and "extremely complex cultures (e.g., m odem industrial
cultures)" (p. 324).

25

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There is some agreement that the "history of materialism" mirrors the rise
of the consumer society (e.g., Mason 1981; McCracken 1988; Mukerji 1983). From
this history, however, different authors draw different conclusions. Marx and
Veblen saw materialism as an evil of capitalism which required increasing
consumption to fuel the economic engines.4 Still others, such as Inglehart (1981),
connect materialism with times of economic want, and post-materialism with
times of economic security. Finally, writers in the social science tradition suggest
that materialism will always be present because of its integral role in negotiating
social networks and relationships and in attaining and maintaining status goals.
The form of materialism may shift with society, but it is always there.

The M eaning of Goods
Goods, possessions, have always had some meaning beyond the merely
utilitarian for the people who owned a n d /o r used them. Evidence for this
position is provided by the existence of "grave goods," or artifacts which are
buried with the dead. Elliott (1990) notes that over 100,000 years ago,
Neanderthals buried flowers, stone tools, and other simple objects w ith their
dead. The much more elaborate grave goods of the ancient Egyptians are well
known to us all. The thrust of this section is to illustrate how the meaning of
goods has shifted over time and the impact of that shift on Western cultures and
its implication for the study of materialism.

4

This statement is not as contradictory as it sounds. Marx disliked capitalism because it
forced the worker to sell their labor to capitalists who used that labor to enrich themselves and to
increase their power over workers. However, he did not take the position that in conforming to
the ways of the capitalist system, there was something wrong with the workers. He understood
the uses of goods in such a system and admitted that needs were socially determined. Thus Marx
damned the sin (capitalism) but not the sinner.
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Before the 16th century, the family (and one's obligation to the feudal
lord—or to those for whom one had feudal responsibility) was the repository of
value and values (e.g., McCracken 1988). The family and the feudal system
defined and sustained social stability. Meaning was passed from generation to
generation within the family. Goods were purchased for the family
corporation—an entity which existed before and which would exist after the life
of any single individual. Goods represented the family's identity and honor, and
an "important" family could be identified by its "old" goods (McCracken 1988).
Queen Elizabeth's government by consumption, however, altered the
situation dramatically (McCracken 1988). She spent lavishly and she forced her
nobles to leave their lands, to come to court, and to spend in a like manner. The
meaning of goods began to shift. Whereas before special possessions which over
time could acquire "patina" were prized, now items which were new and
fashionable became desirable.
Time passed. Society became more mobile, and city loyalties broke down.
Now, instead of status being assessed by one's family relationships, the reliable
way to assess status was through observation of an individual's possessions.
Before, status had been ascribed; now, it was achieved.5 Individual identity and
meaning were transferred from institutions, such as the family and feudal city, to
goods. "This connection between consumption and individualism, largely
wrought in the eighteenth century but b e g u n ... in the sixteenth century, is one of
the great cultural fusions of the modern world" (McCracken 1988, p. 20).
McCracken (1988) further suggests that this use of consumer goods 1) to
express social and cultural values, as well as 2) to be instruments of change is a
5

Though, as any consumer behavior or marketing text will point out, admission to the
upper-upper class in the U.S. is inherited wealth from a socially prominent family. If wealth and
position are earned in the current generation, then one is a member of the lower-upper class.
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phenomenon unique to Western civilization. This meaning transfer is linked with
the success of the industrial revolution. If goods had not taken on such
importance, the industrial revolution might not have been so successful.
Horowitz (1985) similarly traces the changes in thoughts of moralists who,
originally aligned with the church, warned the working classes about
over-reliance on worldly possessions. These same moralists, however, at the
time of the industrial revolution, aligned with the industrialists and exhorted the
working classes to consume (Horowitz 1985).
The industrial revolution, however, was not the only "revolution."
McCracken (1988) suggests that the consumer revolution which preceded it and
has continued after it "changed Western concepts of time, space, society, the
individual, the family, and the state" (p. 3). The changed concept of the
individual is discussed next.

Why Societies Became More Individualistic
A concurrent trend which facilitated the identity transfer from institutions
to possessions was the shift from collectivistic to individualistic societies. Bell
(1976) notes that "the fundamental assumption of modernity, the thread that has
run through Western Civilization since the 16th Century, is that the social unit of
society is not the group, the guild, the tribe, the city, but the person" (p. 16).
Triandis (1990; Triandis et al. 1988) explains why. As society allowed more
mobility and freedom to the individual, and as work became more specialized,
societies became more complex in terms of social networks and opportunities
available to the individual (or at least males). People were no longer likely to
belong to and to be subject to the influence of just a few groups. Instead, people
belonged to many different groups, and became less emotionally attached to them.
With greater specialization and complexity came greater conflict among the
28
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norms of various groups. One way to avoid conflicts was migration, which also
had the effect of reducing the control of the groups (Triandis 1990). Affluence
also resulted in more individualism. Financial independence meant freedom to
"do one's own thing" and more freedom from group influences (Triandis 1990;
Triandis et al. 1988).
The ascendancy of individualism in Europe after the 16th century, also
signaled the diminished importance of demographic attributes for identity
purposes (Baumeister 1986,1987). Instead, "identity is defined by what one has:
what I own, what experience I have had, w hat I have accomplished (e.g., my list
of publications!)" (Triandis 1990, p. 82). Different values also became important.
Pragmatism, hum an rights, freedom, competence, enjoyment, and pleasure are
valued by individualistic but not collectivistic societies (Schwartz and Bilsky
1987,1990). Thus was the groundwork for materialism laid.

Materialism and Individualism
As noted above, a common theme in accounts of the history of the meaning
of goods is the shift in industrialized societies from the tyranny of institutions to
the ascendancy of the individual. As long as institutions controlled meaning,
loyalty was to groups (family, church, etc.) and meaning (and status distinctions)
inhered in the groups (e.g., Douglas and Isherwood 1979; McCracken 1988). Once
individuals broke free from reliance on group membership for meaning and
status, however, these distinctions became more difficult to identify. Society
required a new means of self expression and identification. Goods became the
object of choice. The implication for materialism research may be illustrated by
considering the differences between individualistic and collectivistic societies.
Foa and Foa (1974) identified six kinds of resources that hum ans exchange:
love, status, services, money, information, and goods. The first three are
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characteristic of traditional cultures (their terminology) where the emphasis is on
people; the last three are characteristic of more modern complex cultures where
the emphasis is on tasks (Triandis 1990; Triandis et al. 1988). Based on studies of
three collectivist (Triandis' terminology) cultures (Indonesia, India, People's
Republic of China) and two individualist cultures (US and France) Triandis
(1990; Triandis et al. 1988) suggests that collectivists do a good job of exchanging
love, status, and services, while individualists do well when exchanging
information, money, and goods. Problems occur, however, when individualists
try to exchange services, love, and status in intimate, face-to-face relationships.
Accordingly, Triandis suggests that the defining attribute of individualism is not
self-reliance, as is often thought. Rather, distance from ingroups, much emotional
detachment from others, extreme lack of attention to the views of others,
relatively little concern for family, and tendency toward competition are factors
which define individualists.
Support for this position also comes from Hofstede (1984) who found that
individualism accounted for most of the variance in a factor analysis of value
data across cultures. He considered four value dimensions: power distance (the
emotional dependence on more powerful people), how societies deal with the
uncertainty of the future, individualism versus collectivism (the individual's
dependence on the group), and masculinity versus femininity. Overall, Hofstede
found that items measuring individualism and power distance, which correlated
with individualism at -.67, combined on the first factor to account for 24 percent
of the variance in values. Earlier, when Mezei (1974) factor analyzed the
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) values, he found that an individualistic—
traditional dimension had strong explanatory power for the economic and
community relations problems presented in the value survey.
It seems warranted, then, to hypothesize that individualists are more likely
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to have trouble with relationships and to be more comfortable dealing with
things (possessions), in short, to exhibit the tendencies which have been
attributed to materialists. That individualism and materialism should be
associated has already been explained by the historical analysis which links the
rise of individualism with the rise of the consumer culture. However, while
individualists may also be materialistic, all materialists may not be
individualistic—especially since, as discussed in the first chapter, materialists are
thought to be very attentive to the thoughts and ideas of others.
Thus far, the discussion has suggested that individualistic cultures are more
likely to be materialistic and collectivist cultures less so. There is evidence,
however, that this dichotomy is not necessarily true. For example, in
investigating materialism cross-culturally, Ger and Belk (1990) found that the
Turkish students, from a collectivistic culture, were much more materialistic than
the U.S. or any of the European student groups who were from much more
individualistic cultures. At the same time, the Turkish students exhibited lower
levels of nongenerosity than any of the others. Ger and Belk (1990) suggest that
the explanation for these results may be that materialism and collectivism are not
polar opposites if the desire for material goods is extended to the family instead
of the individual. They opine that the conceptualization of materialism m ight be
thought of as desiring possessions for some unit. In some cultures the unit is the
individual, in others, the family.
Now that historical and definitional concerns have been addressed, the next
issue is how to conceptualize and measure materialism. Two intertwined streams
of research will be reviewed. The first stream is the development of reliable, valid
scales to measure materialism. The second is an investigation of the attitudes and
behaviors which are consistent with a materialistic life-style.
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MATERIALISM SCALES

Early Scale Development
Early measures of materialism truly are a "mixed bag." They span the
disciplines of political science, psychology, and marketing. N o one theoretical
conceptualization of materialism drives the research. As a result, each instrument
addresses different aspects of materialism, with none taking into account the
multidimensional nature of materialism discussed in the first chapter. Further,
some measures are primarily concerned with societal rather than individual
manifestations of materialism; others have been developed for children rather
than adults. And, finally, reflecting the standards of different disciplines and
different times, not all measures have been fully reported in the literature.
Occasionally, only sample scale items have been made available. Nevertheless, a
brief review of some of the more often noted instruments is warranted since they
provide a prologue to the two measures developed within the marketing
discipline which are the focus of this study.
Campbell. One of the early materialism scales was developed by Campbell
(1966) as one of six scales to measure social attitudes. The scale assesses attitudes
toward materialism in society with an eight-item, forced-choice format. This
scale is presented in Figure 1. No research seems to have been reported about the
use of this scale (Belk 1985; Robinson and Shaver 1973).
Inglehart. Another instrument which addresses social attitudes associated
with materialism has been developed by Inglehart (1971,1977,1981). This value
survey has been much praised for being one of the few value measures which is
theory driven (Braithwaite and Scott 1991) and which has been subjected to
longitudinal testing (Richins and Dawson 1992). Inglehart, and others, have been
studying the social values and national goals held by citizens of European
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Figure 1
Campbell's Materialism Scale

1.

A. "A loaf of bread, a jug of wine..." this epitomizes all the material requirements for
personal happiness.
B. "A loaf of bread and a jug of wine" may have been alright [sic] for someone w ho hasn't
known anything else, but let's face it; in twentieth century America w e approach
happiness as the carpet gets thicker and the steaks less "rare." *

2.

A. My philosophy is: to have or to have not is the question, and if I'm lucky enough to
have, I'm going to enjoy it. *
B. To have wealth and material goods is not more conducive to happiness than to have
debts and cancer.

3.

A. An orderly, uncluttered house and a w ell-kept lawn w ill be important features of my
future home. *
B. I'm frankly not really interested in how m y physical surroundings w ill be disposed in
m y future home.

4.

A. The joys which wealth and material possessions bring are superficial and short-term as
compared to the real joys in life.
B. The only people who can say "money can't buy happiness" are those who never had a
chance to try. *

5.

A. A society that worships such extravagances as "golfmobiles" and all electric kitchens is
indeed a "sick" society.
B. If things were such that everybody in the world had stereophonic record players and
champagne, wars would probably be obsolete. *

6.

A. To conjecture upon the size of one's starting salary when leaving college is a natural
tendency on the part of a m odem college student. *
B. A person with a "healthy" value system rarely if ever reflects on his future salary.

7.

A. Neatness and physical appearance of my like-sexed friends are entirely accidental in
terms of my associations.
B. Important determinants in my choice of like-sexed friends in my living group at college
are physical attractiveness and stylishness of dress. *

8.

A. A place for everything and everything in it's place is a good maxim to abide by. *
B. Although cleanliness is important in material things, order, per se, bores me.

D. Campbell (1966). Unpublished papers, Department of Psychology,
Northwestern University. Reported in John P. Robinson and Phillip R. Shaver
(1974), Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes, Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for
Social Research.
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nations (primarily Germany), the United States, Canada, and Japan. Inglehart
works from his thesis, first developed in the 1970s (Inglehart 1971), that the
values held by citizens of industrialized nations are moving from materialism to
post-materialism. This concept was shaped in large part by the needs hierarchy
proposed by Maslow (Inglehart 1981, p. 881). That is, as nations advance
economically, citizens no longer focus on developing a comfortable standard of
living (materialistic goals). Instead, they direct their concern toward other social
and political issues such as peace and the environment (post-materialistic goals).
Inglehart (1971,1981) developed an instrument to measure materialism in
which respondents are asked to order twelve goals (or values) from m ost to least
important. This list of goals is presented in Figure 2. Materialistic goals include
fighting crime and inflation, and maintaining a stable economy. Post-materialistic
goals, on the other hand, are concerned with giving people more say in
governmental decisions, making cities more beautiful, and moving toward a
society where ideas count more than money.
As Richins and Dawson (1992) explain, the primary problem with using
Inglehart's value survey to measure individual materialism is that the instrum ent
focuses on social rather than individual goals. These goals are "not likely to have
large influences on day-to-day consumption choices" (p. 306). Additionally,
Inglehart's survey does not provide a measure of the "complex,
multidimensional nature of materialism" (Richins and Dawson 1992, p. 306).
Still, the measure is useful in that it does provide some assessment of attitudes
toward money.
Ward and Wackman; Moschis and Churchill. In investigating the
influence of the family and the media (specifically television commercials) on
adolescent consumer learning, Ward and Wackman (1971) developed a six-item
scale to measure materialistic attitudes. This scale was p art of a larger overall set
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Figure 2
Inglehart's M aterialist and Post-M aterialist Values

Maintain order in the nation. *
Give people more say in the decisions of the government.
Fight rising prices. *
Protect freedom of speech.
Maintain a high rate of economic growth. *
Make sure that this country has strong defense forces. *
Give people more say in how things are decided at work and in
their community.
Try to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.
Maintain a stable economy. *
Fight against crime. *
Move toward a friendlier, less impersonal society.
Move toward a society where ideas count more than money.

* A materialistic value/goal.

Ronald Inglehart (1981), "Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity,"
American Political Science Review, 75 (December), 880-900.
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of thirteen measures (scales, indices, and open-ended questions) which were
used to assess various factors influencing how adolescents learn to be consumers.
In this research, materialism is defined as "an orientation which views material
goods and money as important for personal happiness and social progress"
(1971, p. 422). Only a representative item for each scale is provided. For the
materialism scale the item is, "It's really true that money can buy happiness."
In their research program into the consumer socialization and learning of
adolescents, Moschis and Churchill (1978), Churchill and Moschis (1979), and
Moschis and Moore (1982) adopted the theoretical foundation and
methodological approach initiated by Ward and Wackman. They expanded the
research design to incorporate thirteen scales to measure variables such as
materialism, knowledge of consumer affairs, television viewing, and peer
communications about consumption. The materialism scale was the same as that
used by W ard and Wackman. Unfortunately, no specific scale items were
reported in this research either.
Yamauchi and Templer. In what would seem to be a more direct
antecedent to the Belk and the Richins and Dawson scales, Yamauchi and
Templer (1982) explored the relationship between money and psychology.
Acknowledging that money is a dominant feature of m odern life, they trace the
interests of psychologists from Freud to Fromm in the relationship between
money and hum an behavior. They lament, however, that this area is
under-studied in psychology because of a lack of a standardized instrument for
assessing "money behavior" (p. 522). To fill the void, they developed an
instrument to measure attitudes toward money, the Money Attitude Scale
(MAS). From a sample of 300 adults living in Los Angeles and Fresno, California,
they generated 62 items which were reduced to four factors representing
attitudes toward money. The scale is presented in Figure 3. While scale items
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address the use of money for power and prestige and address anxieties
connected with having and spending money, they do not measure attitudes
about possessions. The first factor measures the use of money to impress and
influence others — money as an indicator of success. The second factor measures
attitudes toward financial planning for the future. The third factor addresses
attitudes toward money situations — are people suspicious and doubtful or
trusting and accepting of situations involving money. The fourth and final factor
measures whether or not money is a source of anxiety and worry. The advance
provided by the MAS is the connection of money with prestige and status and
the measure of individual attitudes which might be expected to correlate more
directly with behavior. Still, however, the scale does not address possessions
directly—and that is the focus of the two scales used in this study.
Others. More recently, Tashchian, Slama, and Tashchian (1984) developed
a scale to measure social attitudes similar to the ones of interest to Inglehart
(1971). Materialism is measured along with attitudes toward material growth
and toward energy conservation. Finally, Richins and Dawson report (1992) that
an additional scale which incorporates materialism is under development by
Heslin, Johnson, and Black. While the overall focus of the work is on measuring
spending versus saving, a six-item measure of materialism is included in their
work (Richins and Dawson 1992).

Scale Development in Marketing
Recent work on developing materialism scales has been more focused and
driven by theoretical considerations. It has proceeded with the assumption that
materialism is a multidimensional construct which cannot be adequately
assessed with single measures. Belk (1984,1985) began the process. He offered a
scale to measure the materialistic tendencies, or personality traits, of individuals,
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by considering traits of possessiveness, nongenerosity, and envy. In later
research Ger and Belk (1990,1993) extended the scale to include a fourth trait of
tangibility—now termed "preservation." Richins and Dawson, however, while
agreeing that materialism is a complex construct, conceive of it as a value. W ith
this orientation they developed a scale (1990,1992) which measures three
domains of the value "materialism": centrality of acquisitions, acquisitions
leading to happiness, and acquisitions as definitions of success.
It may not be necessary to "take sides" on the trait/value debate, since
personality traits are inextricably bound up with values (Braithwaite and Scott
1991; Kreitler and Kreitler 1990). An emphasis on values, though, does not carry
with it the significant problems of personality and behavior research outlined by
Kassarjian and Sheffet (1981). They report that personality inventories relevant to
consumer behavior are not readily available or applicable (too often they address
deviant personality types), that the relationship between personality and specific
consumer behaviors (such as product choice a n d /o r use) has little theoretical
justification, and finally, that only a few studies report statistically significant
findings.
Further, Triandis (1990) suggests that measuring personality in conjunction
with behavior may be difficult. He draws on Doi's (1986) idea that people have a
public and a private self. In collectivist societies, the public and private selves are
kept quite separate and only the public self is "shown." In more individualistic
societies, the public and private selves are interrelated because the private self is
allowed more expression; still, people may be concerned with doing the right
thing. Thus, in either society, measuring personality is likely to be fraught with
dangers if the interest is to try to determine behavior from personality. As part of
the private self, personality is either totally hidden (collectivist societies) or
partially hidden (individualistic societies).
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Finally, Rokeach (1968) suggests that while personality factors will give rise
to variations in individual value systems, cultural, institutional, and social factors
"will nevertheless restrict such variations to a reasonably small number of
dimensions" (p. 161). Consequently, the value orientation seems warranted.
While each scale will be discussed below, a fuller discussion of the empirical tests
and criticisms of each is presented in Chapter Three.

THE BELK MATERIALISM SCALE (1984,1985; Ger and Belk 1990,1993)
Belk conceives of materialism in two ways. First, he suggests that it is a
complex second-order construct which can be measured via three correlated
first-order constructs of possessiveness, "the inclination and tendency to retain
control or ownership of one's possessions" (Belk 1984); nongenerosity, "an
unwillingness to give possessions to or share possessions with others" (Belk
1984); and envy, "a desire for others' possessions... [and resentment of] those
who own the desired possessions" (Belk 1984). [A fourth subscale, tangibility,
was added later; see page 42.] A second conceptualization is that materialism is a
single-factor construct which may adequately be measured with the aggregation
of the subscales (Belk 1985). Specific information about the reliability and validity
of the overall scale and subscales is presented in Chapter Three. What is of
interest here is how the scale has been used by other researchers to investigate
materialism in various settings. While the focus of this dissertation is on
materialism in the United States, research conducted outside the U.S. is included
in this survey, in the interest of completeness.

Cross-cultural Measures of Materialism
Dawson and Bamossy (1990) suggest that differences in consumption
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patterns between countries with different economic and cultural structures are to
be expected. Of more interest, however, would be an investigation of differences
in materialism between two countries which are relatively similar. For the study
they selected the U.S. and the Netherlands. Because of differences in social,
religious, and political structures, they expected materialism to be higher in The
Netherlands. To investigate this hypothesis, the authors utilized Belk's
materialism scales.
Both Dutch and American envy scales achieved adequate internal
consistency (Alphas of .81 and .76, respectively). The Dutch nongenerosity scale
indicated lower reliability (.46) than did the American (.63), while reliability of
the Dutch possessiveness scale was higher (.68) than the American (.53). Overall
aggregate materialism measures also were low (.61 for the Dutch sample and .62
for the American). Because of these initial results, the authors caution against
drawing too strong a conclusion from the study.
More specifically, the results of ANOVA analysis indicated that the most
significant differences in materialism between the two samples was in
possessiveness. Respondents did not differ significantly on measures of envy,
nongenerosity, or on overall aggregate measures of materialism. The authors also
included measures of life satisfaction in their study. As reported by others, envy
was the only materialism sub-construct which was strongly (and negatively)
related to life satisfaction. Accordingly, Dawson and Bamossy conclude, "these
differences in scale means perhaps challenge the unidimensionality of the
summary materialism scale when conducting cross-cultural studies" (p. 183).
An interesting aspect of this study was in the explanation for the higher
possessiveness of the Dutch sample. While the U.S. may have a throw-away
society, the Dutch tend to hold on to their possessions longer. The authors report
that garage sales and second-hand markets such as swap meets and flea markets
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are virtually non-existent in the Netherlands. They conclude that "in a w orld of
topped-off land fills, 'possessiveness' may not deserve the negative connotation
often associated with 'materialism'" (Dawson and Bamossy 1990, p. 184).
Research by Wallendorf and Arnould (1988) and Rudmin (1988) suggests
that Belk's materialism scales may be more appropriate for the United States than
other cultures, especially those in developing nations. To remedy the situation,
Belk sought to modify his scales to facilitate cross-cultural investigation of
materialism (Ger and Belk 1990,1993). In the 1990 study, factor analysis of data
from university students in the U.S. and Turkey, as well as students from
England, France and Germany attending an international institution in France,
yielded four factors. In addition to the three previously established factors of
possessiveness, nongenerosity, and envy, a fourth, which came to be called
"tangibility" emerged. Tangibility is defined as "the conversion of experience
into material form. Taking pictures during a vacation, keeping souvenirs, and
taking slides of places visited and showing them to friends are examples" (Ger
and Belk 1990, p. 186). Ger and Belk (1990) report that even with the revised
scales, the result is "more reliable in the United States and Europe than in
Turkey" (p. 188). Within Turkey, reliabilities are higher for students from
Istanbul than from the countryside, reflecting the penetration of Western
products and communications in the more cosmopolitan areas of the country.
Ger and Belk (1990) conclude that the expression of materialism is not
consistent across cultures. For example, Turkish students were the most
materialistic overall, being the most possessive, envious and tangibilizing, but
yet the most generous. U.S. students "placed" second on envy and, along with
England and France, on tangibility. They also were the most nongenerous.
Among Europeans, German students were the least materialistic, scoring lowest
on the envy, tangibility, and nongenerosity subscales.
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In more recent cross-cultural research, Ger and Belk (1993) once again
modified the scale after a series of focus group discussions in thirteen countries.
Among other changes, the tangibility subscale was renamed "preservation, "the
conversion of experience into material form" (Ger and Belk 1993). As before,
findings of materialism varied from one country to another as did the reliability
of the scale. Ger and Belk (1993) suggest that it is not surprising that there are
trade offs to be made in pursuit of a truly international scale, since meanings of
materialism seem to differ among countries. They conclude that while "the basic
dimensions [of materialism] are relatively similar" across cultures, the
"particular events arousing the issues of concern, or behaviors or feelings
underlying the dimensions" differ (p. 10). Specific results from this study are
presented in Chapter Three when this revised scale, which is used for this study,
is discussed.

M aterialism and Attachment to Possessions
Ball and Tasaki (1992) hypothesize that there is a difference between
materialism, which refers to the importance of possessions generally, and
attachment, which is centered on specific possessions owned to develop and
maintain one's self-concept. Referring to Belk's scales of possessiveness,
nongenerosity, and envy, they suggest that none of these "imply that
materialistic people should use possession for the purpose of maintaining a
concept of self and nonmaterialistic people should not" (Ball and Tasaki 1992, p.
160). Even though possessions are generally important to materialistic
individuals, they are not expected to use all their possessions to support their self
concept. And conversely, even nonmaterialists are expected to be attached to
some of the things they own. Among their many hypotheses about attachment,
the authors theorize that little relationship should be expected between
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materialism and attachment. In the study, the authors used 16 of Belk's 24 items
and added four of their own. Item analysis of the group of twenty suggested that
only 16 should be retained. Cronbach Alpha for the overall 16-item scale w as .76,
roughly similar to Alphas of .66, .73, and .68 obtained by Belk with his original
scale. As expected, attachment does not correlate with materialism.

THE RICHINS AND DAWSON SCALE (1990,1992)
The initial Richins and Dawson scale was not reported until the 1989
Association for Consumer Research conference. This early seven-item scale has
been used in some research, but results have not been widely reported. Where it
has been employed, however, the results have been favorable. For example,
Othm an (1989) reports superior results with this scale than with Belk's. Cole et al.
(1992) report similar findings, detailed above.
More recently, Richins and Dawson (1992) have undertaken extensive scale
development efforts to develop and test a valid, reliable materialism scale. Like
Belk's, the revised scale is built on the assumption that materialism is a
multidimensional construct and ought to be measured accordingly. A review of
the literature as well as the results an eleven-person focus group generated an
initial pool of items which was refined and factor analyzed. Consistent w ith their
theorizing, three subscales emerged. They measure the centrality of acquisitions
in a person's life, the extent to which happiness is defined by acquisitions, and
the extent to which success is defined by acquisitions.
While specific information about scale reliability and validity are presented
in Chapter Three, it should be noted here that the early findings are quite
positive. With these results, one might reasonably conclude that the Richins and
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Dawson scale can confidently be adopted for further research.
Having addressed materialism, the discussion next turns to a consideration
of the self, which is followed by a concluding section on materialism and the self.

THE SELF
In this section, the discuss turns to a consideration of the impact of
materialism on a person's self identity, on selfhood. First, the term "self" is
defined and then a brief history of how this definition of the self, in Western
societies, came to be is presented. The historical discussion reveals that as culture
changed, so did the concept of the self. Accordingly, the next topic is the role of
culture in self definition. That discussion, in turn, provides a springboard for a
more specific investigation of the role of possessions in self identity. Finally, the
discussion turns to a consideration of materialism and the self. The relationship
between materialism and each of four constructs is explored: self-esteem,
self-actualization, intrinsic/extrinsic motivation, and self-monitoring. These
relationships later form the basis for the research hypotheses for this study.

W hat Is the Self?
It is always appropriate to begin with an understanding of the
terminology—in this case, the "self." In 1982 Sirgy reviewed the consumer
behavior literature which addressed the "self" and found it to be "fragmented,
incoherent, and highly diffuse." Worse, much of the research seemed not to be
guided by theory, and measures of the self which were used often had no
theoretical basis. These conclusions are not unique to the consumer behavior
field. In 1974 and again in 1979, Wylie evaluated psychological and sociological
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studies of self-concept and self-esteem. She found that most of the self-concept
measures "had been used only once or a few times, precluding evaluation of their
adequacy and interpretation of the results of studies based on them" (Wylie 1989,
p. 1). Further, of the fourteen instruments which had been subjected to more than
one test, several were "judged to be seriously deficient [on psychometric criteria]
and hence not to be recommended" (Wylie 1989, p. 1). In 1989, she again made a
careful review of the more recent research in the two disciplines and came to the
same dismal conclusions. After reviewing available literature on the reliability
and convergent validity of various instruments, she was able to select only ten
measures of the self-concept for recommendation (though two other measures
under development also looked promising). The point here is that while there is
a great deal of literature on the self, one m ust use caution in selecting from
among it. Wylie herself explains that part of the problem "lies in the vague state
of theorizing in the self-concept domain" (1989, p. 2), a problem not uncommon
in social science research when we try to provide labels for processes which
cannot be observed. As Cohen (1989) observes, labels are not explanations.
W hat is meant by the term "self"? Many researchers (c.f. Hill and Stamey
1990; Johnson 1985; Richins 1991; Sirgy 1982) reference Rosenberg's (1979, p. 7)
definition of the self-concept as the "totality of the individual's thoughts and
feelings having reference to himself as an object." Within this framework, the self
has often been treated as multidimensional. Belk (1988a) acknowledges that "the
particular num ber o f ... levels of self is an open question—Rappaport (1981)
suggests that there are four levels of self, Atkin (1981) seven, and Feldman (1979)
11" (p. 152). For his own work, Belk (1988a) addresses four levels of the self, the
individual (myself as my self), the family (myself as a member of my family), the
community (myself as a community member), and the group (myself as a group
member). The first of these is an individualistic conception of the self, the last
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three collectivistic conceptions. Freud, of course, identified three aspects, the ego,
the id, and the super ego. Allport (1961) suggested eight categories of the self,
ranging from the self as knower, to the self as a fighter for ends, to the self as a
cognitive processor. Sirgy (1982) identifies three dimensions of the self as being
common to many researchers: the actual self (how a person perceives
him/herself), the ideal self (how a person would like to perceive him /herself),
and the social self (how a person presents him /herself to others). In other
research, Sirgy (1980) has added an additional dimension of the ideal social self
(how a person would like to present him /herself to others). More recently,
Greenwald (1988) has suggested four facets of the self: the diffuse self, the public
self, the private self, and the collective self. And Greene and Geddes (1988) have
suggested that researchers should consider the self as "modular" w ith different
modules (or what they call "nodes") being activated, or brought to the front, in
different situations. Finally Sampson (1978) suggested "location of identity" as a
way to cut across the various levels, facets, and selves which had been proposed
by other researchers. He suggested that some people define themselves more in
terms of externally located characteristics, while others employ more internally
located characteristics in self identity.
In another tradition, formed mainly by the phenomenological
psychologists, the self is thought of as the nucleus of a more general conceptual
system. Here, the self is often referred to as the "self-system." Proponents of this
perspective are Lecky (1969), Snygg and Combs (1949), but the best know n is
Carl Rogers (1951,1961). Rogers' basic theory is that the individual is the center
of a continually changing world of experience. For him, the self is "an organized,
fluid, but consistent conceptual pattern of perceptions of characteristics and
relationship of the T or the 'm e/ together with values attached to these
concepts" (1951, p. 498). All these theorists stress the unity of the self.
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The question arises, then, of which perspective to adopt, a unidimensional
or a multidimensional perspective? Gergen (1971) offers some rapprochement
between the two perspectives.
The way in which we talk about a person's concept or view of
himself suggests that we largely think of the self in the singular....
Y et... if a person is asked to describe himself he will typically use a
large num ber of different concepts.... Former President Lyndon
Johnson once described himself as a "free man, an American, a
United States Senator, a Democrat, a liberal, a conversative [sic], a
Texan, a taxpayer, a rancher, and not as young as I used to be nor
as old as I expect to be" (pp. 19 - 20).
Epstein (1980) continues with the thought that the "many selves are incorporated
into a unified overall self-system" (p. 119). Further, while the self aims at overall
consistency within the system, it never succeeds, for there will always be
contradictory elements. Epstein (1980) concludes, "The argum ent of whether
there is one self or there are many selves is, in a way, reminiscent of the older
argument of whether intelligence is general or specific. The answer turned out to
be that it is both" (p. 119).
Agreeing w ith Belk (1988a) that there is no agreement about the number of
levels (or facets, or dimensions) of the self, this study will adopt a more global
perspective suggested by Brewster Smith (1985) that most of these labels and
conceptions are culture- and tim e-bound and may often reflect differences in
disciplinary traditions and semantics rather than differences in concepts. He
suggests that we m ight think of the "self" not as some concrete, substantive
entity, but rather as the collection of the universal features of being a person. He
cites reflexive self-awareness as both the primary feature of being human and
that which w arrants the term selfhood. H e objects to terminology about the self
which implies a "surgically or conceptually separable object of reference—other
than the person." Actually, he also objects to the use of the word "self" in any way
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other to "treat it as synonymous with the person" (p. 61). It is in this light that
Baumeister (1986,1987) is able to trace the history of "the self" from Medieval
times to the present. It is in this tradition that Cushman (1990) can ponder "Why
the Self Is Empty." In fact, the authors noted above who address various
dimensions of the self begin and end their discussions with the more global
references to the "self." It is this perspective which guides the work here. The
investigation focuses on the materialist as a person, on materialism and selfhood.
W hat do we know, then, about the self? As Smith (1985) and others have
said, the modern conception of selfhood is quite different from that of other eras.
To p u t the discussion in perspective, a brief historical review of the self is
presented next.

"H ow the Self Became a Problem" (Baumeister 1986,1987)
Believing that the self is a social construction and hence an artifact of the
culture in which it is created, various authors have tracked changes in the
concept of self over time and from one culture to another. The investigation has
been conducted using historical records as well as literature. The presentation
here is limited to a discussion of the self in Western societies. While different
authors draw their lines of demarcation at different dates and events in history,
w hat follows is an attempt to draw them all together using the historical eras
proposed by Baumeister (1986,1987). The review begins w ith the early Greeks,6
then moves to Medieval Europe, then the "early modern" times of the 16th
through 18th centuries. From there the more recent history of the Puritans, the
Romantic era of the late 18th and early 19th century, the Victorian period (mid

6The discussion begins with the Greek civilization since it was, as Durant (1939) so
eloquently puts it, "the bright morning of that Western civilization which, with all its kindred
faults, is our nourishment and our life" (p. 671). Owens (1959) also traces "the beginnings of
Western philosophy in the genuine sense" to the Greeks (p. 5).
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and late 19th century), and then both the early and the late 20th century are
addressed. What emerges from this journey is a recognition that our focus on the
importance of the individual and on individual fulfillment (self-actualization) is
a relatively recent phenomenon.
The Greeks. The discussion begins with a personal note. As a college
student I took a number of courses on Greek history and literature. The professor
often spoke about the Greek's psychology and their underdeveloped view of the
self and self responsibility. Greek psychology explained the almost personal
relationship the Greek heroes seemed to have with the gods. It also accounted for
why there were so many gods. The early Greeks did not believe that an
individual alone could accomplish much of anything. Whatever someone did,
whether heroic or not, was accomplished with the aid and assistance of a god.
Thus The Iliad begins with a feud between Achilles and Agamemnon, a quarrel
which was not of their own making, but which was the "fault" of the god Apollo
(Homer 1966). So also, one didn't get drunk, but rather Dionysus entered one's
body! In reading about the self for this study, I once again came upon this
concept—much to my delight, for I had not found any references to it, beyond
class notes, since my college days. In discussing the stories of the Greek poets,
Smith (1985) refers to the "constant intrusion" of the gods when some course of
action was necessary. Morris (1972) agrees, citing the example of the Oedipus
story in which the "personal character of Oedipus is really irrelevant to his
misfortunes, which were decreed by fate irrespective of his own desires" (p. 4).
Certainly the contemporary concept of self was not held by the Greeks.
M edieval Europe. Neither was it present in the late Medieval period when
Christianity held sway and "self" was synonymous with "soul." Aries (1981)
points out that in early Christian beliefs, salvation was collective. Weintraub
(1978) provides further evidence of the collective conception of the self by noting
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that during the Middle Ages the only autobiography he could find w as by
Petrarch (in the 14th century). The thrust of Petrarch's work, however, was to
compare himself with others and not to discover his own individuality. Medieval
people had clear guidelines from the church about self-fulfillment—which was
to work toward salvation. And it was the same for everyone. Further, the social
hierarchy was fixed. Nisbet (1973) notes that beliefs in this regard were
influenced by St. Augustine who wrote that God had assigned each person a
fixed place in society. This belief, coupled with the lack of a sense of an inner self,
led medieval people to equate the person with h is/h er public, visible actions and
appearances (Trilling 1971).
The Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries. By the 16th century, the
beginnings of the m odem era, a shift from a religious to a scientific view of the
w orld had begun. People started believing in a separate self—but believed it to
be hidden. Accordingly, they became obsessed with knowing the inner selves of
others, with deception and pretense (Trilling 1971). One finds ample evidence of
this interest in the plays of Shakespeare, which are rife with people not being
whom they appear to be. During this time (from the 16th to the 18th centuries),
Christianity began to lose its hold on society. According to MacIntyre (1981),
morality was now just a set of rules, with no particular legitimatizing force
behind it. Further, he suggests, the demise of traditional Christian morality
brought with it an end to the view that a person was obligated to act according to
his rank and station in life. With this increased social mobility, the implication for
the self was that a person was "thought of as an individual prior to and apart
from all roles" (MacIntyre 1981, p. 56). In examining the history of food, table
manners, and household arrangements, Tuan (1982) notes that during this time
individual chairs replaced benches for seating, mirrors were found in most
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households for the first time, and private spaces and rooms started to become
features of houses.
The Puritans. With Puritanism, the interest in knowing about the inner self
shifted to an interest in knowing about one's own inner self. The doctrine of
predestination helped foster this interest. "Puritans became self-conscious to an
unprecedented degree" as they tried to learn if they were one of "the Elect"
(Baumeister 1987, p. 165). For the Puritans, self-fulfillment came from good,
honest hard work, with success in work often being taken as a sign that one was
a member of the elect (Weber 1958).
The Romantic Era. Moving to the Romantic era, the individual ascended in
importance. Emphasis was placed on each person's uniqueness and individual
destiny. Secular notions of self-fulfillment on earth replaced heavenly salvation.
During this time "personality (rather than social rank or roles) came to be
increasingly regarded as a, even the, central aspect of the self" (Baumeister 1987,
p. 166). Literary evidence for this fascination is found in biographies which
began to focus more on personal information. The lives of artists, w ho were
thought to live particularly rich inner lives (Altick 1965), were a specific
fascination. In this period, conflict between the individual and society also came
to be a theme of literature and politics (Trilling 1950). "Beginning w ith Rousseau
and continuing throughout the Romantic period, the forms of society were
blamed for personal nonfulfillment" (Baumeister 1987, p. 169).
The Victorian Era. In the Victorian era, the hidden self once again was of
great interest. "Habits of self-scrutiny ... combined with impossibly high moral
standards, forced Victorians to become self-deceptive" (Baumeister 1987, p. 166).
The Victorians were quite concerned that the inner self might be involuntarily
revealed, so they always had to be on their guard. The self, while still individual,
was perceived as "deep, secret, instinct-driven, and potentially dangerous"
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(Cushman 1990, p. 600). In the U.S. near the middle of the 19th century,
transcendentalism emerged as a dominant literary and philosophical theme. In
this perspective, society was regarded as a necessary evil. One had to "to it
alone" for self-fulfillment. Thoreau was perhaps the archetypal example.
(Baumeister 1986,1987).
The Twentieth Century. By the early 20th century, however, alienation
had become a dominant literary theme (Cushman 1990). The idea that a person
could ever reach fulfillment in either this life or the next was rejected. These
attitudes may have been produced, in part at least, by the industrial revolution.
Baumeister (1987) explains that society was still viewed as blocking individual
self-fulfillment. Industrialization had caused one's economic livelihood to be
even more dependent on society, so that fulfillment independent of society, as
the transcendentalists had advocated, was not feasible.
In more contemporary times, post World War n, emphasis still is placed on
the individual, and self-actualization is almost a societal goal.7 However, some
writers have lamented that the total immersion of the individual in society,
especially in a consumer culture (e.g. Fox and Lears 1983; Fromm 1955,1976),
may m ean that the possibility for true individuality is vanishing. The
"fragmented self" became a common term (c.f. Kilbourne 1987,1991; Lasch 1979;
Leiss 1976). And Cushman (1990) laments that the modem self is "empty"
because of a loss of a sense of community and tradition—a theme also found in
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981), Rochberg-Halton (1986), and
H alton (1992). Others, however, have suggested that people must find an
accommodation with society (Klein 1964). Sampson (1988) reports that American
society still remains committed to the idea of self-contained individualism as the
7

As an illustration of societal interest in the individual and the self, Blascovich and
Tomaka (1991) note that the state of California established a Commission on Self-Esteem.
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way to realize personal freedom and independence, maintain socially
Q

responsible behavior, and allow people to achieve to the best of their potential.
Psychologists use the term "indigenous psychology" (Cushman 1990;
Sampson 1988) when they speak of a particular culture's understanding of what
is necessary to be truly human. W hat remains to be addressed, then, is a fuller
consideration of culture's role in self identity.

Culture and the Self
Descartes was wrong (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981). The
mind and the body are not separate entities. In fact, they are inextricably linked.
How is it that we know our "self"? We know about our "self" through an
inferential process. Thus, Descartes was also right—when he said that he knew
he existed because he could perceive himself thinking. Kant opined that
Descartes really could not have inferred his existence from observing that he was
thinking because to make that observation, he first had to exist! Nonetheless,
Descartes made a valuable contribution in suggesting that we know about
ourselves by drawing inferences from empirical evidence.
Working with the idea of inference, Kant (1929) explained that we can
never know our "real" self, our "noumenal self"—but that we can know our
phenomenological self. That is, I know myself by perceiving my own acts of
perception. My self is not something I come to know in isolation. I come to know
of my self in relation to the world which I perceive. Knowledge of my self is
mediated over time by physical cues in the world.
So, if we know ourselves through our perceptions, w hat do we know about

Q

Sampson (1988), himself, however, doubts that these goals can be achieved unless society
returns to a more collective form of individualism, which he terms "ensembled individualism."
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ourselves? We return to Descartes for an answer. A contemporary of Descartes,
Gassendi, took him to task for thinking that a person's mind could be thought of
as pure rationality: "Tell me frankly, do you not derive the very sound you utter
i n ... saying [I think, therefore 1 am] from the society in which you have lived?
And, since the sounds you utter are derived from intercourse with other men, are
not the meanings of sounds derived from the same source?" (Mumford 1970, p.
82). The answer to the question of what we know of ourselves is that we know of
ourselves from our world and from our culture.
The culture in which we are raised sets the guidelines and parameters for
our knowledge and our interest. What we know of our selves and of others is a
constructive enterprise (e.g., Berger and Luckman 1967), constructed by the
people and institutions of the culture in which we live. As one anthropologist
points out, "Man can be characterized as an obsessive creator of meaning
systems" (Barley 1989, p. 41). One of the meaning systems we create is our
"selves."
As has been discussed, the notion of the uniqueness of each individual is a
rather recent concept in the Western world. In the not too distant past, people's
identify was tied to the groups to which they belonged. Identity was ascribed,
being based on inherited position (Belk 1984; Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg-Halton 1981; Dittmar 1992). The rationale for the "tyranny" of the
group is explained by Douglas and Isherwood (1979). When groups, such as the
church and government, held the power, they could lay claim to taking the long
view for the benefit of society (and for the benefit of the particular organization).
Any single individual simply was incapable of making this same claim since
individual lives are much shorter than institutional "lives." Accordingly,
consumption could be proscribed to be carried out by and on behalf of the
organization or group instead of the individual. Individual consumption was,
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thereby, held to a minimum. Because consumption options were so restricted,
objects were relatively unavailable for helping to define the individual self. In
more recent times, however, when self identify is achieved, people came to be
defined by what they have instead of their kinship (Dittmar 1992). Objects
became im portant to persons for more than their functional uses.
What then is the relationship between the self and possessions? Perhaps the
most widely quoted (c.f. Baumeister 1986,1987; Belk 1988a; Csikszentmihalyi
and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Dittmar 1992; Lunt and Livingstone 1993; RochbergHalton 1986) description of this relationship is provided by William James.
The Empirical Self of each of us is all that he is tempted to c a ll... me.
But it is clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply
calls mine the line is difficult to draw. We feel and act about certain
things that are ours very much as we feel and act about ourselves
.... In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self is the sum total of
what he C A N call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but
his clothes and his house,... his reputation and works, his lands
and horses, and yacht and bank account.... If they wax and prosper,
he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast
down. (1890/1981, p. 279 - 280, emphases in the original).
James draws the link not only between the self and possessions, but also the
link between evaluation of the self and possessions. The same position has been
articulated more recently by Tuan (1980) who suggests that our "fragile sense of
self needs support, and this we get by having and possessing things because, to a
large degree, we are what we have and possess" (p. 472). This idea of the
symbolic use of objects, of course, is not new with James or Tuan. As
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) point out, anthropologists have
"accumulated incredibly detailed descriptions of the symbolic use of objects in a
variety of cultures" (p. 26). Wallendorf and Arnould (1988) would concur.
[T]he research in ownership in a num ber of fields leads us to
contend that attachment to objects as symbols of security, as
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expressions of self-concept, and as signs of one's connection to or
differentiation from other members of society is a usual and
culturally universal function of consumption.... Although the
meaning of self differs cross-culturally and varies in its link with
individualism (Hsu 1985), the fact that these conceptions of self are
expressed to some degree through objects seems to be universal (p. 532).
From a study of the meaning of possessions, Furby (1991) reports m uch the
same conclusion. The research spanned three cultures and involved
developmental interviews with people of five age levels in each culture. Two
basic themes emerged. The first was that possessions were "linked to the
experience of efficacy and a sense of personal control." The other "was an
association between possessions and one's sense of self. Both the meaning of, and
the motivation for, possession was frequently related to one's self concept" (1991,
p. 459).
Yet another researcher reports similar findings.
Writings throughout the last century suggest that possessions play
an important role in people's lives.... One of the recurrent themes in
this literature is the notion of the relation between possessions and
the self. These writings collectively suggest that personal
possessions come to be symbols of, embodiments of, and
indistinguishable from the self of the owner (Kamptner 1991, p.
210 ).

Anthropologists have well documented this link between possessions and
the self in traditional societies. For example Beaglehole (1932) explained that
possessions were thought to be imbued with the owner's spirit. To prevent
contamination by the selves of others, possessions were not touched by other
people and were often buried with the owner. The link was often made more
obvious, and more public, by licking new possessions, by claiming ownership of
objects by touching them or shedding blood on them.
The link is still with us today, as suggested by Barley, a British
anthropologist who undertook an ethnographic study of his own country. He
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makes the point that "it is, curiously, in the Western cultures, where people make
very few of the things they own, that we nevertheless expect to be able to draw
inferences about owners from their possessions.... We expect to be able to tell a
great deal about the internal states of people by their faces, their clothes, the way
they talk" (1989, p. 41 -42).
W hat then can we say about the role of possessions in defining the self?
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) suggest that possessions help to
express qualities of the self, provide signs of status, serve as symbols of social
integration, and assist with socialization. Belk (1988a) develops a similar list. He
says that possessions help provide a sense of self, help distinguish our self from
others and from our environment, manage our identities, and help achieve a
sense of self continuity. For these researchers, as well as for the others cited here,
possessions fulfill these and many other functions. The common thread which
binds them all together is the idea that possessions help provide meaning in our
lives by being "objective manifestations of the self" (Belk 1988a, p. 159). How
this association develops is considered next. Theoretical concerns are presented
first, and then empirical evidence for the role of possessions in self definition is
reviewed.

Possessions as Means of Acquiring and Expressing Identity
"We derive our self-concept from objects" (Wallendorf and Arnould 1988,
p. 531). That is, we use possessions to say to others as well as to ourselves who
we are (Belk 1988a; Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Levy 1981;
McCracken 1986,1988; Rook 1985). Because of this function of goods, Douglas
and Isherwood (1979) contend that goods themselves are neutral, but their uses
are social; they may be used as fences or bridges. Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg-Halton (1981) make much the same point suggesting that while the
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term "materialism conjures up images of crass self-centeredness, of mindless
consumers buying needless things and devoting their lives to a shallow quest for
the acquisition of money and possessions that will serve as status sym bols,... it is
also apparent that goods can serve the 'common good.' Indeed, they are essential
to it" because of their role in fashioning and communicating identity (p. 231).
Dittmar (1992) expands the idea by suggesting that the relationship of
interest is not just between an individual and his/her possessions, but is a triadic
relationship among the individual, the object (possession), and the other.9 We
cannot use goods as an expression of our identity unless there is someone else
out there to acknowledge the expression. Mead (1934) sets forth the argument for
the importance of shared underlying conceptions of material possessions.
If we say, "This is my property, I shall control it," that affirmation
calls out a certain set of responses which m ust be the same in any
community in which property exists. It involves an organised
attitude ... which is common to all members of the community....
The m an is appealing to his rights because he is able to take the
attitude which everybody else in the group has with reference to
property, thus arousing in himself the attitude of others (p. 161 162).
From a consumer behavior product-oriented perspective Hirschman (1981)
suggests much the same thing, "consum ers... must have in common a shared
conception of the product's symbolic meaning. For example, driving a 'prestige'
automobile will not serve as an effective symbol of one's social status unless
o th ers... share the driver's belief that the automobile is indeed, prestigious" (p. 5).
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) also support the triangular

O

Roberts and Dant (1991) offer an alternative perspective in their conception of a "personal
fund" of resources which consumers allocate only to themselves. They suggest that some
personal rituals and behaviors are for oneself exclusively and have no real social goal or outcome,
such as reading a mystery novel. Their focus seems to be on behaviors, however, rather than
goods.
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relationship when they declare that "information about the self is not released
through direct interaction between person and object but, instead, is mediated by
the opinions of others" (p. 141).
Implicit in this view is the notion that possessions are a means of
communication. Via possessions we communicate to ourselves and to others who
we are, who we hope we are, and who we hope to become. This communicative
role of goods is possible, of course, only because of a socially shared sense of
meaning. Douglas and Isherwood (1979) conceive of goods being both the
hardware and software of the social information system (p. 72). Because goods
are the markers of cultural categories (see also McCracken 1986), they are an
integral part of a live information system. The essential function of consumption,
then, is its capacity to make sense of the world for us. In a sense, consumption is
joint production, with our fellow consumers, of meaning, of values, of our
universe (Douglas and Isherwood 1979, p. 4,5,10,59-60,62,67).
Belk (1988a) extends these ideas with the thought that we not only use
possessions to define ourselves, but that possessions can themselves alter our
identity. This position was anticipated by Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg-Halton. "In all cases where actual physical objects become associated
with a particular quality of the self, it is difficult to know how far the thing
simply reflects an already existing trait and to what extent it anticipates, or even
generates, a previous nonexistent quality" (1981, p. 28). For example, feeling
sophisticated when we get dressed up is a perception engendered more by the
clothes we are wearing than by ourselves. An extension of this idea of presented
by Schouten (1991) in his study of women and cosmetic surgery. He concludes
that the surgery is symbolic consumption which people use to restore, repair,
and in other ways deal with an unsatisfying self-concept.
Goods not only help define who we are, but also help differentiate us from
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others—thereby establishing us as a unique individual. (Though, of course, there
is an integrating aspect to this differentiation since other people are still required
to acknowledge the differentiation (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton
1981).) Wallendorf and A m ould (1988) found that people's favorite things
enhanced self-expression and helped not only to differentiate the individual
from society but also to integrate the individual within society.
On the other hand, we may use goods to signal, consciously or not, our
association with a membership or aspirational group. Belk (1988a) provides a
variety of examples to illustrate this point. By wearing Brooks Brothers suits and
by decorating our house with antiques a n d /o r antique reproduction furniture,
we are saying to the world that we are a certain kind of person. Belk refers to
research by Weisner and Weibel (1981) which demonstrates that families with
different lifestyles and from different social classes live in different kinds of
houses which are decorated in different styles.
This social construction of the self, to borrow a phrase from Berger and
Luckman (1967), is true even of people who have few possessions. Hill and
Stamey (1990) found that homeless people often dealt with the socially negative
connotations of their condition by defining themselves as resourceful individuals
who could live by their own abilities and did not need welfare or the help of
social services. The meaning of "home" also is altered by the homeless.
Additionally they found that these individuals often engage in meaningful work
to bolster their self-concept. For example, many are involved in recycling and
scavenging activities which they perceive to be beneficial not only for themselves
but to society as well. Thus the homeless use the meanings of their own
subculture to build and reinforce their identities.
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Studies Investigating the Role of Possessions in our Lives
The evidence presented in this discussion of material objects and
self-identity is extended by several studies which have specifically investigated
the relationship.
General. Two studies, conducted with adults, have empirically
investigated this relationship between possessions and the self. The earlier is
reported by Prelinger (1959). In this study people were given a list of 160 items
from eight different categories. Respondents were asked to rate each item on
scale of 0 to 3 depending on the extent to which the item was "definitely a part of
your own self." Of the eight categories, possessions were ranked fourth
highest—though of non-body items, they were rated first. Body parts were
considered closest to one's self (mean = 2.98), body-internal processes were next
closest (mean=2.46), personally identifying characteristics such as age or name
were next (mean=2.22), and then possessions and productions were rated
(mean=1.57). Abstract ideas, other people, objects in the close physical
environment, and the distant physical environment comprised the remaining
categories in order of closeness to the self. In the second study, after repeatedly
asking, "Who are you?" Gordon (1968) found that people often named material
objects and possessions as elements of their selves.
Children and possessions. Some have turned to studies of children and
possessions to bolster the theory that material objects are considered part of our
selves. For example, in a longitudinal study in the UK of children, Newson and
Newson (1976) conclude that having their own personal possessions was
important for children to develop a sense of self. "A child's personal possessions,
including first of all his name and his memories, but extending to the material
objects that he can touch and hold and know to be his, establish him in his own
identity and confirm him as a person in his own right" (p. 128).
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Furby's studies of possessions reach similar conclusions. For example,
Furby and Wilke (1982) report that more than 70 percent of the six-month old
children studied had preferences for a specific object, even if they did not view it
as separate from themselves.10 Furby (1980) hypothesizes that since every society
tries to protect objects from the potentially destructive actions of children,
children, to assert themselves, come to identify particularly w ith the objects to
which they are allowed access. Accordingly, "possessions and self become
intimately related" (p. 35). Furby concludes that "if the toddler were given
unlimited access to everything, then the whole story might be different" (p. 36).
Not only are possessions inextricably part of our selves from the very
beginning of life, they continue to be an important part of our self definition near
the end of our lives as well.
Possessions and aging. While several studies (Belk 1985; Csikszentmihalyi
and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Kamptner 1991) have demonstrated that the types of
possessions we are attached to and which we treasure change as we age,
possessions are still important for maintaining a dignified sense of self. For
example, Sherman and Newman (1977) report that when elderly people enter a
nursing home, they may bring with them a favorite object or two to compensate
for a feeling of a loss of status. They also report that elderly people who have
cherished possessions, regardless of where they are living, are happier than those
who do not. Dittmar (1992) hypothesizes that possessions may become
especially important to the elderly who tend to lose other identity markers. For
example, being retired, no longer being a full-time parent, and perhaps being
less active in various organizations and groups, the elderly lose the forms of

10These objects, such as a blanket, a diaper, or a pillow, really serve as "part-self objects."
That is, "although the object may be an extension of the s e lf..., it is nevertheless not yet a
complete and autonomous object for the child" (Gulerce 1991, p. 194).
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identity which they had in earlier years. Possessions, however, rem ain to
reaffirm who they are. Along the same lines, McCracken (1987) reports that when
people who enter a nursing home are forced to give up their possessions, their
sense of identity tends to be eroded. Dittmar (1992) concurs, saying that in such
situations, possessions help people maintain a sense of control and of social
status.
Finally, Unruh (1983) extends the importance of possessions as a marker
reporting that people like to leave some of their treasured possessions to their
heirs as a means of preserving their identity "beyond the grave." Alternatively,
some people desire to have special possessions buried with them. From a survey
of morticians about contemporary grave goods, Elliott (1990) reports that
possessions ranging from "typical items" such crucifixes, photographs, and
jewelry to "unusual" items such as tennis rackets, golf clubs, and a set of
wrenches have been buried with their owners. W hen asked for reasons why
possessions were buried with a loved one, morticians responded that, among
other reasons, people wanted to express who the deceased was and "to show
how the person was different in life" (p. 610).
It is not just the elderly, however, who do not function well when their
possessions are taken from them. This phenomenon seems to be common to
people of all ages.
The self and loss of possessions. Dittmar (1992) explains the theory here.
"If material possessions are constitutive parts of self, it follows that their
unintentional loss should be experienced as a lessening of self" (p. 46). Fromm's
(1976) expression of the point is more biting. "If I am what I have and if what I have
is lost, who then am I? Nobody but a defeated, deflated, pathetic testimony to a

wrong way of living" (pp. 96 - 97). Sometimes personal possessions are taken
from people for the express purpose of lessening any sense of self uniqueness, as
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in the military. At other times the loss of personal possessions is less voluntary,
as when someone is the victim of burglary or natural disasters. Both situations
are discussed next.
Goffman (1959,1961) discusses the "stripping" process which occurs when
people are institutionalized—in prisons, mental hospitals, boarding schools,
monasteries, the military and the like. Everything personal is taken from the
individuals involved. Then, they are dressed like everyone else, given the same
living arrangements and the same possessions. The sense of an individual self,
different from others, is stripped away. In its place, a sense of group identify is
created by providing each person with a kind of standard identity kit (Belk
1988a). Accordingly, soldiers, boarding school students, and inmates wear
uniforms which identify them as members of the group but separate them from
people outside the institution. In a similar vein, Hill (1991) studied the lives of
otherwise homeless women who were living in a shelter. He found that because
the Sisters of Mercy who ran the shelter determined what possessions the women
could acquire and keep, the women exhibited some of the same characteristics of
the groups of people just described who had been "stripped" of their
possessions.
A less voluntary loss of of possessions occurs w hen a person is robbed or
w hen a natural disaster destroys home and possessions. Several studies of
burglary victims (c.f. Brown and Harris 1989; Paap 1981; Van den Bogaard and
Wiegman 1991) report that people feel a sense of loss because of the stolen
possessions, but they also feel as if they have been violated and a part of their
selves has been taken away. In her study of police response to burglary, Stenross
(1984) found that police are more diligent in pursuing crimes when certain kinds
of possessions have been stolen jew elry and sentimental items). She suggests
that the police recognize that people suffer greater distress when possessions
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"typically regarded as markers of the self" have been lost (1984, p. 389).
The same seems to be true when possessions are lost because of a fire,
flood, or other natural disaster. Erickson (1976) reports that people w ho lost
possessions because of a flood actually mourned that loss. McLeod (1984) found
the same to be true of people whose possessions were lost in a mudslide. Belk
(1988a) reports his own experiences w ith flood victims, saying that even six
weeks after the disaster, people could not talk about the event and w ere still "in
the early stages of grief," (p. 142).
In a commentary on Belk's article, "The Extended Self," Cohen (1989)
objects to the conclusion that emotional response to a loss of possessions is due to
a "diminution of self" (p. 127). The emotional trauma might be explained by
other factors, he suggests, such as the loss of ability to provide for one's family,
to a loss of trust in institutions (which perhaps did not protect home and
possessions). Belk (1989a) does not respond to this specific argument in his reply.
One m ight respond for him, that while possessions are linked with self identity,
that position in no way excludes self identity being defined in other ways as well,
such as thinking of oneself as a good provider. So, when Cohen objects that the
emotions resulting from a loss might really reflect a sense of loss of abilities, it is
still the sense of self which is diminished. Further, since possessions help define
the self because of the meanings they carry, then house and property certainly
can be taken for a material sign of one's ability to provide for one's family. And
that ability certainly can be part of one's self concept. It is not a very great leap to
see that when the symbols of that ability are lost, the individual would feel some
loss of self as well, whether one thinks he is mourning the loss of the material
possessions or the loss of the meaning they carried.
A similar involuntary loss is the loss of one's job. Yet even w hen one's
income is reduced, people still often try to continue the consumption of visible
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symbols of identity. For example, Richins and Dawson (1992) report the case of a
30-year-old woman who refused to sell her Mercedes and mink coat even after
her condominium was repossessed because the "loss in image and self-esteem
would be too great" (p. 303). Similarly, in a study of steel workers who had been
laid off, Roberts (1991) found that many continued to purchase visible products
such as cars, trucks, vans, and horses, while they cut back on the types of food
they ate and on entertainment.
It should be clear now that possessions play an important role in defining
and communicating about the self. As Ball and Tasaki (1992) point out, however,
that knowledge is not enough, since both materialistic and nonmaterialistic
people use possessions to maintain a concept of self. The focus of this study is
not the relationship between consumption and the self, but rather the more
narrow topic of materialism and the self. That is the topic of the next section.

MATERIALISM AND THE SELF
The many researchers noted above would agree with Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg-Halton (1981, p. ix) that the transactions between people and things is
central to the human condition. In fact Douglas and Isherwood's (1979) basic
thesis was that we should view consumption as properly belonging to the social
process and to recognize that goods contribute to a rational life by providing,
along with language and gesture, the channels of communication within a
culture. If goods then are not "bad," where does that leave materialism? It may
be useful to return to the definition of materialism which guides this study.
Materialism reflects the importance a consumer attaches to worldly
possessions. At the highest levels of materialism, such possessions
assume a central place in a person's life and are believed to provide
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the greatest sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in life (Belk
1984, p. 291).
With this definition, a materialist is one who goes beyond using
possessions in the service of self identity, beyond using possessions for the
meaning they convey about one's self to oneself and to others. Instead of
focusing on the communicative role of the possessions, the materialist focuses
solely on the possessions. In so doing, the materialist is cut off from engaging in
other activities. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) draw this
distinction quite clearly when they suggest that
[i]f things attract our attention excessively, there is not enough
psychic energy left to cultivate the interaction with the rest of the
world. The danger of focusing attention exclusively on a goal of
physical consumption—or materialism—is that one does not attend
enough to the cultivation of the self, to the relationship with others,
or to the broader purposes that affect life (p. 53).
Their position is similar to that proposed by the economist Linder (1970). He
suggested that acquiring and maintaining objects can easily fill up a person's
time to the point that there is no time left even to use and enjoy the things one
acquires. W hen that stage is reached, Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton
suggest that "the adaptive value of objects is reversed.... The former tool turns its
master into a slave" (1981, p. 53). Belk (1988a) himself makes much the same
point when he discusses pets as part of the extended self. "Although pets, like
other objects that become part of the extended self, may be beneficial, they can
also become harmful fetishes if too much of one's self and one's world is invested
in them" (p. 156).
If this is true, then we need to know what the materialistic self is like. Belk
and Richins and Dawson have developed scales to measure whether or not one is
a materialist and have investigated correlations between materialism and life
satisfaction. Other researchers have studied differences in materialism based on
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gender, whether one is an expatriate or not, etc. But to date, no one has looked at
the self of a materialist. Richins and Dawson (1992) call for further investigation
of the self in this light. Dittmar (1992) explains the impact of such study is
nothing less than "imperative for a more complete understanding of the
consequences of our Western materialist, consumption-dominated societies" (p.
17).
For purposes of this study, four aspects of the self have been selected for
study, self-esteem, self-actualization, self-monitoring, and intrinsic motivation.
The rationale for these selections is addressed next.

Self-Esteem and Materialism
Self-esteem is often used as a global measure of self-worth. This
perspective is strongly influenced by Rosenberg (1979) who defines a person
having high self-esteem as an individual who considers himself to be a "person
of worth," who "appreciates his own merits" yet "recognizes his faults" (p. 54). A
person with low self-esteem, on the other hand, "lacks respect for himself,
considers himself unworthy, inadequate, or otherwise seriously deficient as a
person" (p. 54).
Possessions and their meanings are available not only for describing who
we are, but also for evaluating ourselves. Allport (1937) explains that we develop
our identity, and hence gain self-esteem, in part, by acquiring a continuously
expanding set of possessions which we regard as our own. Gecas (1982) and
Scheier and Carver (1980) take the idea one step further by suggesting that a
distinction can be draw n between self-conceptions (identities) and
self-evaluations (such as self-esteem). According to Gecas (1982), "Identity
focuses on the meanings comprising the self as an object, gives structure and
content to the self-concept, and anchors the self to social systems. Self-esteem deals
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with the evaluative and emotional dimensions of the self-concept" (emphasis
added) (p. 4). Material possessions, then, serve as symbolic extensions of the self
as well as concrete representations of self worth.
In fact, one of the common themes to emerge from Ger and Belk's (1993)
focus group interviews in several countries was that materialists use possessions
to improve their self-esteem. The irony is that in focusing just on possessions,
materialists are, in effect, taking themselves out of the social system. This leaves
them with only goods for determining self-esteem. Relationships and
connections with others have effectively been shut out. This conclusion is
supported by the research of Richins and Dawson (1992) in validating their scale.
Using Kahle's (1983) List of Values, they found that people who scored high on
materialism were more likely to value "financial security" and less likely to value
"warm relationships with others" than those who scored low.
N ot only have materialists shut themselves off from alternative means of
evaluating themselves, but they have selected an evaluative yardstick which is
flawed. As McCracken (1986,1988) and others (Brickman and Campbell 1971;
Fromm 1976; Lasch 1979; Leiss 1976; Lunt and Livingstone 1992; Wachtel 1983)
have pointed out, a life focused solely on possessions ultimately will be
unsatisfying because there will always be something new (and/or more) to
acquire. Further, the categories of goods which signal success are always shifting.
Hence, if self-esteem is assessed as James (1890/1981) proposed, as a ratio of
successes to expectations, self-esteem is likely to be lower for materialists than
for non-materialists because, for materialists, the ante is always being raised.
Bond (1992) reaches the same conclusion, but for a different reason. He
theorizes that self-esteem should be lower for materialists since evaluations of
self-worth are based on what they own and not w hat kind of person they are or
w hat kind of life they have led. He argues that while material possessions can be
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important contributors to feelings of well-being, possessions alone are not
sufficient no matter how many one has.11 Bond offers friendship, mutual
affection, and striving to do something worthwhile—beyond simply striving for
pleasure and wealth accumulation—as necessary ingredients for self-esteem.
That people use possessions to try to enhance self-esteem has been the
subject of several research projects. Wicklund and Gollwitzer's (1982) study of
symbolic self completion found that when collectors' self-esteem was low, they
bolstered it by adding objects to their collection. Dawson and Bamossy (1991)
found that one characteristic of successful expatriates was high self-esteem
which allowed these individuals to detach from their "old" possessions when
they moved to a new job in a different country. Along the same lines, Ertel et al.
(1971, quoted in Dittmar 1992) demonstrated that when participants' self-esteem
was experimentally lowered, they used valued objects to bolster their
self-esteem. Beggan (1991) reports that to counter negative implications of
failure, people used personal property to enhance feelings of self-worth. Finally,
Jackson (1979) found that feelings of self-esteem were related to a ratio of
possessions wanted to possessions actually owned. The point here is that when a
sense of accomplishment, a sense of success can only—or primarily—be
measured by outward, tangible signs (such as driving status automobile) instead
of coming from an inner sense of having done well, satisfaction is unlikely, and
so self-esteem is likely to suffer. This conclusion is supported by one of Richins
and Dawson's studies (1992). For people in a large western city, the correlation
between high scores on the materialism scale and high scores on the Rosenberg
(1965) self-esteem scale were negative and statistically significant.

am reminded of the bumper sticker, "He who dies with the most toys wins." Bond
might respond that "he" may be the winner, but "he" will not have had a life filled with a sense
of well-being. Bond might find the bumper stickers and tee shirts which proclaim, "He who dies
with the most toys still dies" or "The best things in life aren't things," more to his liking.
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Not only does self-esteem suffer when one is a materialist, but one is less
likely to achieve self-actualization.

Self-Actualization and Materialism
While the term "self-actualization" was originated by the psychologist
Goldstein (Maslow 1950), the term is closely connected w ith the writings and
ideas of Abraham Maslow, who "did more to popularize it than any other single
individual" (Welch, Tate, and Medieros 1987, p. ix). Maslow's own definition of
the concept is as follows:
self-actualization (SA), as yet a difficult syndrome to describe
accurately,... m ay be loosely described as the full use and
exploitation of talents, capacities, potentialities, etc. Such people
seem to be ... doing the best that they are capable of doing.... This
connotes also either gratification past or present of the basic
emotional needs for safety, belongingness, love, respect, and
self-respect, and of the cognitive needs for knowledge and for
understanding (1950, p. 12).
Researchers in the field acknowledge the difficulty even today of "pinning
down" the concept. For example, after reviewing the writings of several authors,
Crandall and Jones (1991) conclude that "there is still conceptual 'fuzziness'
about what self-actualization is" (p. 340). And Weiss (1991) complains that
self-actualization theory "appears to be in fragments with many seeming
incongruous versions" (p. 268).
Nevertheless, definitions offered by others are consistent with Maslow's
initial conceptualization. For example, according to Shostrom (1976), author of
two of the most widely used tests for self-actualization (Flett et al. 1991), the term
refers to
an active process of being and becoming increasingly
inner-directed and integrated at the levels of thinking, feeling, and
bodily response. It is, therefore not an end point, but a process of
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moving from normal manipulation toward growth, development,
and the unfolding of hum an potential.
The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology (Harre & Lamb, 1983, p. 559)

offers a similar definition. "The inherent tendency towards self-fulfilment,
self-expression and the attainment of autonomy from external forces. It is a
process rather than an end state." It is the ideas contained in these definitions
which are adopted for this research.
Even with these definitional difficulties, self-actualization remains an
important contemporary concept. Baumeister (1986) opines that
"self-actualization has become increasingly accepted by the general society as a
legitimate and important aspect of life" (p. 163). However, the relationship
between possessions and self-actualization is not a simple one. Csikszentmihalyi
and Rochberg-Halton (1981) explain that if possessions reflect nothing more than
ties with other people then we are unlikely to develop as individuals, and, hence,
not become self-actualized.12 At the other extreme, however, if we are not in
possession of our self, if we are "possessed" by objects, then neither are we free
to develop ourselves. This understanding of the lack of self development
resulting from either not focusing enough or focusing too much on goods is also
argued by Maslow.
The neurotic organism is one that lacks basic need satisfactions that
can come only from other people. It is therefore more dependent on
other people and is less autonomous and self-determined, i. e.,
more shaped by the nature of the environment and less shaped by
its own intrinsic nature. Such relative independence of
environment as is found in the healthy person does not of course,
mean lack of commerce with it; it means only that in these contacts

12

Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) explain that "most traditional peoples
have emphasized the integrated or social self at the expense of personal uniqueness, whereas
m odem Western culture has tneded to stress the differentiated, uniquely individual self. Thus
runaway fragmentationis more of anactual possiblity in our own culture" (p. 40).
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the person's ends and his own nature are the primary determinants,
and that the environment is primarily a means to the person's
self-actualizing ends" (1970, p. 68).
Thus, it is true that people need goods for self definition and to differentiate
them from other people. Yet an over-emphasis on goods to the exclusion of all
else is equally as bad. In support of this idea, Richins and Dawson (1992) found
that people scoring high on the materialism scale were less satisfied w ith their
income or standard of living and with life as a whole. They tended to be more
envious, as evidenced by a strong correlation between high scores on the Richins
and Dawson materialism scale and high scores on Belk's (1984,1985) envy
sub-scale.
As Maslow (quoted above) suggests, the individual who is not becoming
self-actualized is overly-dependent on other people. Rochberg-Halton (1986)
draws the link among this dependence, becoming self-actualized, and
materialism. "Those who pursue [materialism] most fervently have a goal of
becoming a pure individual, yet they can never satisfactorily attain this goal
because they are always dependent upon other people to appreciate their
individuality and give them the status they so desperately want" (p. 181). This
idea of an external instead of an internal focus leads to the next discussion of
materialism and intrinsic/extrinsic motivation.

Intrinsic/Extrinsic Motivation and Materialism
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation have been defined in a num ber of ways.
The discussion here begins with a brief review. One of the most often quoted
sources in intrinsic motivation, Deci, has provided a variety of definitions. In
1972 he stated that intrinsic motivation referred to performing some activity
solely for the pleasure of the activity. In 1973 he suggested that intrinsic
motivation referred to engaging in behavior which is itself rewarding. He
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provided a more expansive definition in 1980: a person's striving to be effective
and competent when dealing with his/her environment (1980, p. 50). In 1985 he
added the concepts of interest and emotion (Deci and Ryan 1985). These ideas are
further explained below.
In addition to Deci's work, however, others have proposed definitions
which are generally consistent, though the focus for the motivation is sometimes
placed on the individual and sometimes on the task. For example, Florey (1969)
said that a person is intrinsically motivated if he or she experiences pleasure and
satisfaction with the activity itself. Similarly, McReynolds (1971) suggested that
intrinsically motivated behaviors are those which are in themselves inherently
appealing. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) offered that intrinsically motivated activities
are those which are enjoyable in themselves, and for which the reward is the
ongoing experience of enjoying the activity.
These conceptions of intrinsically motivated activity are contrasted with
that which is extrinsically motivated. For example, McReynolds (1971) defines
extrinsically motivated behavior as being focused on the end result and not the
process. Koch (1956) describes extrinsic motivation as working or striving or
doing something in order to reach a particular reward. And DeCharms (1968)
refers to externally motivated individuals as "pawns," since they are dependent
on others for their rewards.
In summary, then, we might agree with Mayo (1976) that intrinsic
motivation is "derived from an interest inherent in the task performance itself"
(p. 1), while extrinsic motivation is aimed at seeking a reward (or interest)
outside the task or experience itself. This idea of interest in the task is not unique
to Mayo. Deci and Ryan (1985) report that "when intrinsically motivated, one
follows one's interests" (p. 12). Additionally, enjoyment and excitement are
emotions which accompany intrinsically motivated behavior and which
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represent the "rewards" of the behavior—though they are not rewards which are
separate from the activity itself (Deci and Ryan 1985). With extrinsic motivation,
on the other hand, the reward is beyond the activity or task; it may be social
approval, money, or some material object. The enjoyment is not inherent in the
activity, rather the enjoyment is in the reward.
Before proceeding further, the distinction between intrinsic/extrinsic
motivation and locus of control should be made clear. According to Rotter (1966),
who developed the construct, locus of control refers to the degree to which
individuals judge the reinforcements they receive to be the result of their own
efforts (or attributes) or the result of external forces (luck, fate, the actions of
others). The former judgement is termed internal locus of control, the latter,
external locus. While there are similarities between the locus and
intrinsic/extrinsic motivation constructs, they are not the same. There may,
however, be some similarities in the behavior of external locus individuals and
individuals prone to extrinsic motivation. That is, these individuals would be
expected to "possess the other-based reference system associated with high
levels of materialism" (Hunt et al. 1990, p. 1102). In fact, Hunt et al. did find
modest support for the link between materialism and locus of control.
Materialism and extrinsic motivation should also be linked. The materialist
is concerned with owning and doing the "right things," for it is possessions
(broadly construed) which help define success and happiness. Further, the
materialist is dependent on the approbation of others for these feelings of success
and happiness. The possessions (or club memberships) are not rewarding in and
of themselves. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) provide an
example of this distinction. They talk about valuing a painting only because it
was a wedding gift or because it fits with the room's color scheme, or because it
makes one look sophisticated, rather than valuing the painting for itself (p. 179).
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The materialist's dependence on the opinions and attitudes of others also is
consistent with extrinsic motivation. The materialist does not follow h is/h er own
interests (as does an intrinsically motivated individual), but rather is constrained
to select objects and activities which have received the stamp of approval from
others. Deci (1980) explains that the notion that people are free to choose what to
do and how to behave is implicit in the definition of intrinsic motivation. He
draws the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in the following
way: "we infer intrinsic motivation for an activity when a person does the
activity in the absence of a reward contingency or control (Deci and Ryan 1985, p.
34). [Wjhen the motives are extrinsic, the decision involves selecting w hat
extrinsic rewards to strive for and what behaviors to undertake in quest of the
rewards" (1980a, p. 50). One of the aspects of materialism which emerged from
Ger and Belk's (1993) U.S. focus group illustrates this difference quite nicely.
Materialists were thought to view work "merely as a means of earning money
rather than as an end and source of reward in itself" (p. 17). One person voiced
the idea this way, "[Tjhere are a lot of people in law and medicine that are more
interested in the financial, the money, the materialistic things they can gain from
having that profession than saving lives or in winning lawsuits for justice" (p. 17).
The focus on the opinions of others which accompanies extrinsic motivation
is also characteristic of people termed high self-monitors (Snyder 1987; Snyder
and Gangestad 1986).

Self-M onitoring and Materialism
To begin this discussion, we turn once again to the work of William James
(1890/1981). In addressing the social nature of the self, he speaks of each
individual having multiple selves:
A m an has as many social selves as there are individuals who
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recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind.... [H]e has
as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of
persons about whose opinions he cares.... From this there results
what practically is a division of the man into several selves
(emphasis in the original; p. 294).
James provides the example of our acting differently with our family, with
employers, and with close friends.
This perspective has been carried forward and adopted by psychologists,
sociologists, and consumer behavior theorists today. Consistent with James,
Goffman (1959,1967) explains one reason for the different presentations of the
self. In our social interaction we come to realize that different people interpret
our actions differently. And so we try to control the self which we project to
foster desired images in the eyes of others, "to maintain an image appropriate to
the current situation and to secure a positive evaluation from the other person"
(Goffman 1967, p. 38 - 39).
People who make a conscious attempt to vary their self-presentation have
been termed "high self-monitors" (Snyder, 1987; Snyder and Gangestad 1986).
Snyder draws the distinction between high and low self-monitors quite clearly.
The prototype of the high self-monitor is someone who is
particularly sensitive to cues to the situational appropriateness of
his or her social behavior and who uses these cues as guidelines for
monitoring (that is, regulating and controlling) his or her
expressive behavior and self-presentations. By contrast, the low
self-monitor is less attentive to social information about
situationally appropriate self-presentation and does not possess a
highly developed repertoire of self-presentation skills. His or her
expressive self-presentations seem ... to be controlled by inner
attitudes, disposition, and values, rather than to be molded and
shaped to fit the situation (1987, p. 14).
Snyder (1987) also makes clear that the distinction between low and high
self-monitors should not be taken as a distinction between a desirable and an
undesirable way of life. Rather he sees these two self-presentation styles as just
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that, two different ways of behaving. He reports various studies which link
self-monitoring with various professions. For example, professional actors,
managers and mediators, and leaders all tend to be high self-monitors. Each of
these professions require people to have good social and communication skills.
Actors, of course, make their living by believably altering their presentation. In
fact, Snyder (1987) reports that the one item on his scale which best distinguishes
between high and low self-monitor is, "I would probably make a good actor."
But w hat about materialism and self-monitoring. As noted in Chapter One,
materialists need to be continual information gatherers to keep abreast of the
current meaning of goods so that they can acquire and display just the right
goods (Fournier and Richins 1991). Materialists read "catalogs and magazines,
observ[e] w hat others have acquired, visit shops to see w hat is available. [They
are] always thinking about future purchases" (p. 410).
High self-monitors have been shown to have much the same
characteristics. Snyder (1974) demonstrates that when given the opportunity,
high self-monitors consult information about their peers' self-presentation more
frequently and for longer periods of time than do low self-monitors. Other
studies (Cheek and Brigs, Cheek and Busch, both unpublished, cited in Snyder
1987) conclude that high self-monitors place a high value on social aspects of
identity, considering external identity characteristics, such as group membership,
particularly important. Snyder and Cantor (1980) also found that high
self-monitors were able to readily report the behaviors that would convey
specific social images and the situations that would provide opportunities to
play particular roles, even if they themselves did not take on those roles. Finally,
Glick (unpublished, cited in Snyder 1987) found that high self-monitors are quite
aware of the messages they project by their clothing and other personal items
and that they tend to be avid readers of magazines and books geared to these
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concerns. Consistent with these findings, is that of Hosch and Platz (1984) that
high self-monitors are more accurate eyewitnesses than low self-monitors.
While there seems to be substantial overlap between materialism and high
self-monitoring, then, not all high self-monitors would be expected to be
materialists. Making that assumption would be to fall into the trap warned
against by Douglas and Isherwood (1979) and others. High self-monitors are
simply making full use of the social system in constructing their identities.
However, the converse association may be assumed to be true, that materialists
are likely to be high self-monitors. But what of self-monitoring and other
constructs which are important to this study?
Snyder (1987) suggests that while self-monitoring does not correlate well
with measures such as self-esteem, the need for approval, extroversion, locus of
control, among others, there is some overlap with Riesman's (1969) inner- and
other-directed social characters. Inner-directed people are guided by personal
values and standards, as are low self-monitors; other-directed individuals are
more attuned to the expectations and preferences of others, as are high
self-monitors. However, Snyder (1987) suggests that the two concepts rely on
different levels of analysis. Self-monitoring is an individual phenomenon while
inner- and other-directedness is "defined at the level of social characters
characteristic of entire nations, societies, cultures, and historical periods" (p. 28).
However, the intrinsic/extrinsic motivation measure employed in this study is
not the same as Riesman's social character types. Hence, the self-monitoring
concept is expected to add to the understanding of materialists in ways which
would not be expected of the other self measures.

80

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the research on materialism and the self, this chapter has
presented a number of areas which would provide fertile ground for the further
investigation of materialism. Our understanding of the construct would be
broadened if we could further understand the relationship between materialism
and the self. The specific hypotheses which address this topic and the research
design for the study are presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

This study proposes to examine materialism as an independent variable.
The focus of the study is on the "materialistic self." More specifically the study
will investigate the impact of materialism on self-monitoring, self-esteem,
self-actualization, and on extrinsic motivation. Hypotheses about these effects
are presented below. Investigation of the hypotheses will involve the use of both
the Belk (Ger and Belk 1993) and Richins and Dawson (1992) materialism scales.
Additionally, the construct validity of the two scales will also be assessed.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Echoing the ideas of Daun (1983) and Riesman and Roseborough (1955),
Fournier and Richins (1991) conclude that for the materialist, consumer products
"engage values that are centrally-held, serve as a source of meaning, and
provide structure for life's goals and daily activities" (p. 404). Taking this
conclusion as a base, a number of questions about the materialist lifestyle might
be raised. Do people who value materialism work harder at behaviors connected
with that value? Do they p u t more effort into materialism-related activities? For
example, do they spend more time shopping? When they shop do they buy more
frequently? Do they derive pleasure from the act of purchasing? In being
influenced by the opinions of others about goods, are materialists similarly
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influenced by the opinions of others about themselves? Are materialists more
other- than inner-directed, more extrinsically than intrinsically motivated? Are
their self-concepts tied more to the opinions of others than to their own
opinions? Questions such as these have not yet been directly addressed in
1

materialism research. It is the purpose of this study to begin to find answers to
the latter questions which address materialism and the self.

Psychological Constructs and Motivational Measures
W hat follows are the research hypotheses accompanied by brief
discussions of why the specific motivations and psychological constructs would
be expected from materialists. The first hypothesis deals with materialism and
self-monitoring.

H I: Those scoring high on either materialism scale w ill also
score high on the self-m onitoring scale.
Rokeach (1973) suggests that values: 1) guide the presentation of the self to
others, 2) guide our evaluation and judgment of ourselves and others, and 3)
provide a m eans of comparing ourselves to others. More recently, in their
extension of Rokeach's work, Kahle and Timmer (1983) also explain that values
are im portant for self-description and impression management. For the
materialist, the behavior which has been labeled "conspicuous consumption"
(Fournier and Richins 1991; Mason 1981; Veblen 1899/1979) is a direct response
to impression management and to the evaluation of the self and others.

Richins and Dawson (1990) report some initial interest in the self-esteem and
self-monitoring ideas. However, scales to test these concepts were not administered to the entire
sample, and specific results were not reported. This focus of their research seems not to have
been continued (Richins and Dawson 1992).
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Conspicuous consumption is defined as deriving product satisfaction from the
reaction of others, instead of from the utility of the product itself (Fournier and
Richins 1991; Veblen 1899/1979). Objects are valued for their ability to generate
recognition or envy among others. Dawson and Bamossy (1991) explain that, "we
seek to acquire and have those things which other people expect us to have, and
value us having" (p. 380). Fournier and Richins (1991) lend support to this
position by suggesting that possessions allow "estimates of one's standing in
relation to others and in relation to the values deemed most important in the
culture"(p. 404). Leiss, Kline and Jhally (1986) concur:
people tend to compare their actual situation with a reference
standard or norm... Happiness is measured by the ratio of what one
has to what one thinks one ought to have in order to maintain
self-esteem in the face of the normal consumption standards
accepted by the society (p. 254).
This social comparison process is recognized by Marx who offers an
example in Wage, Labour and Capital,
a house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses
are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But
let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a little
house to a h u t ... Our desires and pleasures spring from society: we
measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which
serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they
are of a relative nature (Selected Works, 1966, p. 163).
From their focus group discussions, Fournier and Richins (1991) report that
materialists are thought to focus on socially-sanctioned goods and
activities—golfing at the right country club, buying prestigious brand names or
products known to be expensive, and purchasing trendy items.
In order to know what the appropriate activity is, to know w hat the status
items are, one m ust be attuned to the opinions of others and pay particular
attention to one's "impression management." People who are "sensitive to their
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own expressive behavior" (Sampson 1978) are referred to as self-monitors. Such
individuals are characterized as being very sensitive to social cues so that they
might adapt and modify their behavior to be the "right person in the right place
at the right time." In contrast, low self-monitoring individuals rely more on their
own feelings and attitudes (Snyder 1979; Snyder and DeBono 1985). Thompson
and Davis (1988) have tied self-monitoring to the way individuals use
possessions as visual props in self-presentations. "[T]he furniture with which
individuals surround themselves is an expression of their self-image and is
intended to send messages about themselves to others" (p. 280). Belk (1988a) has
also addressed the use of possessions in self identity. Accordingly, the first
hypothesis suggests that self-monitoring individuals are expected to be more
likely to be materialists than individuals who are not self-monitors.
Particular attention to external cues also has been related to the motivation
for purchasing and using a product (Bell, Holbrook, and Solomon 1991). This
relationship provides the connection to the second hypothesis which concerns
materialism and intrinsic/extrinsic motivation.
H2: Those scoring high on either materialism scale will also
score low on the intrinsic/extrinsic motivation scale (IE Index),
thereby providing evidence of greater extrinsic than intrinsic
motivation.
Intrinsic motivation refers to appreciating and enjoying an experience, an
activity, or a product for its own sake. With extrinsic motivation, however, the
experience, activity, or product serves as a means to some end, such as making a
desired impression on others (Deci 1972,1973; Deci and Ryan 1985; Florey 1969;
Holbrook 1986a). Just as materialists would be expected to be self-monitors, they
also would be expected to be more extrinsically motivated. As detailed above,
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materialists are concerned with owning and doing the "right" things, of making
decisions based on the opinions of others. These characteristics are very similar
to the description of extrinsic motivation which is provided by Bell, Holbrook
and Solomon (1991), "the correctness of choices is assumed to be externally
verifiable, in that the purchase decisions made are believed to affect the
probability of attaining future social goals" (p. 246).
If an individual pays particular attention to and acts on the wishes of
others, that person may be self-confident and may not perceive her/him self to
be competent (Philips and Lord 1980). Thus, the materialistic individual may
have low self-esteem. This relationship comprises the third hypothesis.

H3: Those scoring high on either materialism scale w ill also
score low on scales m easuring self-esteem.
Rokeach (1973) suggests that values enable "us to maintain and enhance
our self-esteem no matter how socially desirable or undesirable our motives,
feelings, or actions may be... values serve to maintain and enhance self-esteem"
(p. 13). Holding materialism as a value may be one way to bolster a lack of
internal self-assurance. Fromm (1976) holds that insecurity and a need for
superiority are connected with too great an emphasis on possessions. More
recently, Fournier and Richins report that insecurity is an often mentioned
characteristic of materialists. Berger and Luckmann (1964) explain why:
"material objects... must be called upon to testify to the individual's worth" (p.
339). In an empirical study, Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1982) reported that male
MBA students who had a lower chance of career success were more likely to own
and wear status objects associated with successful businessmen, such as watches,
suits, and briefcases, than were students who had a higher chance of career
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success. Following the lead of James (1890/1981), Ger and Belk (1990,1993) have
suggested that low self-esteem may result from perceived or actual relative
deprivation. That is, if we believe that having certain possessions and/or
amounts of possessions are necessary—for whatever reason—and we see that
others have those objects but we don't, then regardless of w hat and how much
we do have, we will feel deprived and somehow "less" than those who do have
these objects. Accordingly, one would expect materialists to have lower
self-esteem than non-materialists. A similar relationship between materialism
and self-actualization is expected; that is the fourth hypothesis.
H4: Those scoring high on either materialism scale w ill also
score low on scales measuring self-actualization.
Kilboume (1987,1991) explains one perspective on the impact of using
material goods to provide the "meaning of existence." Historically, the person has
been important. The individual is the subject and products are the objects.
However, with the "development of the symbolic value of products, the
historical relationship is transposed" (1991, p. 451). By possessing some thing, its
symbolic value attaches to the user. And in this process, the object has become
the subject. Kilbourne provides an example. Everyone has tables; when a special
table is purchased, others are invited to sit at it and to admire it. In this way the
table reflects the purchaser's character and good taste. In effect, the table
becomes the subject and confers status on its owner. The problem with this
transposition, explains Kilboume, is that the individual
reverts to the ontological status of 'object'... thereby retarding the
development of authenticity. In becoming an authentic individual,
the person comes to realize that the locus of evaluation and control
must be internal. The approval of others becomes less and less
important (1991, p. 451-452).
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Unfortunately for the materialist, the approval of others becomes more and more
important—just the opposite of what is necessary for self-actualization (Maslow
1950). Instead of the reference point being "I am true to myself," it is "I am what
I possess," or "I am as you desire me" (Moustakas 1956).
This perspective, while reflecting a decidedly postmodern perspective
(Firat 1991),2 is similar to that advanced by Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg-Halton (1981) and Belk (1988a) that while using possessions to help
define the self is not in and of itself bad, when the possessions become an
obsession the individual is no longer in control. Further, in such a situation, as
has been discussed in previous chapters, the opinions and attitudes of others
become more important than one's own. Again, the self has lost possession of
itself and self-actualization is the casualty. This perspective is somewhat less
cynical than that advanced by Kilbourne, but it is nonetheless pessimistic.

Validity Tests
While this research is designed to test four hypotheses about materialism
and the self, its value is not limited to those tests. The study will also provide an
assessment of the Belk and the Richins and Dawson materialism scales. The
research is designed so that, with its conclusion, the validity of the two scales
will have been addressed. As noted in the introduction, two types of construct

2

Drawing on the work of Baudrillard (1975,1988) and Jameson (1983) among others, Firat
(1991) explains that postmodernism is a "new perspective on life" which is found primarily in
Western cultures. It is a philosophical position which is in direct opposition to the modernist
belief in progress and in the ability of humans to control nature through science. Postmodernists
argue that people are controlled by the economic circumstances of their existence. People are no
longer the essence of society; products have ascended in importance and humans live merely to
"reproduce the simulated images for the products" (p. 74). Accordingly, w e consume not to
improve our lives, but rather for the spectacle, the experience, provided by the product(s).
Marketing is seen as the facilitator of the postmodern culture, in which images and meanings are
deliberately manipulated as are the people who purchase them.
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validity—whether or not the scales are truly measuring materialism—will be
assessed. The first, convergent validity, refers to the extent to which a measure
correlates highly with other methods designed to measure the same construct
(Churchill 1979). If both scales are indeed measuring materialism, then the
correlation between the two should be highly positive and statistically
significant. The second, nomological validity, refers to the extent to which a
measure "correlates in theoretically predicted ways with measures of different
but related constructs" (Malhotra 1993, p. 310). If the materialism scales are
related to the self measures in the directions hypothesized, and the relationships
are statistically significant, then this type of validity will have also been
established. Finally, a scale cannot be valid if it is not reliable. Calculations of
Coefficient Alpha for each of the scales and the subscales as well as confirmatory
factor analysis will help establish the reliability of each scale.

SELECTION OF MEASURES
The materialism construct will be measured by the Belk and the Richins
and Dawson scales. Following Bagozzi's (1984) rules of correspondence, when
someone scores high on one of the scales, we may take the score as evidence that
the person is materialistic. Bagozzi would caution, however, that the measure
(the scales) is not the same as the theoretical construct, that we are only inferring
the existence of the construct (materialism) from the empirical evidence (the scale
score). This caution is not unique to Bagozzi. He is echoing the cautions offered
by others such as Buzzell (1964) and Howard and Sheth (1969) in marketing, of
Blalock (1962,1964) in sociology, and of Izrik and Meyer (1987) in philosophy.
Howard and Sheth (1969) make the point quite clearly:
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We tend to hide behind the belief that operational definitions and
measurements ensure that we have obtained the meanings that we
want.... The important but subtle point is that we m ust have some
knowledge of a construct... other than that given by a specific and
concrete set of operations in order to know whether the operations
are adequate to the task in the first place. For the knowledge, we
m ust go back to the meaning that we originally imposed when we
formulated the abstraction (p. 6-7).
Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider the history of these measures.

The Belk Scale
Belk (1984,1985; Ger and Belk 1993) proposed a multi-dimensional
conceptualization of materialism. His scale is presented in Figure 4. W ith this
use of the scale, the internal consistency of the subscales and the correlations
among them are important reliability issues. In considering the subscales
separately, Belk (1984) reports Coefficient Alphas of .68, .72, and .80 for the scales
measuring possessiveness, nongenerosity, and envy, respectively, when scales
were administered to a large sample of business students. W hen administered to
a larger, more diverse sample (business students, secretaries, students at a
religious institute, fraternity members, and blue collar workers), however,
Alphas of .57 to .64 were reported for the three subscales. Correlations among
the subscales, however, are not high. Reported subscale intercorrelations (Belk
1985) are: possessiveness and nongenerosity .25; possessiveness and envy .35;
nongenerosity and envy .30. In a later cross-cultural study (Ger and Belk 1990),
Alphas ranging from .42 to .69 were reported. This study, also included a fourth
subscale to measure tangibility. While Churchill (1979) suggests that for basic
research, Alphas of .60 are desirable; Nunnally (1978) established .70 as the
benchmark. Thus the results reported for the Belk scale raise questions about its
usefulness because of low internal consistency.
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FIGURE 4
THE BELK MATERIALISM SCALE

Possessiveness Subscale
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even if it has little monetary value.
I don't like to have anyone in my home when I'm not there.
I don't get particularly upset when I lose things. *
I am less likely than most people to lock things up.
Nongenerosity Subscale
I enjoy donating things for charity. *
I enjoy sharing what I have. *
I do not enjoy donating things to the needy.
•

I don't like to lend things, even to good friends.
When friends do better than me in competition it usually makes me feel happy for them. *
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home. *
When friends have things I cannot afford it bothers me.
I worry about people taking my possessions.
I don’t mind giving rides to those w ho don’t have a car. *
Envy Subscale
I don't seem to get what is coming to me.
People w ho are very wealthy often feel they are too good to talk to average people.
If I have to choose between buying something for myself versus for someone I love,
1 would prefer buying for myself.
I am bothered when I see people who buy anything they want.
There are certain people I would like to trade places with.
Preservation Subscale
I like to collect things.
I have a lot of souvenirs.
I tend to hang on to things I should probably throw out.
4 Reverse scored items.

Giiliz Ger and Russell W. Belk (1993), "Cross-Cultural Differences in Materialism," working
paper, University of Utah.
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Belk (1985) also suggests that materialism might be considered as a
single-factor construct which may adequately be measured w ith the aggregation
of the measurement scales. "The three oblique first-order factors reproduced the
three subscales and produced a single second-order factor with an eigenvalue
greater than one, accounting for just over 75 percent of shared variance" (p. 271).
Further, Belk (1985) reports Alphas of .66 to .73 for the overall scale, and
correlations between the aggregate scale (called "materialism") and the subscales
of .35 for possessiveness and materialism, .41 for nongenerosity and materialism,
and .48 for envy and materialism. He believes that this aggregated measure is
"adequate to begin exploring... [the] macro issues of consumer behavior" (p.
276) with respect to materialism.
As a test of nomological validity as well as an initial foray into macro
consumer behavior issues, Belk investigated the correlations between overall
materialism scores and measure of happiness and satisfaction in life. The
correlations were expected to be negative. At significance levels of .001, he found
that materialism and happiness correlate at -.26 and that materialism and life
satisfaction correlate at -.24. He cautions, however, that these statistics are
correlations only and do "not allow one to infer the direction of causality" (Belk
1985, p. 274). That is, one should not conclude from these results that materialist
causes unhappiness, for it may be that materialism arises in response to
dissatisfaction with life. Findings such as those reported by Belk (and anyone
using correlational analysis) merely demonstrate the relationship between two
constructs.
A second validity check involved testing the ability of the scale to
discriminate among groups of consumers thought to differ on degrees of
materialism. Using the groups noted above (blue collar workers, secretaries,
business students, fraternity members, and students at a religious institute), Belk
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(1985) found that, as hypothesized, the blue collar workers were the most
materialistic,3 with a mean scale score of 74.1. The religious institute students
were the least materialistic with a mean scale score of 70.6. These differences
were significant at the .001 level.
As a final test of convergent validity, Belk (1985) undertook a
three-generation study. Respondents were given a sentence completion
taskwhich addressed four purchase and consumption areas: spending and
acquiring, saving and consuming, giving and receiving, and precipitating
circumstances (to elicit purchase/consumption responses). While there were no
a priori hypotheses because of the open-ended nature of the questions, Belk
"thought that the responses would differ according to the materialistic traits of
the respondent" (p. 272). Overall, those scoring high on the materialism scale did
respond in ways which would be expected of a materialist. For example, those
scoring high on the nongenerosity subscale more often indicated that they were
more likely to buy a gift for themselves than those who scored low on the
subscale. It was also true, however, that there were no predictable patterns to the
responses. Sometimes statistically significant responses came from those scoring
high on all three subscales as well as on the overall scale. More often, however,
statistically significant differences in responses could be attributed to those
scoring high only on some of the subscales, or some of the subscales and the
overall materialism scale, or just the overall materialism scale.
A more recent test of convergent validity has been carried out in
conjunction with Ger and Belk's (1993) cross-cultural studies. Respondents were
asked to list five products which were important to them that they owned, five

3

Earlier research by Best and Connolly (1976) and Chinoy (1955) had shown that blue
collar workers were the most likely to engage in "compensatory consumption."
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they wanted to buy, and five they felt badly about not owning. (Later, a
cross-cultural panel of judges ranked the responses to these wish list questions
from materialistic products to non-materialistic products.) Respondents were
also presented with a list of twenty products, services, and experiences and were
asked to indicate which they considered to be luxuries and which were
necessities. Validity was assessed by correlations of the materialism scale scores
w ith the proportions of items seen as necessities as well as the proportions of
items considered to be materialistic. Ger and Belk (1993) found that materialism
correlated positively with the proportion of items identified as necessities and
w ith the proportion of materialistic items desired, but not with the proportion of
materialistic items already owned. The authors conclude that these results are
consistent with their conceptualization of materialism. The construct is not
measured by what you have but is related to the strong desire for possessions.
When the subscales were considered, these same relationships held for the
nongenerosity scale, but were just the reverse for envy and possessiveness, an
unanticipated result. There was no relationship between these product measures
and preservation. Thus, the validation tests were successful for the overall scale
and for one of the subscales, but not for the other three. This finding is not too
surprising given the low internal reliabilities for the subscales.
This same problem has been reported by other researchers who tested
Belk's scale and who used it along with measures of other consumer attitudes
and behaviors (c.f., Cole et al. 1992; Ellis 1991; Hunt et al. 1990; Richins and
Dawson 1992). Most of the research, detailed below, concluded that the three
subscales were not equally reliable. Because of this finding, there was general
agreement that aggregating the subscale scores to arrive at an overall measure of
materialism which can be used for research was not warranted. As for validity,
Cole et al. (1992) report that no data other than Belk's has been provided.
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Critiques and Tests of the Belk Scale
Working with an early version of the Belk scale, Ellis (1991) tested the two
approaches to measuring materialism proposed by Belk (aggregating the scores
into one and keeping the subscale scores separate) as well as a third alternative
that materialism "is a composite construct composed, in part, of the three
subscales. Such an interpretation does not require positive correlations among
the component constructs" (p. 5). To investigate these three approaches, Ellis
analyzed responses to Belk's scale using LISREL VII. Overall, "none of the tested
models were acceptable from the point of view of generally accepted goodness of
fit indicators" (p. 8). He concluded that, with the then current state of the scale, it
w ould be a mistake to take the aggregate of the three subscale scores as a
measure of materialism. He did not suggest, however, that the
three-dimensional concept of materialism should be thrown out, since there
m ight be "enough positively correlated factors that might be capturing some
aspects of this higher-order materialism construct" (p. 6).
Ellis suggested that part of the problem of "fit" (of the data to the model)
m ight be that, as then conceived, the three subscales did not provide
unidimensional measures of their appropriate constructs. By removing selected
items from the subscales, a better fit of the data to the model could be obtained.
For the present, however, Ellis urged further refinement of the subscales and
concluded with Belk that the use of the scales was "recommended for
exploratory research only" (p. 8).
Richins and Dawson (1992) also reviewed 12 separate data collections using
Belk's scales. They found Alphas of .09 to .81 for the individual subscales and
Alphas of .48 to .73 for the aggregate scale. The reliability coefficients at the
lower end are unacceptable (Churchill 1979; Nunnally 1978).
Cole et al. (1992) assessed both the reliability and validity of Belk's scale.
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Their factor analysis resulted in nine (instead of three) initial factors accounting
for 64.5 percent of the variance. Further, Alphas for the three subscales were low,
confirming other reports of a lack of internal consistency (possessiveness .42,
nongenerosity .30, envy .57). Finally, as tests of nomological validity, they found
that the overall materialism scale, as well as the envy subscale, correlated
relatively well with three measures of life satisfaction. The correlations were in
the direction hypothesized—a negative relationship between materialism and life
satisfaction. The final validity test was to ascertain convergent validity by
correlating Belk's scale with the Richins' scale (1987).4 The correlation was
positive (.489) and significant at the .01 level.
With the idea that materialists seek judgments of success, satisfaction, and
status from others, H unt et al. (1990) hypothesized that there should be a
relationship between materialism and locus of control. Specifically, it would be
expected "that external scorers would possess the other-based reference system
associated with high levels of m aterialism ... largely because they are envious of
others and only incidentally because of their possessiveness and nongenerosity"
(Hunt et al. 1990, p. 1102). The results of this study indicated modest support for
the hypothesis. Generally, as locus of control scores became more internal,
materialism scores diminished, even when controlling for the sex of the
respondents. The authors conclude that while the Belk scale is in need of further
refinement and testing, their study does provide some evidence of nomological
validity.
Hendrickson and Morrisette (1992) employed the scale in a study focused
on lifestyle analysis. While they stress that their research program needs further

4The Richins scale employed in this study was an early version which contained seven
items, mostly designed to measure happiness.
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development, initial results indicate that materialism may not be an independent
variable, but instead may be the result of the choice of a particular lifestyle. In
analyzing the results, they found the low Alphas for the subscales: .47 for
possessiveness, .39 for nongenerosity, and .56 for envy. As did other researchers,
they also found that Alphas could be improved by removing items from various
scales. Consequently they, too, concluded that the Belk scale required additional
refinement.

Revisions to the Belk Scale
Following the advice of such researchers, Belk has continued to refine his
materialism scale and to make it applicable for cross-cultural research (Ger and
Belk 1990,1993). The research has incorporated both qualitative and quantitative
methods and has stretched over thirteen countries. In the process, some of the
items in the subscales have changed and an additional subscale has been added.
Initially the new subscale was termed "tangibility"; most recently, however, it is
called "preservation." These changes have maintained the "moderately
satisfactory alpha levels" for the scale and its subscales (Ger and Belk 1993, p. 17)
and have addressed the concern expressed by Ellis that the subscales did not
positively correlate with the overall scale. Specifically, Ger and Belk (1993)
report Coefficient Alpha of .62 for the new overall scale and Alphas of .66 for
nongenerosity, .61 for possessiveness, .46 for envy, and .55 for preservation.
Further, "the correlations of the materialism scale with the subscales are
(omitting the subscale itself) 0.15,0.19,0.22, and 0.08 with nongenerosity,
possessiveness, envy, and preservation, respectively—all statistically significant"
(Ger and Belk 1993, p. 18)—except for India, Thailand, and Romania where none
are significant. With these changes, the Belk scale has addressed some of the
criticisms detailed above, thereby making it more warranted for research
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purposes. That Belk himself is a strong presence in the marketing discipline also
argues for inclusion of the scale in any study of materialism.

The Richins and Dawson Scale
The second materialism scale, proposed by Richins and Dawson (1992), also
represents a multidimensional conceptualization of materialism. W ith this scale,
however, three dimensions are hypothesized: the centrality of possessions in
one's life, the use of possessions to define success, and the use of possessions to
determine happiness. This scale is presented in Figure 5. With its publication in
the December 1992 issue of the Journal of Consumer Research, the Richins and
Dawson scale has only recently become generally available. For this reason, little
reported research has used the full scale. What has been reported w ould lead
one to assess it as a scale worthy of inclusion in a study of materialism. Richins
and Dawson (1992) tested the scale in three different studies in four
geographically distinct cities. They report Alphas for their subscales ranging
from .71 to .75 for the centrality subscale; Alphas of from .74 to .78 for the success
subscale; and Alphas of between .73 and .83 for the happiness factor. Because the
three factors "normally act in concert with respect to external variables" (p. 20),
the authors suggest that the subscale scores can be summed for an overall
materialism measure. Single scale Alphas varied between .80 and .88.
To validate the scale, Richins and Dawson investigated the relationship
between the scale and various behaviors and attitudes expected to correlate both
positively and negatively with materialism. The first test utilized Kahle's (1983)
List of Values. Overall, the mean materialism scores were significantly different
for those ranking financial security, warm relationships with others, and a sense
of accomplishment in their top three values and for those not ranking these
among the top three. For a second test, respondents were asked about the level of
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FIGURES
THE RICHINS AND DAWSON MATERIALISM SCALE

H appiness Subscale
I have all the things I really need to enjoy life. *
My life would be better if I owned certain things I don't have.
I wouldn't be any happier if I owned nicer things. *
I'd be happier if I could afford to buy more things.
It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can't afford to buy all the things I'd like.
Centrality Subscale
I usually buy only the things I need. *
I try to keep m y life simple, as far as possessions are concerned. *
The things I ow n aren't all that important to me. *
I enjoy spending money on things that aren't practical.
Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure.
I like a lot of luxury in my life.
I put less emphasis on material things than most people I know. *
Success Subscale
I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, and clothes.
Some of the most important achievements in life include acquiring material possessions.
I don't place much emphasis on the amount of material objects people ow n as a sign of success. *
The things I ow n say a lot about how well I'm doing in life.
I like to own things that impress people.
I don't pay much attention to the material objects other people own. *
* Reverse scored items.

Marsha L. Richins and Scott Dawson (1992), "A Consumer Values Orientation for Materialism
and Its Measurement: Scale Development and Validation," Journal of Consumer Research, 19 (3),
3 0 3 -3 1 6 .
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household income necessary to satisfy their needs. As expected, those scoring
high on the materialism scale needed significantly more income than those
scoring low. In the third test, self-centeredness was explored and found to
correlate positively with materialism. Correlations with measures of voluntary
simplicity, the fourth test, were not as successful, however. Finally, materialism
was correlated w ith measures of life satisfaction and contentment. Materialism
was negatively related to all five aspects of life measured on the Andrews and
Withy (1976) Delighted-Terrible scale;5 it w as positively correlated with Belk's
(1985) envy subscale, and negatively correlated with Rosenberg's (1965)
self-esteem scale. All of these relationships were statistically significant. These
tests provide evidence of both convergent and nomological validity.
The only other known attempt to try to determine the validity of the
Richins and Dawson scale is reported by Cole et al. (1992). As noted above,
however, they used was an early seven-item measure directed mostly at
happiness. Nevertheless, Cole et al. did find strong evidence of convergent
validity (the correlation between the two materialism scales was .489 and
significant at the .01 level). Further, correlations between the Richins (1987) scale
and three measures of life satisfaction were all statistically significant at the .01
level and were negative, as expected—thereby suggesting nomological validity.
Two other studies which employed the Richins and Dawson scale have
been reported. However, they did not address validity. Williams and Bryce
(1992) investigated the relationship between materialism and care for others via
behavioral measures of helpfulness and selfishness. While the hypotheses were

5

This scale is comprised of one question asked twice, once before a list of other questions,
and again after about a fifteen-to-twenty minute interval which is filled w ith the other questions.
Respondents are asked to evaluate how they feel about their lives now (taking into account what
has happened in the past year and what they expect of the future) using a seven point scale
anchored with "Terrible" at one end and "Delighted" at the other.
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not confirmed, the study is useful as a test of the materialism scale itself. After
factor analysis, the authors obtained factor loadings similar to those reported by
Richins and Dawson. The scale reliability measures were also consistent. The
Alpha for success was .80; for happiness it was .76; .68 was calculated for
centrality; and for the overall scale, the Alpha was .86.
McKeage (1992) used the Richins and Dawson scale along with a measure
of self-gifts to assess the relationship between materialism and self-indulgence.
She obtained a very dissimilar factor structure and so did not attempt any
subscale analysis. However, Coefficient Alpha for the overall scale was .86.
While no "official" hypothesis about the two materialism scales is
proposed, it is expected that the Richins and Dawson scale will continue to be the
more reliable of the two. While it is the less tested scale, initial results suggest
that it is more internally consistent. Further, the authors' initial work to establish
validity is encouraging. Accordingly, the Richins and Dawson scale is expected
to "match up" better with the self-concept measures employed in this study.

The Self-M onitoring Scale
The Self-Monitoring Scale, presented in Figure 6, developed by Snyder
(1979) and modified by Snyder and Gangestad (1986) will be used to measure the
self-monitoring construct. Snyder and Gangestad (1986) report a Coefficient
Alpha of .70 for the new scale. They also suggest that the validity of the scale can
be attested to from the research of others which correlated the previous scale
with behaviors expected to be associated with self-monitoring—especially since
the new version was developed in response to validity questions which arose in
the use of the original version. This scale is the only one which proports to
measure self-monitoring (Snyder and Gangestad 1986) and has been used by
researchers in various disciplines. For example, Sampson (1978) used the scale in
101
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a study of personality and concepts of identity. Covey et al. (1989) used the scale
in a study of dishonest behavior. In the communication field, G udykunst (1985)
investigated the impact of culture and self-monitoring on uncertainty reduction
processes. Lindsey and Greene (1987) assessed the phenomenon of social
knowledge using the scale.

The Intrinsic/Extrinsic Motivation Index (IE Index)
Intrinsic/extrinsic motivation will be measured by a modification of an
index developed by Holbrook (1986a), and extended by Bell, Holbrook, and
Solomon (1991). This scale is presented in Figure 7. Until Holbrook's index was
developed, intrinsic/extrinsic motivation scales were developed either to
measure the motivation of children or adolescents to do their school work (for
example, Harter 1980,1981) or to measure motivation of adults to perform some
task (often their job). For example, The Experience of Work (Cook et al. 1981) is a
compilation of scales relating to a variety of work-related behaviors and
motivations. The eleven intrinsic/extrinsic scales which are included in the
compendium all refer to satisfaction with work, to rewards from work, or to the
value of work. Another set of intrinsic/extrinsic scales measure "intrinsic task
interest"—motivation to perform a task based on whether or not some extrinsic
rew ard (Wicker et al. 1990)—was available (see for example Mayo 1976). In a
review of measures of intrinsic/extrinsic motivation, Holbrook (1986a) concludes
that he is "unaware of any competing instruments suitable for use in the context
of consumer behavior" (p. 36).
Holbrook acknowledges (1986a; personal conversation, November 7, 1992)
that his scale is in its very early stages of development. He admits to enjoying
developing scales but not to refining them. "Some attempt was made to purify
the ... IE index by removing weakly correlated items. However this approach
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FIGURE 7
THE INTRINSIC/EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION INDEX

When I read a magazine, listen to the radio, or watch television, I always know what I expect to
get out of it. *
When I take a walk I always like to have a specific destination. *
W inning isn't everything, it's the only thing. *
When I fix something or do chores around the house, I am just puttering around for the fun of it.
In playing cards, board games, or video games, winning matters less than how you play the
game.
I w ould keep doing the things that I do for a living even if I w on the lottery.
When I read a magazine, listen to the radio, or watch television, I just appreciate the experience
on its own terms.
When I perform some creative activity such as writing, drawing, or playing a musical instrument,
I set a goal for myself to try to achieve*
When I engage in noncompetitive sports like skiing, jogging, or body-building, I tend to view the
activity as an end in itself.
I would not throw a party or take someone out to dinner unless I expected to enjoy the
companionship of the people involved.
When I perform some creative activity such as writing, drawing, or playing a musical instrument,
I am aware that the process is inherently its own reward.
When I play a competitive sport such as tennis, golf, or ping pong, my primary motivation is to
enjoy the game for its ow n sake.

* Reverse scored items

Adapted from Morris B. Holbrook (1986), "Aims, Concepts, and Methods for the Representation
of Individual Differences in Esthetic Responses to Design Features," Unpublishedmanuscript,
Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, N ew York, N ew York 10027.
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produced only modest improvements and was therefore omitted for the sake of
avoiding search bias" (Holbrook 1986 p. 26). Finally, Holbrook (1986b) suggests
that the IE Index m ust be subjected to tests over time to determine its usefulness.
Its inclusion in this study does just that.

The Self-Esteem Scale
Self-esteem will be measured using Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale,
presented in Figure 8. It is a short, ten-item scale which provides a global
measure of self-esteem. This scale has been widely used and its psychometric
properties have been well demonstrated (Blascovich and Tomaka 1991).
Cronbach Alphas of .77 and .88 have been reported for the scale. Test-retest
reliability is equally as good. Convergent validity has been demonstrated with
various measures as has discriminant validity (Blascovich and Tomaka 1991).

The Self-Actualization Scale
Self-actualization will be measured by the Short Index of Self-Actualization
(Jones and Crandall 1986, Crandall and Jones 1991) which is presented in Figure
9. Cronbach Alphas of between .63 and .68 (Flett et al. 1991) have been reported
for the scale, and a twelve-day test-retest reliability of .69 has been achieved
(Crandall and Jones 1991). Until this Short Index was developed, the two "best
known measures of self-actualization" were Shostrom's Personal Orientation
Inventory (POI; Shostrom 1964) and the Personal Orientation Dimensions (POD;
Shostrom 1975) (Flett et al. 1991). However, the POI contains 150 forced-choice
items and the POD consists of 260 such items, making them both time consuming
and cumbersome to administer (Flett et al. 1991). The Short Index, which
contains only 15 items, was developed for use when researchers wanted an
overall measure of self-actualization—as is the case in this study. The Short
1 05
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FIGURE 8
THE SELF-ESTEEM SCALE

I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.
I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. *
I am able to do things as well as most other people.
I feel I do not have much to be proud of. *
I take a positive attitude toward myself.
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
I wish I could have more respect for myself. *
I certainly feel useless at times. *
At times I think I am no good at all. *
* Reverse scored items.

Morris Rosenberg (1965), Society and the Adolescent Self Image, Princeton, NY:
Princeton University Press.
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FIGURE 9
THE SHORT INDEX OF SELF-ACTUALIZATION

I do not feel ashamed of any of my emotions.
I feel I m ust do what others expect of me. *
I believe that people are essentially good and can be trusted.
I feel free to be angry at those I love.
It is always necessary that others approve what I do. *
I d on't accept my own weaknesses. *
I can like people without having to approve of them.
I fear failure. *
I avoid attempts to analyze and simplify complex domains. *
It is better to be yourself than to be popular.
I have no mission in life to which I feel especially dedicated. *
I can express my feelings even when they may result in undesirable
consequences.
I do not feel responsible to help anybody. *
I am bothered by fears of being inadequate. *
I am loved because I give love.

* Reverse scored items.

Alvin Jones and Rick Crandall (1986), "Validation of a Short Index of
Self-Actualization,"Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12 (1), 63 - 73.
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Index has been used by several researchers (Richard and Jex 1991; Schelle and
Bonin 1989; Watson, Morris and Hood 1990), and Flett et al. (1991) conclude that
"initial psychometric investigations have suggested that the increasing use of the
scale is warranted" (p. 322).

SAMPLE DESIGN
Most materialism research has been conducted with homogeneous groups.
For example, Moschis (1976,1984), Moschis and Moore (1982) and Moschis and
Churchill (1978) used middle school and high school adolescents. W ard and
Wackman (1971) and Ward, Wackman and Wartells (1977) used elementary
school children. In Belk's studies (1984,1985), 80 percent of his sample were
college students, though he did address small samples of secretaries (39) and
machine shop workers (27). His more recent cross-cultural research (Ger and
Belk 1993) has been conducted w ith graduate students, most of whom are
enrolled in an MBA, or equivalent, program. Initial research by Richins and
Dawson (1990) surveyed graduate and undergraduate students from three
separate universities. Othman (1988) also employed a student sample for his
dissertation, though he restricted his survey to students at one university. In
their larger scale development study, however, Richins and Dawson (1992)
utilized a heterogeneous sample of randomly-chosen residents of households in
four cities.
This study also utilized a heterogeneous sample. A questionnaire, with the
previously outlined materialism and attitude and behavior scales and
demographic data questions, was administered to a stratified proportional
random sample of the adult population in the Peninsula area of Southern
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Virginia. The Peninsula is part of the larger Hampton Roads Metropolitan
Statistical Area. Recently, the U.S. government expanded the MSA to include
three additional counties, two in Virginia and one in North Carolina. This new
MSA, now named the Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA-NC MSA,
ranks as thirty-first in the nation with a population of 1.5 million people (Daily
Press, August 25,1992). The Peninsula itself is one of the fastest growing areas in

the United States. With a five-year growth rate of 6.6 percent, it outstrips the U.S.
as a whole (5 percent), the Commonwealth of Virginia (6 percent), and the state's
capital, Richmond (5.6 percent). More specifically, the sample was comprised of
residents of Hampton, Newport News, Poquoson, and York County, Virginia.
Respondents were selected so that the percentage of respondents from each city
or county was equal to the proportion of Peninsula residents living in the city.
Thirty-seven percent of the respondents were to be chosen at random from
Ham pton residents; 48 percent of the respondents were to be chosen at random
from Newport News residents; 12 percent of the respondents were to be chosen
at random from York County residents; three percent of the respondents were to
be chosen at random from Poquoson residents.
A target sample size of 300 was established. Because the research
hypotheses were tested with correlation analysis, the sample size was selected
according to a statistical power analysis approach, advocated by Cohen (1988),
which is appropriate when the significance of a product moment correlation
coefficient is desired. While the significance level of a test refers to the probability
of rejecting the null hypothesis if the null hypothesis is true (a type I error), the
power of a test refers to the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis if it is
false (avoiding a type II error). Thus, power is the flip side of significance; a low
significance level and high power are desirable. For this research, because the
hypotheses were tested with correlation analysis, sample size was determined
109
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from the tables provided by Cohen (1988) for use in planning experiments which
will employ correlation analysis. The table is presented in Table 1. To determine
the sample size, the desired significance level, the m inimum value of the
correlation to be detected, and the desired power m ust all be specified. The
rationale for each of these decisions is presented next.
First, a significance level of .05 was employed, assuming a one tailed test
since the hypotheses suggested the direction of the relationship among the
measures to be correlated. Second, since many of the scales employed in this
research are still exploratory, and since this is social science research, detecting
correlations as "low" as .20 would be desirable. This decision was made for two
reasons. As detailed earlier in this chapter, most of the correlations of
materialism scales with other measures, such as life satisfaction, were in the .20
to .30 range. Second, Cohen (1988) explains that "many relationships pursued in
'soft' behavioral science are of this order of magnitude" (p. 79). He quotes
Thurstone as saying that "in psychology, we measure men by their shadows."
That is, while there may be strong hypothetical relationships among theoretical
constructs (such as materialism and self-esteem), a great deal of noise,
"measurement unreliability, lack of fidelity to the construct," accompanies the
attempt to operationalize the relationship.
This, in turn, will attenuate the correlation in the population
between the constructs as measured. Thus if two constructs in theory
... can be expected to correlate .25, and the actual measurement of
each is correlated .63 with its respective pure construct, the
observed correlation between the tw o fallible measures of the
construct would be reduced to .25 (.63)(.63)=.10. Since the above
values are not unrealistic, it follows that often... we are indeed
seeking to reject null hypotheses... when r [the correlation
coefficient] is some value near .10 (p. 79).
Third, while a power of 80 is conventional (Cohen 1988, p. 100), for this type of
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TABLE 1
SAMPLE SIZE TABLE

a = .05

Power

.10

.20

.30

.40

.50

.60

.70

.80

.90

.25

97

24

12

8

6

4

4

3

3

.50

272

69

30

17

11

8

6

5

4

.60

361

91

40

22

14

10

7

5

4

.70

470

117

52

28

18

12

8

6

4

.75

537

134

59

32

20

13

9

7

5

.80

617

153

68

37

22

15

10

7

5

.85

717

178

78

43

26

17

12

8

6

.90

854

211

92

50

31

20

13

9

6

.95

1078

266

116

63

39

25

16

11

7

.99

1570

387

168

91

55

35

23

15

10

Jacob Cohen (1988), Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, Second
Edition, New York: Academic Press, p. 101.
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research a power of 95 was selected to be consonant w ith the significance level of
.05. W ith these decisions, the table indicates that a sample size of 266 is
necessary.

DATA COLLECTION
Data for the study were collected via a questionnaire using the drop-off
and pick-up methodology. The questionnaire contained the various scales
detailed above as well as demographic questions to collect data about
respondents' age, sex, occupation, income, education, and ethnic background. (A
copy of the questionnaire is included in the Appendix.) In one way or another,
each of these demographic variables has been hypothesized to relate to
materialism. Thus it was important to use them to control for their possible
confounding effects. Collection of the demographic information also made it
possible to assess the goodness of fit between the population and the sample
along demographic lines.
For the actual data collection, survey administrators were given the
following instructions.
Go to the first address on the list. Knock on the door and ask the
person who answers if he/she is 18 years of age or over. If so, ask
for his/her participation in the survey. If the person agrees to
participate, leave the survey. Go to the next address on the list.
Once the surveys are distributed, go back to the first address and
pick them up in sequence. If the person who answers the door is
not over 18, ask if there is someone at home who is. If so, ask for
that person's cooperation with the survey. If there is no one over
18, do not leave a survey. Go on to the next house/apartm ent on
the street. If the individual who answers the door is unwilling to fill
out the survey, thank him /her and go to the next house/apartm ent
on the street. Repeat this procedure until you find someone on the
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street who is willing to fill out the survey.
Because of safety considerations, survey administrators were told only to
go into neighborhoods which were considered to be safe and not to administer
surveys after dark. To capture individuals who work outside the home during
the week, surveys were administered on weekends as well as on week days.

DATA ANALYSIS
To determine the compatibility of the sample with the population from
which it was drawn, the Chi-square statistic was computed.
To compute scale and subscale scores, responses to the items for each scale
were sum m ed according to procedures established for each scale. Usually
several items needed to be adjusted for reverse scoring.
To evaluate the two materialism scales, Cronbach's Alpha was computed as
a measure of internal reliability of the scales. Correlations among and between
the subscales and the overall scale were computed for each materialism scale.
These results were then compared with those reported in other studies. Finally,
confirmatory factor analysis was run to verify the factor structure of each scale
which had been reported by the authors.
To evaluate the research hypotheses, scores for the self-monitoring,
extrinsic/intrinsic motivation, self-esteem, and self-actualization scales were
computed and then correlated with the materialism scale and subscale scores.
If these correlations are in the directions hypothesized and are statistically
significant (at the .05 level), then the study provides some measure of the
construct validity of the scales. Weiss (1991) notes that while tests such as these,
which make use of a "nomological network," can make a convincing case for the
validity of the scale, construct validity cannot be demonstrated solely by this
113
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technique (p. 283). Accordingly, convergent validity was also assessed by
correlating the results for responses from the two materialism scales with
responses to the four behavior/attitude scales.
Finally, to assess the differences between people scoring high and people
scoring low on the materialism scales, cluster analysis was run. Because it did not
provide conclusive results, respondents were grouped into terciles based on their
scores on the Richins and Dawson scale and the top and bottom groups were
analyzed for differences in the self measures as well as demographics.
The results of these analyses are reported in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS OF THE STUDY

This chapter presents the results of the data analysis and interpretations of
the findings of the study. It begins with a consideration of the data itself.
Secondly, the two materialism scales are discussed, focusing on scale reliability
and confirmatory factor analysis. Tests of the research hypotheses are addressed
next, along w ith the construct validity of the two materialism scales. Finally, the
data are analyzed with an eye toward developing a profile of materialists.

CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS
Of the 280 surveys which were obtained, 278 were usable. The other two
contained so many unanswered items as to be useless. Thus, the 266 surveys
necessary to allow for testing the significance of the correlations in the
hypothesis tests, as described in the previous chapter, were obtained. The sample
selection criteria and data collection procedures, described in Chapter Three,
were designed to insure a stratified proportional random sample of residents
living in the four jurisdictions which comprise the Virginia "Peninsula":
Hampton, Newport News, Poquoson, and York County. Examination of the
demographics of the survey respondents provides evidence that the goal of the
sampling design was closely met. The Chi-square test which indicates that the
difference between the target percentages and actual sample is not statistically
115
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significant also supports this conclusion (see Table 2).
When further demographics are considered, however, statistically
significant differences between sample and population are present for all
categories except income. Table 3 presents the demographic data for both the
sample and the Peninsula along with the results of the Chi-square tests. The data
for the Peninsula population was obtained from the research department of the
local newspaper, the Daily Press. All income levels are well represented in the
sample (Chi-square = 3.827; p = .281). However, there are more females in the
sample (62 percent) than in the population (52 percent). Younger respondents
(the 18-to-34 age group) are over represented, while the 50 and over group is
under represented. People with a high school education or less are under
represented, while those with "some college" are over represented; college
graduates are well matched between sample and population. When considering
the ethnic background, African-Americans are under represented in the sample,
but members of other ethnic groups (Asians, Hispanics, Native Americans, and
"other") are over represented.
Three explanations may account for the differences between the sample and
the population. First, the Daily Press data were based on a survey conducted in
January and February 1992 by Belden Associates, and on information from the
1992 Survey of Buying Power. Surveys for this study were collected in February
and March 1993. Given the rapid growth of population in the area—6.6 percent
per year, as noted in Chapter Three—the demographics could have changed in
the twelve m onths between the Belden survey and this one. Secondly, the
Belden survey itself has a "sample tolerance of plus or minus 3.5 percentage
points" (Daily Press 1993, p. 19). Third, it certainly must be considered that the
original sampling methodology may have been flawed. It assured geographic
proportionality, but it did not insure proportionality in other areas.
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Table 2
Population Distribution: Sample and Peninsula
(Each city's population as a percent of total)

Sample

Population

City
Hampton

.33

.37

Chi-square

Newport News

.48

.48

p = .316; df = 3

Poquoson

.04

.03

York County

.15

.12

3.537
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Table 3
Demographics: Sample and Population

Sample

Population

Gender
Female
Male
No Answer

61.9
34.2
4.0

52.0
48.0

Chi-square = 16.342
p = .000

Age
18-34
35-49
50+
No Answer

54.3
32.4
13.3
1.1

40.0
36.0
24.0

Chi-square = 22.748
p = .000

Household Income
Less than $25k
$25-$34.9k
$35-$49.9k
$50k+
No Answer

31.7
19.1
22.3
20.5
6.5

32.0
19.0
22.0
27.0

Chi-square = 3.827
p = .281

Education
Some High School
High School Graduate
Some College
College Grad +
No Answer

1.4
17.6
52.9
27.4
0.7

11.0
37.0
21.0
30.0
1.0

Chi-square = 163.044
p = .000

Occupation *
Blue Collar
White Collar
Military
Other
No Answer

11.2
58.2
6.8
19.4
4.4

39.0
51.0
10.0

Ethnic Background
Black
White
Other
No Answer

14.7
76.3
8.3
1.8

28.0
68.0
4.0

Chi-square = 32.986
p = .000

* Chi-square was not calculated for Occupation because of difficulties in
comparing occupational categories.
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While the drop-off-and-pick-up method did result in the desired proportional
geographic stratification of the sample, it may have also resulted in the underand over-representation in other areas. Women may have been more inclined to
comply with a request to fill out the survey. They may also be the individual
most likely to answer the door; the instructions were to enlist the cooperation of
whoever came to the door, if that person were 18 years of age or over. The
difference in education levels may be accounted for in three ways. First, people
with "some high school" may not have been willing to admit to not having a
diploma (since the drop-off and pick-up was a less anonymous data collection
procedure). Secondly, people who have attended some of the private business
colleges may have checked "some college." Third, those with less than a high
school education or only a high school diploma tend to either be older a n d /o r
live in areas considered to be unsafe. The under representation of older people
may have simultaneously led to an under representation of those without a high
school degree. Similarly, not having the survey administrators go into unsafe
areas may have similarly biased the education results. The differences in "ethnic
background" may be reflective of the current controversy over racial and ethnic
terminology. A recent study into the ethnic identity of Peninsula residents
(Petersen 1993) reports that not all who consider themselves black believe that
the term "African-American" describes them well. Because of multi-racial
backgrounds, because country-of-origin may be the Caribbean basin, some who
consider themselves black may not have checked "African-American" on the
survey, preferring another category such as Hispanic or "Other."
After acknowledging these discrepancies, an important question remains
unanswered. Do these differences between sample and population cause a loss of
confidence in the study's conclusions? Had the objective of the research been to
derive population estimates of personality traits, attitudes, or values, then the
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difference between sample and population would have been of strong concern.
The purpose of this research, however, was to test hypotheses about materialism
and measures of the self. The correlation analyses are not dependent on the
match between sample and population. Further, as reported below, the match
between this study's results and those reported by the authors of the two
materialism and the four self scales are quite similar in most areas. Correlations
between the materialism scales and the demographic variables are similar to
those reported by the scales' authors. Additionally, Coefficient Alphas, scale
means, standard deviations and ranges for almost all of the materialism and self
scales are consistent with those reported in other studies. These consistencies
lead one to have confidence in the hypotheses tests and conclusions of this study.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
After correcting the responses for the reverse scored items, means, standard
deviations, and ranges were calculated for the six scales. These measures were
then compared with those reported by the scales' authors a n d /o r other
researchers. The calculations resulting from this study's data generally are
consistent with those from other studies. The results and comparisons with other
research are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
To assess the "fit" of the data to the assumptions of the various analytical
techniques and statistical tests employed in this study, the data were examined
for normality and for homoscedasticity (equal variances). As the information in
Table 6 indicates, the normality assumption is met for all six scales. In every case,
skewness, which measures the "degree to which a distribution of cases
approximates a normal curve" (Nie et al. 1975, p. 184), and kurtosis, which
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Table 4
Materialism Scales
Comparison of Results

Richins and Dawson Scale
(Journal o f Consumer Research, December 1992, p. 303-316)
Scale

Mean
Study R&D*

Std. Dev.
Study R&D*

Range
Alpha
Study R&D** Study R&D

Overall scale

50.8

46.8

10.1

9.4

23-77

20-84

.83

.80-.88

Happiness

14.2

13.1

4.3

3.9

5-24

5-25

.74

.73-.83

Centrality

21.5

19.6

4.1

4.1

8-32

9-33

.64

.71-75

Success

15.5

14.3

4.1

3.9

6-27

6-30

.68

.74-.78

* Average of three surveys
** Actual range over the three surveys

Belk Scale
(Working Paper 1993 — USA sample only)
Scale

Mean
Study Belk

Std. Dev.
Study Belk

Range
Study Belk

Alpha
Study Belk

Overall scale

56.8

61.1

8.6

NA

30-80

NA

.66

.62

Possessiveness

14.5

14.0

2.8

NA

6-20

NA

.38

.61

Nongenerosity

19.1

22.7

4.9

NA

9-32

NA

.64

.66

Envy

12.4

14.2

3.4

NA

5-21

NA

.50

.46

Preservation

10.8

10.1

2.9

NA

3-15

NA

.65

.55
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Table 5
Self Scales
Comparison of Results

Scale

M ean
Study Other*

Std. Dev.
Study Other

Range
Study Other

Alpha
Study O ther

Self-Esteem

34.1

NA

5.1

NA

17-40

NA

.83

.77-88

Self-Actualization

62.2

44.2

9.1

7.3

35-87

NA

.68

.63-.68

Self-Monitoring

65.6

NA

15.2

NA

28-112

NA

.78

.70-.79

Intrinsic/Extrinsic
Motivation

53.4

NA

7.8

NA

32-76

NA

.41

.68-.74

* For Self-Esteem scale, "Other" results are those reported by Dobson, et al. (1979),
Fleming and Courtney (1987), and Richins and Dawson (1992).
For Self-Actualization, Crandall and Jones (1991), Flett et al. (1991), and McLeod
and Vodanovich (1991).
For Self-Monitoring, Synder and Gangstead (1986), Bell, Holbrook and
Solomon (1991).
For Intrinsic/Extrinsic Motivation, Holbrook (1986), Bell, Holbrook and
Solomon (1991).
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Table 6
Tests for Normality

Skewness

Kurtosis

Richins and Dawson Scale

-.0314

-.2299

Belk Scale

-.1900

-.0447

Self-Esteem Scale

-.9571

.4609

Self-Actualization Scale

.1357

-.0053

Self-Monitoring Scale

.2039

-.1072

-.1542

.0493

IE Index

NOTES:
Skewness is a "statistic to determine the degree to which a distribution of cases approximates a
normal curve, since it measures deviation from symmetry" (Nie et al. 1975, P. 184). Values near
zero indicate a symmetrical bell-shaped curve. Positive values indicate that cases are clustered
more to the left of the mean, with the most extreme values on the right. Negative values indicate
clustering to the right.
Kurtosis is a "measure of the relative peakedness or flatness of a curve defined by the
distribution of cases" (Nie et al. 1975, p. 185). Values near zero indicate a normal distribution.
Positive values are indicative of a more peaked (narrow) distribution than normal. Negatiave
values indicate a flatter, more elongated, distribution of cases.
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measures the "relative peakedness or flatness of a curve as defined by the
distribution of cases" (Nie et al. 1975, p. 185), are close to zero, indicating a close
to normal distribution. To test the homogeneity of variance assumption, residual
plots were examined for the association between each of the materialism scales
and the self scales. The plots are presented in Table 7. There seems to be no gross
violation of this assumption either. The knowledge that the data conform to
acceptable standards allowed the analysis to proceed.
The final general assessment was to explore the relationships between
demographics and the materialism measures. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
was run to assess the differences in mean materialism scores for the demographic
categories of gender, age, education, household income, and ethnic background.
Because of unequal sample sizes, the "regression" or "unique" option for
calculating sums of squares was selected (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1985;
SPSS-X User's Guide 1988). In the initial ANOVA calculations, interactions could

not be computed because too many cells were empty. Some combinations of
demographic categories, or treatments, were not represented. To deal with this
problem, categories were combined for some variables. As a result, two-way
interactions could be calculated. Consistent with computations by Belk (1985;
Ger and Belk 1990,1993) and Richins and Dawson (1992), correlation analysis
was also run for the overall scales and subscales with education, age, gender, and
household income. For both types of analysis, a significance level of .05 was
used, unless otherwise noted.

The Richins and Dawson Scale
ANOVA. For the Richins and Dawson scale, Analysis of Variance
indicated two significant interactions. The first was between the ethnic
background and sex (F=2.337; significance = .099) of the respondents. The second
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Table 7
Residual Plots

The Belk Scale (Y) and Self-Esteem Scale (X)
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Table 7 (Continued)
Residual Plots
The Belk Scale (Y) and the Self-M onitoring Scale (X)
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Table 7 (Continued)
Residual Plots

The Belk Scale (Y) and the Richins and Dawson Scale (X)
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Table 7 (Continued)
Residual Plots

The Richins and Dawson Scale (Y) and The Self-Actualization Scale (X)
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Table 7 (Continued)
Residual Plots

The Richins and Dawson Scale (Y) and The IE Index (X)
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was between the education level and sex of the respondents (F=3.43; significance
= .034). Table 8 presents the ANOVA table. The ethnic/sex interaction was
investigated, even though it is not significant at the .05 level (p = .099). The
Tukey multiple was selected for evaluating the comparisons since it is
appropriate when doing all comparisons. Further, when sample sizes are
unequal, Tukey is conservative (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1985). A
significance level of .10 was selected for this because of the significance level of
the F statistic. Ethnic background was measured at three levels (black, white and
other); sex was measured at two levels (female and male). After calculating the
difference in mean materialism scores for all fifteen possible comparisons, only
those between black females and other males, between black males and white
females, and between black males and other males were large enough to not
contain zero in the confidence interval. The result of the comparisons was that
none of these were significant, an occurrence which, while unusual, is not
unlikely (Markowski, personal communication, July 22,1993). This result is also
consistent with other research reports of either no relationship or an inconsistent
relationship between materialism and gender.
To investigate the interaction between education and sex, a similar
procedure was followed, except that a significance level of .05 was used, since the
F statistics was significant at p = .034. Education was measured at three levels
(high school degree or less, some college, college degree or more). For six
comparisons, the difference in mean materialism scores, when averaged over
age, household income and ethnic background, was large enough for zero not to
be in the confidence interval. The following pairs were selected: high school
females versus high school males, high school males versus college grad females,
high school males versus college grad males, some college females versus college
grad females, some college females versus college grad males, and some college
130
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Table 8
ANOVA Table: Richins and Dawson Scale and
Selected Demographic Variables

Mean
Square

Source of Variation

Sum of
Squares

DF

Main Effects

1288.793

10

128.879

1.271

.249

Ethnic background

322.407

2

161.203

1.590

.207

Education

181.506

2

90.753

.895

.410

2

268.353

2.647

.074

536.707

Age

F

s i8
ofF

31.8%

1

31.896

.315

.576

489.922

3

163.307

1.611

.188

3675.371

39

94.240

.930

.593

104.228

4

26.057

.257

.905

Ehtnic Age

340.259

4

85.065

.839

.502

Ethnic Sex

473.770

2

236.885

2.337

.099
.256

Sex
Household Income
2-Way Interactions
Ethnic Educ

Ethnic Income

795.531

6

132.588

1.308

Educ

312.256

4

78.064

.770

.546

3.430

.034
.923

Age

Educ

Sex

695.320

2

347.660

Educ

Income

198.027

6

33.004

.326

Age

Sex

110.052

2

55.026

.543

.582

Age

Income

525.204

6

87.534

.864

.523

Sex

Income

130.537

3

43.51

.429

.732

Explained

6002.815

49

122.506

1.209

.187

Residual

18549.494

183

101.363

Total

24552.309

232

105.829

278 cases were processed.
45 cases (16.2 pet) were missing.
Due to empty cells or a singular matrix, higher order interactions have been suppressed.
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males versus college graduate males. Of the six, the only comparison which was
statistically significant was that between males having a high school degree or
less and males with an undergraduate degree or higher. When averaged over the
other demographic variables included in the analysis, "high school males" have
mean materialism scores 7.8 points higher than "college graduate males" with an
error of no more than 7.47 points and a significance level of .05. This result is
consistent with Belk's (1985) hypothesis and finding that blue collar workers
were more materialistic than any of the other groups he surveyed. Of course, not
all those with a high school degree or less are blue collar workers. But they are
more likely to be than are college graduates.
The only main effect which was significant was age (F=2.647; p = .074).
Since age was not part of either tw o-w ay interaction, it makes sense to
investigate it separately. The Bonferroni multiple was selected since the number
of comparisons was equal to the number of treatments (age was measured at
three levels). Also, Bonferroni is exact for unequal sample sizes (Neter,
Wasserman, and Kutner 1985). Because of the significance level of the F statistic,
a significance level of .10 was selected for the calculations. The results were that,
when averaged over sex, ethnic background, and education and income levels,
18-to-34 year olds had mean materialism scores which were 3.92 points higher
than 35-to-49 year olds, with an error of no more than 2.77 points. Further,
18-to-34 year olds had mean materialism scores which were 4.34 points higher
than those 50 years of age and older, with an error of no more than 3.98 points.
The contrast between the youngest group and the two other age groups,
indicates that the youngest age group had mean materialism scores which were
4.13 points higher than the average mean materialism score of the two older age
groups, with an error of no more than .41 points.
This finding is consistent with reports from other materialism researchers.
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Using the data from three of their four surveys, Richins and Dawson (1992)
report that the age correlation was the only one which was not "quite low" and
for which there was a discernible pattern. The median correlation between the
overall scale and age was -.19, indicating that as people age, they tend to become
less materialistic. Belk (1985; Ger and Belk 1993) has reported a similar
relationship. However, in a study of lifestyles, Hendrickson and Morrisett (1992)
found a positive correlation of the overall materialism scale with age.
Correlations. The correlation analysis in this study, as reported in Table 9,
results in much the same conclusions.1 The correlation between age and the
overall scale is -.22, and is the only demographic variable to significantly
correlate with materialism. A statistically significant correlation is also present
between age and each of the three subscales. The only other statistically
significant correlations are between income and the happiness subscale (-.15;
p=.018), and education and happiness (-.11; p=.065).

The Belk scale
ANOVA. For the Belk scale, as a result of Analysis of Variance, the only
significant difference in mean materialism score was for the gender variable, and
that was only significant at p = .085 (see Table 10). To investigate the nature of
the difference, the comparison between female and male mean materialism
scores was evaluated using the Bonferroni multiple (since the number of
comparisons was small and sample sizes were unequal). A significance level of
.10 was also used because of the significance of the F statistic reported above. The
result of the comparison was that, when averaged over age, ethnic background,

E xcep t for age, all correlations are Pearson product-moment correlations. For age,
correlations are point biserial correlations—which SPSSX automatically computes when
comparing a continuous and a dichotomous variable (Guilford and Fruchter 1978).
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Table 9
Correlations of M aterialism Scales w ith Demographics

Richins and Dawson Scale
Gender* Income

Educ.

Age

Overall Scale

-.1005
(.100)

-.2190
(.000)

.0062
(.921)

-.0655
(.297)

Happiness

-.1116
(.065)

-.2281
(.000)

.0562
(.362)

-.1477
(.018)

Centrality

-.0701
(.250)

-.2275
(.000)

-.0622
(.316)

.0124
(.843)

Success

-.0621
(.305)

-.1271
(.036)

.0248
(.687)

-.0587
(.347)

Belk Scale
Gender* Income

Educ.

Age

Overall Scale

-.0292
(.633)

-.1221
(.045)

.1913
(.002)

—.0730
(.245)

Possessiveness

-.0108
(.859)

-.0617
(.310)

.0206
(.738)

-.1014
(.103)

Nongenerosity

.0074
(.903)

-.0740
(.224)

.1903
(.002)

-.0076
(.903)

Envy

-.0361
(.553)

-.1950
(.001)

.1923
(.002)

-.1127
(.071)

Preservation

-.0956
(.114)

.0695
(.253)

-.0284
(.645)

.0182
(.772)

* Correlations for gender are point biserial correlations; all others are Pearson
product-moment correlations.
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Table 10
ANOVA Table: Belk Scale and
Selected Demographic Variables

Source of Variation

Sum of
Squares

DF

Mean
Square

F

Sig
ofF

977.175

10

97.718

1.333

.216

Ethnic background

309.667

2

154.833

2.111

.124

Education

Main Effects

114.183

2

57.092

.779

.461

Age

50.093

2

25.047

.342

.711

Sex

219.352

1

219.352

2.991

.085

Household Income

283.260

3

94.420

1.288

.280

3084.466

39

79.089

1.079

.360

2-Way Interactions
Ethnic Educ

249.236

4

62.309

.850

.495

Ehtnic Age

87.670

4

21.917

.299

.878

55.724

2

27.862

.380

.684

475.259

6

79.210

1.080

.376

Ethnic Sex
Ethnic Income
Educ

Age

127.490

4

31.873

.435

.783

Educ

Sex

218.108

2

109.054

1.487

.229

Educ

Income

281.028

6

46.838

.639

.699

Age

Sex

191.318

2

95.659

1.304

.274

Age

Income

183.874

6

30.646

.418

.867

Sex

Income

267.264

3

89.088

1.215

.306

Explained

4037.057

49

82.389

1.124

.288

Residual

13493.067

184

73.332

Total

17530.124

233

75.237

278 cases were processed.
44 cases (15.8 pet) were missing.
Due to empty cells or a singular matrix, higher order interactions have been suppressed.
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education and income levels, female mean materialism scores were 3.42 points
lower than the mean materialism scores for males, with an error of no more than
1.81 points. This conclusion is consistent with some materialism studies but not
others. As detailed in the next paragraph, conclusions about materialism and
gender are mixed.
Correlations. Correlation analysis of the Belk scale with the education,
age, gender, and income variables also supports the gender difference, as
reported in Table 9. And while neither Richins and Dawson (1992) nor Belk
(1985; Ger and Belk 1990,1993) have found a consistent relationship between
materialism and gender, Ger and Belk (1993) did find some significant
differences by gender for some of the subscales. Women scored higher than men
on possessiveness and preservation, while men scored higher than women on
envy. In this study, the differences between men and women were on the traits
of envy and nongenerosity as well as materialism overall. Additionally, age
correlated with materialism. The statistically significant age correlations are with
the overall scale (-.12; p = .045) and the envy (-.19; p = .001) subscale. These
results are consistent with the findings reported by Richins and Dawson. Finally,
there is one other significant correlation of income with envy (-.11; p = 071).

RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
As noted earlier, several of the scales used in this study are in their
formative stages. One contribution of this study is to provide further tests of
them. After correcting the responses for the reverse scored items, Coefficient
Alphas were calculated for the six scales. These results were then compared with
those reported by the scales' authors a n d /o r other researchers and found to be
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quite similar. The results and comparative figures are reported in Tables 4 and 5.

The Richins and Dawson Scale
For the Richins and Dawson scale and subscales, Chronbach Alphas
calculated in this study were generally consistent with those reported by its
authors (Richins and Dawson 1992). The overall scale Alpha was .83; the
happiness subscale had an Alpha of .74; for centrality, the Alpha was .64; for
success it was .68. These last two are below the threshold established by
N unnally (1978) of .70. They are, however, below the Alphas found by Richins
and Dawson (1992) of .71 to .75 for the centrality subscale and .74 to .78 for the
success subscale. To determine if any of the reliability coefficients might be
improved with the deletion of any of the scale items, item -to-total correlations
were calculated as well as scale Alphas with the removal of each item on an item
by item basis. For neither the overall materialism scale nor for any of the
subscales could the Alphas be improved. The results of this analysis are
presented in Table 11. As a result of this reliability analysis, one can have
confidence in further analysis with the overall materialism scale, but should use
caution when dealing with the subscales.

The Belk Scale
For the Belk scale and subscales, while the results of this study are
generally consistent with those reported by the author (Ger and Belk 1993, USA
sample only), the reliability coefficients are much lower and fall into
unacceptable ranges. In this study, the overall scale Alpha was .66, compared
w ith .62 reported by Ger and Belk (1993, USA sample only). Alphas for the
subscales were .64 for nongenerosity (.66, Ger and Belk), .50 for envy (.46, Ger
and Belk), .65 for preservation (.55, Ger and Belk), and .38 for possessiveness (.61,
137
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Table 11
Item-to-Total Statistics
Richins and Dawson Scale

Corrected
ItemSquared
Alpha
Total
Multiple
If Item
Correlation Correlation Deleted

Scale
Mean
If Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
If Item
Deleted

Happier if could buy more

47.6176

97.4621

.5126

.4178

.8191

Don't pay attention to other's goods *

48.4926

103.0184

.3708

.2690

.8267

Achievements = acquiring goods

48.8860

101.4002

.4041

.2385

.8252

Better life if own certain goods

48.3824

97.1005

.5368

.4327

.8178

Enjoy buying non-practical items

48.3676

102.8754

.3160

.1866

.8298

Goods = how w ell I'm doing

48.5625

101.9001

.3608

.2472

.8275

Try to keep my life simple *

48.4265

102.8433

.3761

.2857

.8265

Like to own impressive things

48.5625

96.5274

.5804

.3861

.8154

Buying things gives me pleasure

47.5882

101.2837

.4648

.2615

.8225

Have all I need to enjoy life *

48.9154

101.4209

.3685

.2848

.8272

Usually buy only what I need *

48.2757

103.2779

.2847

.2422

.8317

Admire owners of expensive items

48.3897

98.6225

.5302

.3947

.8187

Don't emphasize goods as signs
of success *

48.6875

101.5145

.4215

.2797

.8243

No happier if owned nicer things *

48.5000

99.9262

.4145

.2344

.8247

I like a lot of luxury in life

47.9890

98.9999

.4876

.3711

.8207

Things I own * important *

47.6801

102.0265

.3219

.1567

.8300

Emphasize material things less *

48.4449

103.6722

.3575

.2241

.8273

Am bothered when can't afford
to buy what I like

48.2941

98.5036

.5123

.3508

.8194

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 18 ITEMS; ALPHA = .8324

* Reverse scored items
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Table 11 (Continued)
Item-to-Total Statistics
Richins and Dawson Scale

Happiness Subscale
Corrected
Squared
Alpha
ItemIf Item
Multiple
Total
Correlation Correlation Deleted

Scale
Mean
If Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
If Item
Deleted

Happier if could buy more

10.6232

11.6539

.5787

.3646

.6616

Better life if owned certain goods

11.3877

11.8092

.5665

.3467

.6668

Have all I need to enjoy life *

11.9239

13.1033

.4196

.1820

.7221

No happier if owned nicer things *

11.5000

12.8400

.4266

.1848

.7206

Am bothered when can't afford
to buy what I like

11.2899

12.5702

.5151

.2700

.6877

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 5 ITEMS; ALPHA = .7382
* Reverse scored items

Centrality Subscale
Corrected
ItemSquared
Alpha
If
Item
Multiple
Total
Correlation Correlation Deleted

Scale
Mean
If Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
If Item
Deleted

Enjoy buying non-practical items

18.6813

15.5488

.2857

.1249

.6237

Try to keep my life simple *

18.7473

15.3513

.3945

.1780

.5906

Buying things gives me pleasure

17.9084

15.5835

.3749

.1591

.5966

Usually buy only what I need *

18.5934

14.3819

.4064

.1942

.5839

Like lot of luxury in my life

18.3114

14.3549

.4351

.1996

.5746

Things I own * important *

18.0000

15.4559

.2601

.0967

.6346

Emphasize material things less *

18.7692

16.1635

.3135

.1237

.6138

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 7 ITEMS; ALPHA = .6394
* Reverse scored items
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Table 11 (Continued)
Item-to-Total Statistics
Richins and Dawson Scale

Success Subscale
Scale
Mean
If Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
If Item
Deleted

Corrected
ItemSquared
Alpha
Multiple
If Item
Total
Correlation Correlation Deleted

Don't pay attention to other's goods *

12.8051

14.1430

.2648

.0916

.6770

Achievements = acquiring goods

13.2130

12.9508

.3769

.1556

.6436

Goods = how well I'm doing

12.8917

12.3795

.4278

.1896

.6260

Like to ow n impressive things

12.8881

11.8026

.4781

.2512

.6069

Admire owners of expensive items

12.7256

12.3882

.4499

.2360

.6183

Don't emphsize goods as signs
of success *

13.0036

12.8152

.4285

.1922

.6265

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 6 ITEMS; ALPHA = .6755
* Reverse scored items
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Ger and Belk). As noted before, Churchill (1979) has suggested that .60 is a
minimal requirement for scale reliability; Nunnally (1978) has stated that .70 is
the minimum acceptable level. Belk himself reports that the reliability levels
associated with his scale and subscales are "moderately satisfactory," but
suggests that in using a single scale for international research there is a trade off
between reliability and cross-cultural adaptability (Ger and Belk 1993, p. 9).
It may be instructive, at this point, to recall the inconsistencies reported in
Chapter Three between Belk's own findings and those who have used his scale in
other research. That this study also found inconsistent results, therefore, is not
unusual. However, one m ust use caution when comparing across studies. The
scale employed here is the latest version and is somewhat different from that
used by other researchers. At least four different versions of the Belk scale have
been reported in the literature.
To determine if any of the reliability coefficients might be improved with
the deletion of any of the scale items, item-to-total correlations were calculated
as well as scale Alphas with the removal of each item on an item by item basis.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 12. For only two of the
subscales could the Alphas be slightly improved. For example, if two of the
preservation subscale items were removed, the overall scale Alpha could be
raised: from .66 to .67 by removal of "I like to collect things" or from .66 to .68 by
removing "I have a lot of souvenirs." Neither of these improvements is
significant enough to warrant removal of the items. The reliability of the
preservation subscale can be raised from .65 to .67 if the item "I tend to hang on
to things I should probably throw out" is removed. As before, the alteration of
the scale does not seem to be warranted. The results of the reliability tests cast
doubt on the advisability of further analysis with either the overall materialism
scale or the subscales. Nunnally (1978) explains that scales with a Coefficient
141
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Table 12
Item-to-Total Statistics
The Belk Scale

Scale
Mean
If Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
If Item
Deleted

Upset w hen something is stolen

52.5351

68.6867

.2336

.1642

.6520

Enjoy having friends in my home *

54.8708

69.8240

.1701

.1888

.6581

Don't like to lend things

54.4022

65.6487

.3405

.3232

.6397

Happy for friends when they do w ell * 54.4170

68.8736

.2170

.1763

.6536

54.3063

64.8577

.3732

.2149

.6355

Don't mind giving rides to the car-less* 54.6310

67.2930

.3113

.2226

.6442

Bothered w hen friends have things
I cannot afford

54.8672

67.6786

.3326

.2423

.6434

Don't enjoy donating to needy

55.1255

68.6138

.2172

.1355

.6536

Would like to trade places w / some

54.3764

65.4060

.3281

.2424

.6407

Don't like anyone in my home if
I'm not there

53.4059

66.5532

.2574

.1881

.6494

Don't get what is coming to me

54.5793

67.3705

.2998

.2487

.6453

If have to choose, will buy for myself
instead of for loved one

54.9926

66.9333

.3185

.1934

.6432

Bothered when others buy what want

54.2214

66.4471

.2767

.2125

.6470

Enjoy sharing what I have *

54.8893

67.4470

.3822

.3588

.6401

Not upset when lose things *

53.1845

70.1436

.1212

.1021

.6639

Wealthy people feel are too good
to talk with average people

53.5867

69.0434

.1721

.1275

.6587

Keep things should throw out

52.9705

69.1991

.1491

.2139

.6618

Enjoy donating to charity *

54.8745

67.1101

.3590

.3576

.6406

Have lots of souvenirs

53.3358

71.6757

.0247

.3417

.6761

Less likely to lock up *

53.6273

69.5087

.1403

.1262

.6624

Like to collect things

53.4059

70.6939

.0734

.3145

.6704

Worry about possessions being taken

Corrected
ItemSquared
Alpha
Total
Multiple
If Item
Correlation Correlation Deleted

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 21 ITEMS; ALPHA = .6627
* Reverse scored items
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Table 12 (Continued)
Item-to-Total Statistics
The Belk Scale

Possessiveness Subscale
Scale
Mean
If Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
If Item
Deleted

Corrected
ItemSquared
Alpha
Total
Multiple
If Item
Correlation Correlation Deleted

Upset when something is stolen

10.2428

5.7554

.2093

.0510

.3169

Don't like anyone in my home if
I'm not there

11.1014

5.1097

.1762

.0354

.3566

N ot upset when lose things *

10.9022

5.3831

.2126

.0544

.3103

Less likely to lock things up *

11.3406

5.1490

.2342

.0551

.2855

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 4 ITEMS; ALPHA = .3824
* Reverse scored items

Nongenerosity Subscale
Scale
Mean
If Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
If Item
Deleted

Enjoy having friends in my home *

17.1387

20.0906

.2707

.1114

.6237

Don't like to lend things

16.6606

18.5547

.3424

.1965

.6073

Happy for friends when they do w ell * 16.6788

20.1895

.2436

.1340

.6302

Worry about possessions being taken

16.5730

18.9196

.2925

.1197

.6214

Don't mind giving rides to the car-less * 16.8869

19.1630

.3566

.1731

.6037

Bothered when friends have things
I cannot afford

17.1423

20.3863

.2714

.1399

.6232

Don't enjoy donating to needy

17.3978

20.6434

.1780

.0740

.6462

Enjoy sharing what I have *

17.1460

18.9603

.4906

.2911

.5786

Enjoy donating to charity *

17.1350

18.5861

.4867

.3078

.5756

Corrected
ItemSquared
Alpha
Total
If Item
Multiple
Correlation Correlation Deleted

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 9 ITEMS; ALPHA = .6405
* Reverse scored items
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Table 12 (Continued)
Item-to-Total Statistics
The Belk Scale

Envy Subscale
Corrected
Squared
Alpha
ItemIf Item
Total
Multiple
Correlation Correlation Deleted

Scale
Mean
If Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
If Item
Deleted

Don't get what is coming to me

9.9055
10.1345

7.7793
8.2629

.3120
.3616

.1197
.1342

.4213
.3962

If I have to choose, w ill buy for myself
instead of for loved one

10.5345

9.0672

.2141

.0738

.4832

Bothered when others buy what want

9.7600

8.1174

.2677

.0821

.4528

Wealthy people feel are too good
to talk with average people

9.1345

8.6570

.2280

.0770

.4770

Would like to trade places w / some

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 5 ITEMS; ALPHA = .5029
* Reverse scored items

Preservation Subscale
Corrected
ItemSquared
Alpha
If Item
Total
Multiple
Correlation Correlation Deleted

Scale
Mean
If Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
If Item
Deleted

Keep things should throw out

6.9529

4.7287

.3752

.1522

.6661

Have lots of souvenirs

7.3116

3.9316

.5511

.3135

.4257

Like to collect things

7.3659

4.3201

.4649

.2571

.5493

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 3 ITEMS; ALPHA = .6511
* Reverse scored items
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Alpha of less than .70 should be further examined because the low Alpha
indicates that sufficient measurement error remains in the scale to call its use into
question. The items in the scale may not be clearly written or they may not all be
sampling the content of the same construct (p. 230). In either case, the scale
warrants further refinement and testing.

The Self Scales
The descriptive statistics and reliability calculations for three of the self
scales were consistent with previous studies (the results are reported in Table 5).
This finding lends credibility to this study and provides confidence in the tests of
the hypotheses.
The one self scale for which results were not similar is the Intrinsic/
Extrinsic Motivation Index (IE Index). As discussed in the previous chapter,
Holbrook (1986a) acknowledges the exploratory nature of his scale. Further, a
modified version of the index was used in this research because several items in
the original scale duplicated items in the materialism, self-monitoring, and
self-actualization scales. When those items are put back in, the reliability
coefficient improves from .41 to .50. While this is a good measure of
improvement, several problems remain. First, an Alpha of .50 is below that
advocated for either basic or applied research (Churchill 1979; Nunnally 1978).
Second, if the reliability coefficient is improved with the addition of items from
scales measuring other constructs, the validity of the scale is called into question.
For these reasons, the work with this scale is considered to be purely exploratory
at this time. While further results are discussed, no conclusions are draw n about
measures of intrinsic/extrinsic motivation and materialism.
Except for the IE Index, the self scales have been widely employed by
researchers. As detailed in Chapter Three, the self-monitoring scale has been
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used in studies of dishonest behavior (Covey et al. 1989), of personality
(Sampson 1978), and of culture (Gudykunst 1985). Richins and Dawson (1992)
used the self-esteem scale, as have many other researchers (Blascovich and
Tomaka 1991). The short index of self-actualization is a newer scale, but has been
successfully employed in several personality studies (c.f., Richard and Jex 1991;
Schelle and Bonin 1989; Watson, Morris and Hood 1990). The materialism scales,
however, are still undergoing refinement and testing. One of the purposes of this
study was to provide a further test of the two scales. The next section addresses
the relationships among the overall materialism scales and their subscales as well
as the scales' factor structures.

CONVERGENT VALIDITY ASSESSMENT
As a test of convergent validity, the correlation between the two scales was
calculated. The relatively high correlation (.4691; p = .000) is evidence of
convergent validity. That the correlation is not closer to 1.00 indicates that the
two scales are not tapping exactly the same construct in the same way. One way
to understand this idea is to calculate the square of the correlation coefficient,
since it provides a measure of the amount of variation in one scale which is
accounted for by the variation in the other (Cohen 1988; Nunnally 1978). In this
case, the square of the correlation coefficient is .22, indicating that 22 percent of
the variation in the Belk scale is explained by the variation in the Richins and
Dawson scale and vice versa. This result is to be expected since, as noted in
Chapter Two, Belk conceives of materialism as a personality trait and Richins
and Dawson approach materialism as a value. Put another way, Belk measures
materialism indirectly, while Richins and Dawson measure it directly.
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Correlations among the subscales further support the differences between
the two measures. Richins and Dawson developed items to measure the
importance of possessions in a person's life (how central possessions are) and the
role of possessions in determining happiness and success. Belk developed items
to measure an individual's willingness to share what s /h e has with others
(nongenerosity), an individual’s reaction to others who have more (envy), a
tendency to control or retain ownership of one's possessions (possessiveness),
and a desire to collect and hold onto tangible possessions (preservation). As
Table 13 shows, there is not a great deal of overlap among these seven
dimensions of materialism. Half of the correlations among subscales are less than
.20, indicating that the variation in one subscale explains less than four percent of
the variation in the other. The low correlations between possessiveness and the
three Richins and Dawson subscales could simply be a function of the low
internal consistency of the possessiveness subscale (.38). The low, and
non-significant, correlations between preservation and tw o of the three Richins
and Dawson subscales could reflect the fact that preservation is not m easured in
the Richins and Dawson scale—though aspects of preservation are implied in the
centrality concept as indicated by the correlation analysis.
Two Belk subscales, however, do correlate positively (and significantly)
with two of the Richins and Dawson subscales. Correlation analysis indicates
that the more a person defines happiness and success by her/his possessions, the
more that person is nongenerous and envious of others. This sense of this
conclusion can be illustrated by examining the individual/collective dichotomy
present in the relationship between two other variables with which the reader
may be more familiar, freedom and equality. In his longitudinal study of value
hierarchies in the United States from 1968 to 1981, Rokeach (1973; Rokeach and
Ball-Rokeach 1989) found that while freedom ("independence, free choice") was
147
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Table 13
Correlations Among Subscales

Richins and Dawson
Overall
Scale

B e lk

Happiness

Centrality

Success

Possessiveness

.1587

.1388

(.004)

(.011)

.2061
(.000)

.2143
(.000)

.3331

.1413

.3657

.3821

(.000)

(.010)

(.000)

(.000)

Envy

.4199
(.000)

.1370
(.012)

.3317
(.000)

.3517
(.000)

Preservation

.0518
(.196)

.2188
(.000)

.0282
(.321)

.1318
(.015)

Overall Scale

.4260

.2537

.4691

(.000)

(.000)

.4140
(.000)

Nongenerosity

(.000)
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consistently ranked as the third most desired value, equality moved from
ranking seventh in 1968 to fourth in 1971 to twelfth in both 1974 and 1981. The
explanation for the relative positions of the two values was that as individual
freedom became more important, freedom for "me" came at the expense of
freedom for "thee." Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach conclude that in choosing
me-centered "pursuits of freedom, comfort, achievement, and excitement," the
value of equality declined (1989 p. 783). A similar difference between collective
and personal orientation is reflected in the results of this study. If one requires
possessions (and, sometimes, more possessions) to feel happy and successful,
then that same person is not likely to give away or share those possessions (lest
happiness and success be somehow diminished). That person is, however, likely
to be envious of those who have more since his/her ow n happiness and success
are diminished by not having as much as someone else.
Thus, the two measures are tapping some similar aspects of materialism.
Yet it is also clear that, as expected, the two scales address different dimensions.
Analysis of the factor structures of the scales further supports this conclusion.

CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
Data from this study were factor analyzed to determine if the factors found
by Belk and by Richins and Dawson could be replicated. In neither case were the
factor structures the same as those reported by the scales' authors. Before
investigating each scale separately, general "assumptions" about factor analysis
need to be addressed.
A first condition for successful factor analysis is that, at a minimum, there
should be five cases for each variable in the analysis (Nunnally 1978). There were
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278 respondents in this study. Thus, for the Richins and Dawson scale, which has
18 items, three times the minimum number of cases were available for the
analysis. Since the Belk scale has 21 items, two and one-half times the minimum
num ber were available. Thus, both scales meet this criterion.
The m ain assumption of factor analysis, that the data are factorable, is not
well met for the Belk scale, however. Evidence for this conclusion comes from a
test for sampling adequacy as well as from examination of the correlation matrix.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is an index for
"comparing the magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients [among the
variables in the factor analysis] to the magnitudes of the partial correlation
coefficients" (Norusis 1990, p. 162). If the variables have any factors in common,
the partial correlation coefficients should be relatively small, since the partial
correlation coefficient measures w hat is "left" after the common variation is
partialed out. Kaiser (1974) has devised an alliterative characterization for the
KMO measure. He suggests that results in the .90s are marvelous; those in the
.80s are meritorious; measures in the .70s are middling; those in the .60s are
mediocre; and those in the .50s are miserable. According to this progression, one
could characterize the KMO measure for the Richins and Dawson scale (.84742)
as "meritorious," but the measure for the Belk scale (.70875) as "m iddling" at
best.
Examination of the correlation matrix provides specific information about
the problems with factor analysis of the Belk scale. Tabachnick and Fidell (1989)
caution that "factor analysis is exquisitely sensitive to the sizes of correlations"
(p. 602) and that if no correlations exceed .30, the use of factor analysis is
questionable. A look at the matrix of correlations among the items for the Belk
scale reveals that only five are .30 or better (Table 14). For the Richins and
Dawson scale, however, 29 correlations are .30 or better (see Table 15)—and there
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are four fewer items in this scale, resulting in fewer correlations. With this
information, one would expect the confirmatory factor analysis to be more
successful for the Richins and Dawson scale, and it was.

The Richins and Dawson Scale
For the Richins and Dawson scale, three, four and five factors are possible
(see Table 16 for scree plot and eigenvalues), though the four factor solution
seems optimal. The first four factors have eigenvalues greater than one,
accounting for 49.5 percent of the variation in the data. More importantly, the
four factor solution is the "cleanest" of the three because of the pattern of factor
loadings as well as the interpretation of the factors. Tables 17 through 19 present
the three, four, and five-factor matrices. A discussion of each solution and the
rationale for the four factor solution are presented next.
The three and five factor solutions. The three factor solution, while more
closely mirroring the structure suggested by Richins and Dawson (1992), does
not exactly reproduce the factors they identified. The only "clean" factor is
centrality, comprised of four items. However, the three other centrality items are
spread between the other two factors. Interestingly, factor analysis by Williams
and Bryce (1992) yielded the same result. They discovered "some instability" in
the centrality scale, with two items loading on the success scale and one on the
happiness scale. Investigation of the four and five factor solutions reveals that,
except for the placement of two items, the structures are almost identical. (Of
course, the num ber of factors and the percent of variation in the data which is
explained are not the same.) One centrality item becomes a single-item factor;
one other centrality item is moved from one factor to another. In terms of
variation explained, the fifth factor accounts for an additional 5.1 percent. In
terms of understanding, however, the knowledge of the materialism construct is
153
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Table 16
Scree Plot and Eigenvalues
The Richins and Dawson Scale

500
4.75
4.50
4 .2 5
4.00
3 75

Eigenvalues

3 .5 0
3 .2 5
3 00
275
2.50
2 .2 5

2 00
I 75
1.50
1.25

1.00
0 .7 5
0 .5 0
0 .2 5

0

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

II

12

13

14

15

16

17

Factors

Factor

Eigenvalue

% of Var

Cum. %

1

4.809

26.7

26.7

2

1.602

8.9

35.6

3

1.318

7.3

42.9

4

1.179

6.6

49.5

5

.914

5.1

54.6
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18

19

Table 17
Richins and Dawson Scale — Factor Analysis
Three Factor Solution

Factor
1

2

3

I'd be happier if I could afford to buy more things. (H)

.7249

-.0049

.1449

My life would be better if I owned certain things
I don't have. (H)

.7104

.0726

.1328

It sometimes bothers m e quite a bit that I can't
afford to buy all the things I'd like. (H)

.6206

.0281

.2744

I have all the things I really need to enjoy life. * (H)

.5802

.1334

-.1063

I admire people who own expensive homes, cars,
and clothes. (S)

.5795

.1802

.2288

Some of the most important achievements in life
include acquiring material possessions. (S)

.5505

.2533

-.1106

I like to own things that impress people. (S)

.5294

.2801

.3154

I wouldn't be any happier if I owned nicer things. * (H)

.4342

.1400

.2246

Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure. (C)

.4111

.1954

.3442

I don't pay much attention to the material objects other
people own. * (S)

.0056

.6589

.2808

I put less emphasis on material things than most
people I know. * (C)

.0484

.6405

.2003

I don't place much emphasis on the amount of material
objects people own as a sign of success. * (S)

.3811

.5629

-.1365

The things I ow n aren't all that important to me. * (C)

.1388

.5470

.0596

The things I ow n say a lot about how well I'm
doing in life. (S)

.3259

.4858

-.0825

-.0622

.1767

.7315

I like a lot of luxury in my life. (C)

.3772

.0865

.5862

I enjoy spending m oney on things that aren't practical. (C)

.2506

-.0750

.5472

I try to keep m y life simple, as far as possessions
are concerned. * (C)

.0233

.4377

.4937

H appiness (with) (Pleasure from) Possessions

Success

Centrality
I usually buy only the things I need. * (C)

* Reverse scored items.
(H) Original Happiness Subscale Item
(S) Original Success Subscale Item
(C) Original Centrality Subscale Item
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Table 18
Richins and Dawson Scale — Factor Analysis
Four Factor Solution
Factor
1

2

3

4

Happiness
I have all the things I really need to enjoy life. * (H)

.7011

-.1238

.0999

.1439

I'd be happier if I could afford to buy more things. (H)

.6934

.2562

-.0242

.1731

It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can't
afford to buy all the things I'd like. (H)

.6439

.2992

.0949

.0553

My life would be better if I owned certain things
I don't have. (H)

.6438

.2576

.0189

.2454

I wouldn't be any happier if I owned nicer things. * (H)

.5947

.0988

.2682

-.0634

I like a lot of luxury in m y life. (C)

.1764

.6930

.1533

.1191

I enjoy spending m oney on things that
aren't practical. (C)

.0630

.6606

.0161

.0092

Buying things gives m e a lot of pleasure. (C)

.1640

.5122

.1243

.3197

Pleasure o f Acquisition(s)

I usually buy only the things I need. * (C)

.0254

.5012

.4922

-.3027

I like to own things that impress people. (S)

.3042

.4725

.1902

.3818

I admire people who own expensive homes, cars,
and clothes. (S)

.3162

.4564

.0437

.4195

I don't pay much attention to the material objects other
people own. * (S)

.0825

.0527

.7245

.1296

I try to keep m y life simple, as far as possessions
are concerned. * (C)

.1635

.2241

.6508

-.1158

I put less emphasis on material things than most
people I know. * (C)

.0256

.0748

.6154

.2630

The things I ow n aren't all that important to me. * (C)

.0788

.0176

.4509

.3349

-.0505

.1915

.1219

.7277

Some of the most important achievements in life
include acquiring material possessions. (S)

.3151

.1316

-.0053

.5494

I don't place much emphasis on the amount of material
objects people own as a sign of success. * (S)

.2927

-.0907

.3531

.5133

Centrality

Success
The things I ow n say a lot about how well I'm
doing in life. (S)

* Reverse scored items.
(H) Original Happiness Subscale Item; (C) Original Centrality Subscale Item
(S) Original Success Subscale Item
156

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 19
Richins and Dawson Scale — Factor Analysis
Five Factor Solution
Factor
1

2

3

4

5

.7059

.2740

.1277

-.0762

.1191

Happiness
I'd be happier if I could afford to buy more things. (H)
My life would be better if I owned certain things
.6571

.2852

.1750

-.0784

.1981

I have all the things I really need to enjoy life. * (H)

.6425

-.1523

.3560

.2014

-.2021

I wouldn't be any happier if I owned nicer things. * (H)

.6287

.0819

-.1109

.1554

.3192

It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can't
afford to buy all the things I'd like. (H)

.6219

.2704

.1599

.1943

-.1064

.0801

.1865

.0766

I don't have. (H)

Pleasure of Acquisition(s)
.1813

.6853

I enjoy spending money on things that
aren't practical. (Q

.0629

.6438

.0063

.1365

-.1047

Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure. (O

.1775

.1961

.0098

.2728

I like to own things that impress people. (S)
I admire people who own expensive homes,
cars, and clothes. (S)

.2914

.5469
.4953

.3426

.1175

.1931

2839

.4821

.4324

.0473

.0056

I like a lot of luxury in my life. (C)

Success
The things I own say a lot about how well I'm
doing in life. (S)

-.0958

.2635

.6795

-.0284

.2342

I don't place much emphasis on the amount of material
objects people own as a sign of success. * (S)

.2234

-.0779

.6389

.2689

.1243

Some of the most important achievements in life
include acquiring material possessions. (S)

.2628

.1759

5957

-.0446

-.0103

Centrality
.1199

.1324

.0937

.7583

.0173

I usually buy only the things I need. * (C)

are concerned. * (C)

.0220

.4103

-.1945

.6327

.0034

I don't pay much attention to the material objects
other people own. * (S)

.0786

.0241

.1345

.53713

.5027

I put less emphasis on material things than most
people I know. * (C)

-.0007

.0601

.2998

.4704

.3742

.1208

.0660

.1183

.0683

.7584

Factor 5
The things I own aren't all that important to me. * (C)

* Reverse scored items.
(H) Original Happiness Subscale Item; (C) Original Centrality Subscale Item
(S) Original Success Subscale Item
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not enhanced. The discussion of the four factor solution explains why.
The four factor solution. With four-factors, 49.5 percent of the variation in
the data is explained. After varimax rotation, all the happiness items loaded on
the first factor. Three of the success items loaded on the fourth factor; factors two
and three were a combination of success and centrality items. While both of
these latter factors were dominated by centrality items, factor two contained
items which addressed the process of acquiring possessions, and factor three
contained items reflecting the importance of those possession in one's life (which
is how Richins and Dawson define centrality). The presence of the additional
factor (factor two)—entitled pleasure from acquisition—is warranted by theory
and may not be occasioned just by this particular data set. For instance,
Campbell (1987) theorized that in a "high level" consumer culture, in which
people have what they need, the pursuit of acquisitions is as important, if not
more important, than the actual possessions themselves. Further, Fournier and
Richins (1991) found that acquiring and caring for possessions are activities
common to materialists. Materialists are happy and active shoppers: "visiting
shops to see what is available. Always thinking about future purchases so that
thinking about buying involves pleasure and happiness" (p. 410).
At first glance, this four factor solution does not appear to be a clean one.
Several items have loadings of .3 or better on more than one factor. However,
Nunnally (1978) cautions against "over interpreting the m eaning of small factor
loadings, e.g. those below .40" (p. 434). Thus if loadings of .4 or greater are
considered, only two items have cross loadings, and the evaluation of the
four-factor solution is improved.
Richins indicates that as "long as the overall Alpha is reasonable," she is
not overly concerned with the variations in the scale structure since factor
analysis is "notoriously prone" to variations with different samples (personal
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communication, May 25,1993). While Nunnally (1978) supports that conclusion,
the factors should be stable across similar data sets. In their Journal of Consumer
Research article, Richins and Dawson (1992) present the factor analysis which was

derived from only one of their four samples. So, indeed, the differences in factor
structure between this study and theirs could be explained by differences in data
sets. As Table 20 illustrates, there are statistically significant differences between
the samples. Theirs contained more older respondents, more college graduates,
and more males. For a reliable, valid scale, however, w hen samples are similar,
differences in factor structures should not be a frequent occurrence.
The finding of four instead of three factors has a num ber of implications,
assuming that it is not just an artifact of the data set. As noted above, there is
theoretical support for the notion that materialists enjoy the process of acquiring
possessions and that they admire and like to own impressive items. On the other
hand, it might be argued that in a consumption oriented society, for many
people, shopping is simply an enjoyable activity. Further, since it has already
been established that in Western societies people use possessions to cement their
self identities, then noticing, admiring, and enjoying shopping for possessions
may not necessarily be a sign of materialism. It may simply be reflective of a
certain amount of status consciousness. If these last two points are true, then the
scale might be improved by omitting the items on the "pleasure in acquisition(s)"
factor, since they measure a dimension which is not necessarily materialism.2

2

As a quick test of this idea, the six "pleasure of acquisition" items were removed from the
scale. On a reliability basis, the removal was not an improvement. The overall scale Alpha
remained a respectable .77 and Alpha for the happiness subscale w as .74, again quite acceptable.
Alphas for the two remaining subscales, however, fell to unacceptable levels: .58 for centrality
and .54 for success. These results indicate that further research is required. As a final check, factor
analysis of the reduced scale w as run. Indeed, the three factors which had been hypothesized did
emerge cleanly, accounting for 50 percent of the variation in the data. However, similar results
might not be obtained with other data sets. That is a subject for future research.
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Table 20
Comparison of Samples
This Study and the Richins and Dawson Study

This
Study's
Sample

Richins &
Dawson
Sample

Gender
Female
Male
No Answer

61.9
34.2
4.0

55.6
43.2
1.2

Chi-square
p = .007

7.363

Age
18-34
35-49
50+
No Answer

54.3
32.4
13.3
1.1

16.8
39.5
43.5
0.8

Chi-square
p = .000

306.049

Household Income
Less than $25k
$25-$34.9k
$35-$49.9k
$50k+
No Answer

31.7
19.1
22.3
20.5
6.5

39.6
16.8
24.4
16.8
2.4

Chi-square
p = .108

6.086

Education
High School or less
Some College
College Grad +
No Answer

19.0
52.9
27.4
0.7

22.4
38.0
37.2
2.4

Chi-square
p = .000

23.913
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The Belk Scale
While Belk has suggested that four personality traits of possessiveness,
nongenerosity, envy and preservation (tangibility) incline one toward
materialism, factor analysis in this study did not suggest the same four facets.
Instead, the results suggest that three through eight factors are possible (see
Table 21 for scree plot and eigenvalues). When an eight factor solution was
requested, however, varimax failed to converge in 24 iterations. Table 22 through
Table 26 present the three through seven factor matrices. Before discussing the
alternative solutions, the four factor structure will be addressed.
The four factor solution. Because the Belk scale is comprised of four
subscales, factor analysis was run with four factors being specified. The resulting
structure is presented in Table 23. Consistent with Belk (1984,1985; Ger and Belk
1990,1993) nongenerosity was the first factor to emerge, indicating that it
accounts for the greatest proportion of variation in the data. Of course, this result
is w hat one would expect, since the nongenerosity subscale contains nine of the
21 items in the scale. Nunnally's (1978) caution about not ascribing too much
importance to the first factor if the scale is constructed so that more of its items
measure factor one-type constructs is worth remembering. The only clean factor,
however, is preservation, on which the three intended items load. This result is
not surprising since the Alpha for this subscale is the largest of the four, .65. The
envy and nongenerosity subscales are composed primarily of the "right" items,
though there is some mix between the two. Again, knowledge of the internal
consistency of these two subscales helps explain the results. Belk acknowledges
that the nongenerosity subscale generally has been the "most internally
consistent factor" (personal communication, May 7,1993). Its Alpha is .64; the
Alpha for envy is .50. The possessiveness subscale, however, is a mixture of
possessiveness and nongenerosity items—again to be expected from the Alpha of
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Table 21
Scree Plot and Eigenvalues
The Belk Scale
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Factor

Eigenvalue

% of Var

Cum. %

1

3.325

15.8

15.8

2

1.979

9.4

25.3

3

1.598

7.6

32.9

4

1.356

6.5

39.3

5

1.229

5.9

45.2

6

1.108

5.3

50.5

7

1.008

4.8

55.3
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22

.38 which was found in this study for that subscale.
W hat is to be made of the mix of items among the factors? Certainly factor
analysis is not an exact analytical technique and should be interpreted using the
numerical results as well as an understanding of the concepts involved. The four
factor solution, however, only accounts for 39.3 percent of the variation in the
data, while other factor solutions explain more than 50 percent of the variation.
In Ger and Belk's most recent cross-cultural study (1993), the four factors
account for 28 percent of the variance for the overall sample. Specific information
for different countries is not available. Another consideration is the nature of the
construct being measured by this scale—personality traits. Since personality is
quite variable across individuals, a scale which measures a variety of personality
traits m ight also be expected to be variable. Additionally, factor analysis looks
for commonalities. If there is not much similarity in the personalities of the
people being sampled, more factors rather than fewer would be expected. As
noted at the beginning of this section, the correlations among the items in the
Belk scale are quite low, with only four being above .30. Thus there would
appear to be few commonalites among the items.
Belk may have consistently found four factors, partly because he has
consistently used student samples. In fact, he admits to desiring a homogeneous
sample to smooth out differences (Ger and Belk 1993). This study's design,
however, called for a more heterogenous sample in an attempt to reflect the adult
population. Nunnally (1978) issues a strong caution about sample composition.
He suggests that if a scale's factors are to be interpreted solely for people with a
particular characteristic, such as a given age range, then the sample should be
homogeneous with respect to that characteristic. If, however, the factors are
intended to be generalized across more heterogeneous groups, as w ith the
materialism scales, then the sample should be similarly heterogeneous.
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Table 22
Belk Scale: Three Factor Solution

Factor
1
Selfishness (Nongenerosity and Envy)
There are certain people I would like to trade
places with. (E)
I don't seem to get what is coming to me. (E)
When friends have things I cannot afford, it
bothers me. (NG)
I enjoy donating things for charity. * (NG)
I enjoy sharing what I have. * (NG)
When friends do better than me in competition
it usually makes me feel happy for them.* (NG)

2

3

.6532
.5845

-.0674
-.0351

.1134
-.0124

.5441
.5298
.4890

.1490
.2750
.3720

.0257
-.2845
-.2475

.4739

-.0087

-.0701

.4555

.0953

.1744

.4259
.3572

.2703
.0701

-.0639
-.0721

.3174

.0086

.1336

.0561
.2209

.7164
.5513

.0199
.1195

.0644
-.1161

.5448
.5331

-.0064
-.1105

.2687

.4263

-.0579

.0302
.1526

.4134
.3182

.3716
-.2617

I like to collect things. (Pr)

.0346

-.1136

.6969

I have a lot of souvenirs. (Pr)

.0236

-.1979

.6917

.0478
-.0584

.0542
.2489

.6648
.3657

I am bothered when I see people who buy
anything they want. (E)
If I have to choose between buying something for
myself versus for someone I love, I would prefer
buying for myself. (E)
I do not enjoy donating things to the needy. (NG)
People who are very wealthy often feel they
are too good to talk to average people. (E)
Possessiveness and Worry over Loss
I don't like to lend things, even to good friends. (NG)
I worry about people taking my possessions. (NG)
I don't like to have anyone in my home when
I'm not there. (P)
I am less likely than most people to lock things up. * (P)
I don't mind giving rides to those who
don't have a car. * (NG)
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even
if it has little monetary value. (P)
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home. * (NG)
Preservation/Collecting

I tend to hang on to things I should probably
throw out. (Pr)
1 don't particularly get upset when I lose things. * (P)

* Reverse scored items.
(NG) Original Nongenerosity Subscale Item; (E) Original Envy Subscale Item
(P) Original Possessiveness Subscale Item; (Pr) Original Preservation Subscale Item
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Table 23
Belk Scale: Four Factor Solution
Factor
1

2

3

4

.6433
.6156

.2104
.1865

.0694
.1818

-.1597
-.1487

5521
5128

-.0534
-.1821

.2598
.1305

.0782
-.1007

.4376

.2309

.1530

-.0104

.4375
.4013

.2334
.1276

-.1401
-.0535

.0494
.0405

.0222

.6016

.1527

.0229

.2830

.5920

-.1086

.1082

.2230
.2767

.5567
.5224

.1269
-.0895

-.0562
-.0214

-.0606

.4765

.0756

-.0032

.3937
.1396

-.1326
.2825

.6168
.5649

.0458
-.0177

-.2132
.1013

.3049
-.1164

.5594
.5077

.1361
-.1780

.2063
-.2059

.0173
.1419

.5056
.3722

-.0577
.2142

I like to collect things. (Pr)

-.0140

-.0529

-.1419

.8075

I have a lot of souvenirs. (Pr)

-.0311

-.0035

-.0439

.7728

I tend to hang on to things I should probably
throw out. (Pr)

-.0372

.0604

.1357

.6784

N ongenerosity
I enjoy donating things for charity. * (NG)
I enjoy sharing what I have. * (NG)
I don't mind giving rides to those who
don't have a car. * (NG)
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home. * (NG)
If I have to choose between buying something for
m yself versus for someone I love, I would prefer
buying for myself. (E)
When friends do better than me in competition
it usually makes me feel happy for them.* (NG)
I do not enjoy donating things to the needy. (NG)
Envy
I am bothered when I see people who buy
anything they want. (E)
There are certain people I would like to trade
places with. (E)
When friends have things I cannot afford, it
bothers me. (NG)
I don't seem to get what is coming to me. (E)
People who are very wealthy often feel they
are too good to talk to average people. (E)

Possessiveness
I don't like to lend things, even to good friends. (NG)
I worry about people taking my possessions. (NG)
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even
if it has little monetary value. (P)
I am less likely than most people to lock things up. * (P)
I don't like to have anyone in my home when
I'm not there. (P)
I don't particularly get upset when I lose things. * (P)
Preservation

* Reverse scored items.
(NG) Original Nongenerosity Subscale Item; (E) Original Envy Subscale Item
(P) Original Possessiveness Subscale Item; (Pr) Original Preservation Subscale Item
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Differences in age, sex, education, and the like can result in different factors
emerging from the analysis. Thus, one should expect that the factors which are
produced from Belk's student samples would not be the same as those produced
when the sample is more heterogeneous. Hence, the results being discussed here
are what one might expect. Similarly, the nine-factor solution reported by Cole et
al. (1992) from a survey of adults in a large m idwestem d ty is not surprising.
The three factor solution. Of the remaining possible solutions, the six
factor structure is the most interpretable. Before discussing it, reasons for
rejecting the others will be addressed. The three factor solution, presented in
Table 22 is quite appealing numerically, with no items having cross loadings of .4
or greater. However, the three factors account for only 32.9 percent of the
variation in the data. More importantly, their interpretation is not intuitively
appealing. Factor one is a mix of nongenerosity and envy items, suggesting
selfishness, since the items which load here deal with not liking to share things or
not wanting to give to charity or to the needy. Factor two is a mix of
nongenerosity and possessiveness items. They would appear to tap ideas of both
possessiveness and concern for loss of possessions. Finally, the three
preservation items and one possessiveness item load on the third factor.
Conceptually, personality traits of selfishness, possessiveness, and preservation
seem to be too broad for a measure of materialism. The finer distinctions which
appear in the six factor solution are preferable.
The five factor solution. The five factor solution, presented in Table 24, is
an improvement over the three and four factor structures. However, it too,
contains factors which are a mixture of items from the original subscales.
Nongenerosity items load on four of the factors, possessiveness items load on
two, and envy items load on three. Except for the factor with the three
preservation items, the factors are not as interpretable as in the six factor
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Table 24
Belk Scale: Five Factor Solution

Factor
Selfishness/Me-Centered
When friends do better than me in competition
it usually makes me feel happy for them* (NG)
I enjoy donating things for charity* (NG)
I enjoy sharing what I have.* (NG)
I don't mind giving rides to those who don't
have a car* (NG)
When friends have things I cannot afford, it
bothers me. (NG)
If I have to choose between buying something for
myself versus for someone I love, I would
prefer buying for myself. (E)
Worry over Possession Loss
I don't like to lend things, even to good friends.(NG)
I don't like to have anyone in my home when
I'm not there. (P)
I am less likely than most people to lock things up.* (P)
I worry about people taking my possessions. (NG)

I have a lot of souvenirs. (Pr)
I like to collect things. (Pr)
I tend to hang on to things I probably should
throw out. (Pr)
Envy
I don't seem to get what is coming to me. (E)
People who are very wealthy often feel they
are too good to talk to average people. (E)
There are certain people I would like to trade
places with. (E)
I do not enjoy donating things to the needs. (NG)
Factor Five
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even
if it has little monetary value. (P)
I am bothered when I see people who buy
anything they want. (E)
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home.* (NG)
I don't particularly get upset when I lose things.* (P)

4

5

1

2

3

.6749
5969
5505

-.1883
.2023
.3063

.0289
-.1445
-.1308

-.0668
.2285
.2129

.0463
-.1429
-.1009

5505

.3293

.0962

-.1319

-.0807

.5302

-.0525

-.0972

.1640

.4233

.4823

.1764

-.0098

.1364

.0499

.2873

.6725

.0753

-.1234

.0390

.0325
-.0103
.1577

5749
.5355
.4873

-.0322
-.1563
-.0208

.1536
-.0652
.1857

.0574
.0737
.3538

-.0570
-.0339

-.1352
-.0779

.8092
.7695

.0307
.0178

-.0591
.0400

.0026

.0522

.6703

.0036

.1782

.1676

.0067

-.0218

.6967

.0009

-.1245

.0614

-.0139

.5880

.2097

.3519
.0948

-.1193
.1939

.0879
.0755

.5443
.5155

.1502
-.3194

-.0365

.3172

.1073

.0311

.6015

.3063
.1814
-.1043

-.0618
.4129
.2058

-.0227
-.0482
.1966

.2534
.1782
-.0182

.5125
-.4235
.3946

* Reverse scored items.
(NG) Original Nongenerosity Subscale Item; (E) Original Envy Subscale Item
(P) Original Possessiveness Subscale Item; (Pr) Original Preservation Subscale Item
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solution—though some of them do hint at it. For example, factor one contains
items which indicate a self-centered orientation and factor two contains items
which address worry over loss of possessions. The fifth factor, however, also
seems to address the same concern—as indicated by cross loadings of two items
on the second and fifth factors. Hence, this solution can also be rejected.
The six and seven factor solutions. Tables 25 and 26 present the six and
seven factor structures. The common feature of both solutions is that the nine
nongenerosity items do not form a single factor. They are dispersed among four
factors in the six factor solution and among five factors in the seven factor
solution. This situation would appear to suggest that nongenerosity may not be a
single construct in people's minds.
More specifically, in the six factor solution, nongenerosity is divided into
three dimensions. The first deals with sharing with others (with scale items such
as lending possessions, giving rides to those without transportation, and
generally sharing w hat one has). The second face of nongenerosity seems to be
selfishness, or a "me versus thee" mentality (with statements of not rejoicing in
others' good fortunes, not donating to charity, and buying things for oneself
instead of for others loading on this factor). Third, nongenerosity seems to
manifest itself in an almost siege mentality (items suggest not liking to have
friends stay in one's home, not helping out the needy, and feeling that one
generally doesn't get what one deserves from society).
The remaining three factors are quite separate from nongenerosity. The
preservation factor remains intact, as before. Two envy items load on the sixth
factor (being envious, even jealous, of the wealthy and of people who seem to be
able to buy what they want). And, finally, the possessiveness items load together.
This last factor might be more accurately termed a "worry over loss of
possessions" rather than the "desire to retain control or ownership of the
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Table 25
Belk Scale: Six Factor Solution

Factor
1
Factor 1 (Nongenerosity—not sharing)
I don't like to lend things, even to good friends. (NG)
I don't mind giving rides to those who
don't have a car. * (NG)
I enjoy sharing what I have. * (NG)
Factor 2 (Nongenerosity—selfishness)
When friends have things I cannot afford, it
bothers me. (NG)
When friends do better than me in competition
it usually makes me feel happy for them* (NG)
There are certain people I would like to trade
places with. (E)
I enjoy donating things for charity. * (NG)
If I have to choose between buying something for
myself versus for someone 1 love, I would prefer
buying for myself. (E)
Factor 3 (Preservation)
I have a lot of souvenirs. (Pr)
I like to collect things. (Pr)
1 tend to hang on to things 1 should probably
throw out. (Pr)
Factor 4 (Possessiveness—worry over loss)
1 don't particularly get upset when 1 lose things. * (P)
1 don't like to have anyone in my home when
I'm not there. (P)
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even
if it has little monetary value. (P)
I worry about people taking my possessions. (NG)
1 am less likely than most people to lock things up.* (P)

Factor 6 (Envy—jealousy)
People who are very wealthy often feel they
are too good to talk to average people. (E)
I am bothered when I see people who buy
anything they want. (E)

3

4

5

6

.739

-.083

.037

.328

-.053

.101

.638
.615

.227
.256

.065
-.152

.049
-.029

.016
.228

-.102
.193

.081

.672

-.069

.152

-.037

.153

.174

.657

.032

-.123

.021

-.249

-.087
.341

512
.448

-.109
-.170

.016
.068

588
.404

.249
-.119

.347

.365

-.019

.078

.149

.049

-.004
.010

-.084
-.038

.813
.776

-.155
-.059

.018
-.028

.025
.050

-.046

.075

.674

.196

-.009

-.038

-.302

.164

.202

.602

-.003

,167

.176

-.030

-.064

548

.287

-.033

.039
.258
.205

.113
.148
-.102

.129
-.024
-.186

.538
.511
.494

-.248
.055
.071

.313
.264
-.098

.054
.343

.017
.273
-.097

.048
-.012
-.101

.040
-.025
-.018

.666
.561
.499

.051
.356
-.169

.042

-.065

.016

-.018

.164

.768

.086

.451

.021

.085

-.152

.485

QO
o
f

Factor 5 (nongenerosity—siege mentality)
1 do not enjoy donating things to the needy. (NG)
I don't seem to get what is coming to me. (E)
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home. * (NG)

2

* Reverse scored items.
(NG) Original Nongenerosity Subscale Item; (E) Original Envy Subscale Item
(P) Original Possessiveness Subscale Item; (Pr) Original Preservation Subscale Item
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Table 26
Belk Scale: Seven Factor Solution

Factor
1

2

.702
.654
.653

.054
.056
-.151

.041
.024
-.167

380

-.015

-.006
.022

4

5

6

7

.047
-25 3
.228

.002
1-369|
.097

.061
.142
-.0%

-.094
.177
.158

[300]

.166

.148

-.010

-.068

.812
.769

-.101
-.047

.046
.025

-.118
-.117

-.071
.029

.049
.061

-.084

.682

.144

-.051

.177

.133

-.107

.137

-.065

.708

.101

.074

.065

-.148

.102

.030

.657

-.017

-.027

.032

.241

.126

.025

-304

.658

.167

.036

.118

.069
|.459|
-.126

.076
-.191
.014

|344l
.157
383

.629
.479
.479

-.105
.111
| 398

.101
1-4291
-200

.075
-.204
.183

.081
.223
.214

-.047
-.063
-.017

.070
-.112
1.3231

.035
.166
-.036

.654
.629
.403

.258
-.213
|317|

-.026
-.119
.191

-.181

-.148

.037

.146

.032

.701

.189

.085
.277

.102
-.228

259
-.237

-.135
.075

.008
.116

.571
.533

268
.047

.056

.009

.134

.254

-.098

.022

.771

329

.011

361

.249

-.207

-.029

-.452

3

Factor 1 (Nongenerosity)
I don't m ind giving rides to those who
don't have a car. * (NG)
I don't like to lend things, even to good friends. (NG)
I enjoy sharing w hat I have. * (NG)
If 1 have to choose between buying something for
myself versus for someone I love, I would prefer
buying for myself. (E)
Factor 2 (Preservation)
I ha ve a lot of souvenirs. (Pr)
I like to collect things. (Pr)
I tend to hang on to things I should probably
throw out. (Pr)
Factor 3 (Envy)
When friends have things I cannot afford, it
bothers me. (NG)
I am bothered when I see people who buy
anything they want. (E)
Factor 4 (Nongenerosity and Envy)
I do not enjoy donating things to the needy. (NG)
There are certain people I would like to trade
places with. (E)
1 enjoy donating things for charity. * (NG)
I don't seem to get what is coming to me. (E)

1

Factor 5 (Home)
I don't like to have anyone in my home when
I'm not there. (P)
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home. * (NG)
I worry about people taking my possessions. (NG)
Factor 6 (Possessiveness)
I don't particularly get upset when I lose things. * (P)
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even
if it has little monetary value. (P)
I am less likely than most people to lock things up. *(P)
Factor 7 (Jealousy)
People who are very wealthy often feel they
are too good to talk to average people. (E)
When friends do better than me in competition
it usually makes me feel happy for them.* (NG)

* Reverse scored items.
(NG) Original Nongenerosity Subscale Item; (E) Original Envy Subscale Item
(P) Original Possessiveness Subscale Item; (Pr) Original Preservation Subscale Item
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possessions" as Belk (1985) suggests. This factor includes items which address
emotional distress over actual and anticipated losses, as well as an item
concerned with locking things up. The stray nongenerosity item which loads on
this factor seems particularly relevant: "I worry about people taking my
possessions." Thus, the six factor solution, which accounts for 50.5 percent of the
variation in the data, seems to offer the tightest solution in terms of the
personality traits which are being measured.
While the seven factor solution would appear to be optimal, it is not as
interpretable as the six factor solution. The nongenerosity items load on five of
the factors, but not according to a clear pattern. The envy subscale items are
scattered among five factors, again not in any discernible pattern. Additionally,
possessiveness subscale items load on two factors instead of loading together.
The preservation items, however, continue to preserve their independence.
One common feature of both the six and seven factor solutions is the
pairing of nongenerosity and envy. Belk distinguishes between the two traits
saying that nongenerosity is an unwillingness to give or share possessions with
others (Belk 1985), while envy is displeasure with another's superiority in
happiness, success, reputation or possessions (Schoeck 1966, as quoted in Belk
1985). The pairing of items from these two subscales suggests either that the
distinction drawn in the research is not one made by people in everyday life or
that the items are not written in a way that makes the distinction obvious. In
either case it certainly can be imagined that one might be unwilling to share
possessions because of not wanting to increase the success or good fortune of
another. Hence nongenerosity and envy may be intertwined.
Decisions about the appropriate factor structure for the Belk scale, of
course, cannot be made solely on the results of this study. While additional
testing is required, the results reported here are not unusual. As already
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

mentioned, Cole et al. (1992) identified nine factors when they analyzed a large,
diverse, non-student sample. Results such as these tend to confirm the need to
test the scale on samples other than student populations.
Having assessed the reliability, the convergent validity, and the factor
structures of the two materialism scales, the discussion now turns to a
consideration of the specific research hypotheses for the study. In addition to
providing pleasing results, the success of these hypotheses contributes to the
nomological validity of the materialism measures.

TESTS OF HYPOTHESES
In addition to providing a further test of the two materialism scales, this
study was designed to augment the discipline's understanding of materialism by
considering the nature of the materialistic self. Four constructs were selected for
consideration: self-esteem, a global measure of self evaluation; self-actualization,
a measure of how well an individual is fulfilling his/her potential; self
monitoring, a life-style decision regarding attention paid to the values and
expectations of others versus those of one's self; and intrinsic/extrinsic
motivation, a measure of engaging in activities and buying products for the
pleasure inherent in them or for some reason external to the activity or item. It
was hypothesized that the materialistic individual would have lower
self-esteem, be less self-actualized, be more likely to be self-monitoring, and
3

Ger and Belk (1993) are correct in saying that the use of student populations reduces the
variability in the sample and the attendant influence of that variability on scale development and
testing. However, the use of a homogeneous sample can lead to other problems as this section
has pointed out. Further, while Richins and Dawson used students in studies aimed at scale
development, the final testing was accomplished through surveys of adults in four different
cities. Ger and Belk (1993) suggest that one of the next steps in the materialism research program
should be to test the Belk scale with non-student adult populations.
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indicate that extrinsic rather than intrinsic motivation was the reason for
engaging in various activities.
Correlation analysis was selected as the technique most consistent with the
materialism research "tradition"—as well as with the social science tradition.
Cohen (1988) notes that behavioral scientists frequently employ "correlational
analysis as an investigative tool in both pure and applied studies" (p. 75),
primarily because it allows for measures of association without making
assumptions about causality. Belk (1985) and Richins and Dawson (1992) have
cautioned that at this point we do not know if materialism is an antecedent or
consequent of considerations such as life satisfaction. In addition to the
correlations, however, this analysis extends the research on materialism by
developing a profile of those who score high on the materialism scales.
As each research question is examined, it will become clear that the
correlations were all in the direction hypothesized and were all statistically
significant at the .01 level or better. Thus the four hypotheses were
confirmed—though the caution noted above about the intrinsic/extrinsic scale
bears repeating. The results of the correlation analyses are presented in Table 27.
After the hypothesis tests are discussed, scale validity will be assessed. Finally,
profiles of high and low materialists are developed.

Hypothesis One: Materialism and Self-M onitoring
The first research hypothesis was that individuals who were more
materialistic would also be high self-monitors. The correlation between the
Richins and Dawson scale and the self-monitoring scale was .3956 (p = .000); the
correlation between Belk's scale and self-monitoring was .1826 (p = .001). Using
either measure of materialism, the correlation analysis demonstrates that as
materialism scores increase, indicating a more materialistic person,
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Table 27
Tests of Hypotheses

Scale

Correlation
R&D
Belk

Self-Esteem

-.1364**

-.2109*

Self-Actualization

-.3400*

-.4674*

Self-Monitoring
Intrinsic/Extrinsic
Belk Scale

.3956*
-.3198*

.1826***
-.3382*

.4691*

* Correlation significant at p = .000
** Correlation significant at p = .012
*** Correlation significant at p = .001
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self-monitoring scores also increase, indicating a more self-monitoring
individual. This is the direction which was hypothesized because self-monitors
are expected to be scanning the environment, looking for cues about how to
behave and how to express themselves, about how to manage their
self-presentations. Since possessions often provide those cues in our society, and
since materialists are also expected to be focused on possessions, the two
measures were expected to be positively and significantly correlated.
That the correlation between materialism and self-monitoring is more
pronounced for the Richins and Dawson scale (.39) than for the Belk scale (.18) is
consistent w ith the self-monitoring construct. Self-monitoring is not a
personality trait, one of many which an individual may have. Rather, according
to Snyder (1987), self-monitoring reflects a lifestyle choice, which is more
consistent w ith the value orientation adopted by Richins and Dawson. Snyder
explains that the differences in lifestyles may be accounted for by the different
conceptions of self held by high versus low self-monitors:
High self-monitors ask, "Who does this situation w ant me to be
and how can I be that person?" whereas low self-monitors want to
know, "Who am I and how can I be me in this situation?"
Researchers have found that these two characteristic interpersonal
orientations are accompanied by differing conceptions of self—a
pragmatic sense of self for high self-monitors and a principled
sense of self for low self-monitors.... [PJeople structure the
circumstances of their lives to maximize the fit between their
self-conceptions and their social behavior (1987, pp. 31-32).
Thus, in being pragmatic, high self-monitors consider "externally located
identity characteristics particularly important" (Snyder 1987, p. 48). In response
to the "Who Are You" twenty-questions test, they respond with statements such
as, "I am a post office worker; I am quarterback of my school's football team." In
general, they respond with answers that reflect the roles they play. In order to

175

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

play the roles correctly, self-monitors are also avid readers of magazines and
books which focus on fashion and appearance. They have been found to be more
likely to select furniture and decorations for both home and office "according to
their strategic value in controlling the images they project in social situations"
(Snyder 1987, p. 63). In general, high self-monitors display the characteristics
and concerns which have also been attributed to materialists.
Low self-monitors, on the other hand, in being principled selves, march to
their own internal drummer. They consider internally located aspects of identity,
such as emotions and feelings, to be more important. When asked, "Who are
you?" they respond with statements such as, "I am friendly; I am a liberal."
While possessions might be employed to convey these images, low self-monitors,
like low materialists are not expected to place strong emphasis on possessions
because they are external to the self.

Hypothesis Two: Materialism and Intrinsic/Extrinsic Motivation
The second research hypothesis dealt with the relationship between
materialism and intrinsic/extrinsic motivation. As noted above, the IE Index is
suspect, so results are reported with caution. The correlation between the
Richins and Dawson scale and the IE Index was -.3189 (p = .000); the correlation
between the Belk scale and the IE Index was -.3382 (p = .000). Using either
measure of materialism, the correlation analysis demonstrates that as
materialism scores increase, intrinsic motivation (indicated by the score on the IE
Index) decreases. This is the direction which was hypothesized because
materialists value possessions for what those possessions will say about them
(signs of success) or do for them (provide happiness, etc.). In either case, the
possessions are not valued for themselves and, hence, the motivation to acquire
them is extrinsic rather than intrinsic. Accordingly, the two measures were
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expected to be negatively and significantly correlated; and they are.
That both measures correlated well w ith the IE Index indicates that the
external orientation has some explanatory power with regard to materialism, and
vice versa. This conclusion is consistent w ith that which was tested in the first
hypothesis about self-monitoring. Materialists do have an external orientation
and seem to be motivated by extrinsic factors. Calculating the square of the
correlations, one can see that slightly more than ten percent of the variation in
materialism can be explained by the variation in intrinsic/extrinsic motivation.
For social science research, this conclusion is rather significant (Cohen 1988;
Nunnally 1978). However, because of the reliability problems with the IE Index,
confidence in this conclusion is not strong.

Hypothesis Three: Materialism and Self-Esteem
The third hypothesis was that individuals with high scores on either
materialism scale would have low scores on the self-esteem scale. The correlation
between the Richins and Dawson scale and the self-esteem scale was -.1364 (p =
.012); the correlation between the Belk scale and self-esteem was -.2109 (p = .000).
Using either measure of materialism, the correlation analysis demonstrates that
as materialism scores increase, indicating a more materialistic person, self-esteem
scores decrease, indicating an individual with less self-esteem. This is the
direction which was hypothesized.
As discussed in Chapter Two, self-esteem is an overall measure of a
person’s confidence in him/herself. The research and theory suggested that
people with high self-esteem are not expected to rely on outw ard signs of success
and competence as much as individuals with lower self-esteem. And, as the tests
of the first two hypotheses have demonstrated, people scoring higher on the
materialism scales do rely on external indicators more than low scorers do. The
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point is illustrated by the remarks of a participant in one of the Ger and Belk
(1993) focus groups: "If [people] need something to feel like someone, th e n ...
they're trying to substitute a material thing for something that should be from
within" (p. 17). Across all cultures, people generally agreed that the use of
possessions as a primary means to increasing or enhancing self-esteem stemmed
from negative feelings about one's self. Further, as Bond (1992) theorized, the
respect from others which comes as a result of possessions alone is thought to be
"false" respect and thus is devalued, resulting in lower self-esteem. The
materialist, who places all hopes for happiness and success on possessions, is
more likely to feel this "false" respect than not. Hence the correlation between
materialism and self-esteem was expected to be negative and significant, and the
hypothesis was confirmed.
That the correlation was higher with the Belk scale than with the Richins
and Dawson scale may be explained by both the Belk scale and the self-esteem
scales being personality measures. Both are more direct measures of the self than
is the Richins and Dawson scale—even though the latter scale is a more direct
measure of materialism.

Hypothesis F o u r Materialism and Self-Actualization
The fourth hypothesis was that individuals with high scores on either
materialism scale would have low scores on the self-actualization scale. The
correlation between the Richins and Dawson scale and the self-actualization scale
was -.3400 (p = .000); the correlation between the Belk scale and selfactualization was -.4674 (p = .000). Using either measure of materialism, the
correlation analysis demonstrates that as materialism scores increase, indicating
a more materialistic person, self-actualization scores decrease, indicating a less
self-actualized individual. Once again, the result is in the direction hypothesized.
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Maslow (1950) provides an explanation for the negative relationship.
Someone who is moving toward self-actualization is also becoming an
autonomous individual, free from the influence of external forces. As previously
discussed, a materialist is beholden to external forces. Hence, the correlation
between materialism and self-actualization was expected to be negative and
significant. In this study it was.
As before, the higher correlation with self-actualization and the Belk scale
might be explained by the two measures being designed as psychological
measures, whereas the Richins and Dawson scale was designed to measure one's
orientation toward the value of materialism. However, in either case, the
relationship between materialism and self-actualization is relatively strong—for
social science research. Once again, calculating the square of the correlation
coefficient, one learns that variation in self-actualization explains 11.5 percent of
the variation in materialism as measured by the Richins and Dawson scale (and
vice versa). For the Belk measure of materialism, 21.8 percent of its variation is
explained by variation in self-actualization (and vice versa).
Overall, all four hypotheses were confirmed, though the caution about the
second hypothesis must again be noted. While some of the correlations were
"low" in an absolute sense, from the standpoint of social science research, the
correlations between measures were quite acceptable. Because so much of
hum an behavior and motivation is variable and not likely to be captured in a
single scale, that correlations of .34, of .39, and of .47 were obtained is indeed
pleasing, since, as explained above, such correlations translate into explanations
of between 11 percent and 22 percent of the variation in the measures. As
Nunnally (1978) reports from a review of studies in psychology, "the average of
all correlations reported... is less than .40" (p. 143). More recently, Cohen (1988)
suggests that coefficients in the .00 to .60 range may be expected, with most
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falling in the lower half of that range (p. 80). The confidence in these findings is
enhanced by the strong theoretical links among the constructs which were
tapped by the scales and materialism.

Assessing Construct Validity
Not only does the correlation analysis provide evidence to confirm the
hypotheses, but it also provides evidence of two aspects of construct validity:
nomological and convergent. As mentioned before, nomological validity refers to
the "extent to which [a] scale correlates in theoretically predicted ways with
measures of different but related constructs" (Malhotra 1993, p. 310). Convergent
validity, on the other hand, refers to the "extent to which the scale correlates
positively with other measures of the same construct" (Malhotra 1993, p. 310).
The four self measures were all predicted to correlate in specific directions with
the materialism measures. W ith these hypotheses being confirmed, further nodes
were added to a nomological network, consisting of materialism and other
constructs which are systematically related to it. Earlier research which
correlated materialism with life satisfaction, with sets of products, with sets of
values, etc., had already begun to build this network. That both measures of
materialism correlated in the same directions with the four self measures is
evidence for convergent validity.
Having confirmed the hypotheses, and having provided evidence of the
validity of the two scales, analysis next proceeded to building a profile of
materialists.
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PROFILING MATERIALISTS
Belk (1984,1985), Ger and Belk (1990,1993) and Fournier and Richins
(1991) began this process with focus group interviews which sought insight into
descriptions of a materialist. Additionally, Belk has concluded that materialists
are less likely to be happy with their lives, are more likely to be younger, and to
be blue collar rather than white collar workers. Richins and Dawson (1992)
corroborated some of these findings by providing evidence that materialists are
more likely to be young than old, and by demonstrating that materialists are less
satisfied with their lives. Neither of these research programs, however, have
attempted a more specific profile of a materialist. Such a description would be
quite useful for marketing practitioners and researchers alike. With the success of
the hypothesis tests, additional information about materialists can be added to
what is already known, thereby providing a deeper understanding of
materialists.
In developing a profile, only the Richins and Dawson scale was used. For
the reasons discussed above, this scale seems to be the more reliable and the
more consistent across data sets. Reliability considerations also restrict the
analysis to three of the self scales, omitting the IE Index.

Cluster Analysis.
To develop a profile, cluster analysis was ru n using the rotated factor scores
derived from the four-factor solution which was suggested by this study. Not
only did four factors provide a more interpretable solution than three factors, but
it also was a "cleaner" structure. The Quick Cluster option in SPSSX was used
since it employs a nonhierarchical iterative method for partitioning the clusters.
Nonhierarchical methods are thought to be superior to hierarchical methods
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when the num ber of observations is large, as in this study, and w hen nonrandom
starting points are used, as with Quick Cluster (Hair, Anderson and Tatham
1987; Punj and Stewart 1983).
Two, three, four, and five cluster solutions were examined to determine if
distinct clusters might be developed. It was thought, however, that either a tw oor three-cluster solution would be optimal. A two-cluster solution might
represent materialists versus nonmaterialists; a three-cluster solution might
represent high, medium, and low materialists. The two cluster solution was
rejected because t-tests of mean scores of the self measures indicated that there
were no significant differences between the two clusters. Standard deviations for
each cluster were also quite high for the four self measures. The four and five
cluster solutions were rejected because each contained clusters with a small
number of cases. In the four cluster solution, one cluster had nine members. In
the five cluster solution, one cluster also had nine members while another had
eleven. Hence, the three cluster solution was further investigated—especially
since using three clusters is consistent with Richins and Dawson's (1992)
groupings of respondents into three categories for some of their analyses. Cluster
centers, distance between clusters, cluster memberships, and F-tests for cluster
means for the three-cluster solution are presented in Table 28.
To develop a profile of each cluster, ANOVA was run for the Richins and
Dawson materialism scale as well as for the self-esteem, self-actualization, and
self-monitoring scales. The results indicate that the only significant differences
on mean scale scores among the three clusters were for self-esteem (F = 2.67; p =
.071) and self-actualization (F = 2.362; p = .096). Even though neither m ain effect
was significant at the .05 level used in this research, comparisons were
investigated to learn what insight might be found. The Bonferroni method was
used because of the small number of comparisons and because of unequal
182
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Table 28
Three Cluster Solution

Final O u ste r Centers
Factor Scores 1

Factor Scores 2

1

.5047

-.8266

-.0355

.5657

2

.7242

.4659

-1.3219

-.9184

3

-.3579

.3559

.2024

-.1600

Factor Scores 3

Factor Scores

Cluster

Factor Scores 3

Factor Scores

F-Test for O u ste r Centers
Factor Scores 1
F

Factor Scores 2

33.9342

Sig o f F

59.6806

.000

28.2615

.000

.000

50.8106
.000

Num ber of Cases in Each Cluster
Cluster

Number of Cases

1

84

2

23

3

165

Distance Between Cluster Centers
Cluster

1

2

1

.0000

2

2.3614

.0000

3

1.6510

2.0203

3

.0000
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sample sizes (Neter, Wasserman and Kutner 1985). In neither case, however,
were there significant differences between any two clusters, even at the .10 level
of significance. For self-esteem, the contrast between the second cluster (with the
lowest mean scale score) and the other two clusters (with higher mean scale
scores) was significant only at the .16 level. For self-actualization, the contrast
between the second cluster (with the highest mean scale score) and the other two
clusters (with lower mean scale scores) was significant only at the .11 level. With
this information, the interpretability and usefulness of the three clusters was
called into question. When Chi-square tests were run to determine if there were
significant differences among the clusters on demographic data, much the same
conclusion was reached. There were no significant differences on the basis of
ethnic background, education level, age, or gender. The only statistically
significant difference was for income level. With this final evidence, the three
cluster solution was also rejected.

Tercile Analysis
An alternative approach to developing an understanding of materialists
versus nonmaterialists, however, was suggested by the work of Richins and
Dawson (1992). For some of their analyses, they divided respondents into terciles
based on their materialism scores and the top and bottom terciles were
compared. (As mentioned above, however, no profile of materialists were
developed as a result of the analyses.) The same analysis was conducted here
using the overall scale score instead of individually analyzing the subscales.
Three reasons support this decision. First, Richins and Dawson (1992) report that
the "factors [the subscales] normally act in concert with respect to external
variables" (p. 310). Secondly, Carver (1989) notes that using a summed scale is
preferred for reasons of parsimony and clarity of communication— especially
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

w hen the subscales are considered to be measures of various manifestations
(happiness, success, and centrality) of the underlying construct (materialism). He
concludes that "the higher level of information (i. e., the consistent relation of the
multifaceted [summed] construct to many outcome variables) is more important
than the lower level [subscale] information" (p. 580). Finally, as discussed above,
the reliability coefficient for the overall scale was clearly in the acceptable range
(.83), but it was not for two of the subscales (the Alpha for centrality was .62; for
success it was .68)—thereby arguing for use of the overall scale.
Respondents were apportioned into three groups, with break points at the
top, middle, and lower thirds of the materialism scale scores. The bottom tercile,
low materialists, had 88 members; the top tercile, high materialists, had 98
members; the middle tercile had 85 members. The analysis which follows,
compares the top (high materialists) and bottom (low materialists) groups.
The first part of the investigation was to run t-tests to evaluate differences
in m ean scale scores between the two groups for the materialism scales and three
of the self scales. As the information in Table 29 illustrates, in every case the
differences were statistically significant at the .05 level or better and were in the
direction suggested by the research hypotheses. Low materialists had lower
m ean self-esteem, self-actualization, and self -monitoring scores. They also
scored lower on the Belk materialism scale.4 Additionally, once the respondents
were partitioned into terciles, the standard deviations for the scale scores were
more in line with what might be expected than was true with the cluster analysis.
The second part of the investigation dealt with the demographic data.
Because the data was categorical (see the survey in Appendix A), the Chi-Square
4

They also had lower scores on the Richins and Dawson materialism scale, which, of
course, w as to be expected. The t-test indicated was that the difference in mean scale scores
between the two groups was statistically significant.
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Table 29
T-Tests of Scale Means for Bottom and Top Terciles
Group 1 = Bottom Tercile = Low Materialists
Group 2 = Top Tercile = High Materialists

Self-Esteem Scale
Group
1
2

N um ber
of Cases
88

Mean
34.8182

Standard
Deviation
5.236

33.3980

4.542

Mean
65.9659

Standard
Deviation
9.902

59.4898

7.996

Num ber
of Cases

Mean

Standard
Deviation

87
97

57.8506
71.0412

13.288
13.957

-6.56

.000

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Prob.

52.7931
60.1354

9.494
7.651

t
Value
-5.72

98

t
Value
1.97

Prob.
.051

t
Value
4.87

Prob.
.000

Value

Prob.

Self-Actualization Scale
Group
1
2

Num ber
of Cases
88
98

Self-M onitoring Scale
Group
1
2
Belk Scale
Group
1
2

Num ber
of Cases
87
96

.000

Richins and Dawson Scale
Group
1
2

N um ber
of Cases
88
98

Mean
39.6591
61.3367

Standard
Deviation
5.330
5.119

t
Value
-28.22

Prob.
.000
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test for significant differences was used. The "collapsed" categories which were
used for the earlier ANOVA analysis were kept for this analysis to avoid having
categories with fewer than five members. While there were no significant
differences between the two terciles for ethnic background or gender (consistent
w ith prior research), there were significant differences on the other variables.
Table 30 presents this information.

The Profile
What, then, can be said about high versus low materialists? First,
materialism cuts across gender and ethnic categories. High and low materialists
are to be found among women and men, be they Asian, Black, Caucasian,
Hispanic, or Native American. Secondly, high materialists tend to be younger
than older, not to have a college degree (though they may have attended college
at some point), and to have either relatively high or relatively low household
incomes. In terms of the self, based on this study, high materialists are less likely
to feel good about themselves as evidenced by lower self-esteem scores. Because
they are less likely to be self-actualized and more likely to be self-monitoring,
high materialists are more susceptible to the influences of outside forces than low
materialists. Their lower self-esteem also contributes to this susceptibility.
Because of their sensitivity to external influences (other people, advertisers, and
products themselves), they may also be more aware of and may care more about
fashions and fads, and are more concerned with outward expressions of
themselves and others. They also would be expected to be more likely to judge
others on the basis of external factors, since this is how they often judge
themselves. Further implications of these differences are discussed in the next
chapter.
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Table 30
Demographic Differences Between Bottom and Top Terciles
Bottom Tercile = Low Materialists
Top Tercile = High M aterialists

Low
Materialists
Percentage

High
Materialists
Percentage

Gender
Female
Male

45.2
46.9

54.8
53.1

Age
18-34
35-49
50+

35.0
59.6
66.7

65.0
40.4
33.3

Household Income
Less than $25k
$25-$35k
$35-$50k
$50k+

35.5
60.5
50.0
40.0

64.5
39.5
50.0
60.0

Education
High School or Less
Some College
College Grad +

44.1
41.5
66.7

55.9
58.5
33.3

p = .0305

Ethnic Background
Black
White
Other

41.4
47.5
53.3

58.6
52.5
46.7

p = .7318

p = .8311

p = .0012

p =.0814
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CONCLUSION
This study has examined the relationship between materialism and four self
concept measures. Four hypotheses were proposed and all were confirmed (with
the caveat, of course, about the IE Index). Further, the study continues to show
that the Richins and Dawson scale is to be preferred over the Belk scale because
of higher reliability and better factor stability (especially for adult populations).
At this point, however, it cannot be said that the Richins and Dawson scale is
more valid. The hypotheses which were tested provided measures of construct
and nomological validity. That is, they measured whether the materialism scales
performed as expected within a network of other related constructs. Since
correlations w ith the self measures were significant and in the direction
hypothesized for both scales, validity was established for both. The validity issue
is further discussed in the next chapter along with a discussion of the
implications and limitations of this study.
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CHAPTER FIVE
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

This chapter begins with a summary of the research findings. It then moves
to a consideration of the theoretical contributions of the research. Next, potential
practical implications, tempered by the limitations of the study, are addressed.
Finally, directions for future research which flow from the study are enumerated.

INTRODUCTION
The thrust of this dissertation may be best understood in terms of a
discussion of the necessary and sufficient conditions for materialism. According
to Ger and Belk (1990), necessary conditions are "some bare minimum of
economic means and communication as to available goods and how other people
... live and consume, and a sense of affordability (I can also buy th is)..." (p. 191).
Mukerji (1983) shares this perspective when she notes that "[o]nly in early
m odern Europe did materialism begin to spread through a large section of the
population.... Even those people outside the ruling elite were increasingly able to
buy objects and value their accumulation and use" (p. 9). But what about the
sufficient conditions? Ger and Belk (1990) suggest that comparison "of one's
own means and possessions with those of others above oneself will push one
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towards materialism.... [This comparison] may be related to a latent sense of
relative deprivation, esteem /dignity... and the desire to self-actualize and assert
power" (p. 191) Since we all probably feel deprived at one time or another, and
since we all are interested in dignity, self-esteem, self-actualization, and,
perhaps, power, this list seems to stop short of truly being an explanation. The
question still unanswered is, "why do some people decide they are satisfied with
'enough' and others still want more?" This dissertation investigates the
hypothesis that that distinction m ight be found in each individual's self-concept.
People with higher self-esteem, w ho are more self-actualized, who are low
self-monitors, and who are intrinsically rather than extrinsically motivated are
those more likely to be happy with their lot in life, to be satisfied w ith "enough."
Lacking self-esteem, not becoming self-actualized, being a high self-monitor,
and being more extrinsically motivated, therefore, are hypothesized to be
sufficient conditions to push one towards materialism. This may be true because
the materialist relies on goods to provide the greatest sources of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction in h is/h er life.
Because materialism research is in its relative infancy, these theoretical
concerns merit attention. There is no agreement about issues such as the
definition of materialism and how to operationalize the construct for research
purposes. Discussions and possible resolutions of both issues are presented next.

DEFINITIONAL CONCERNS
With Veblen's (1899/1979) attack on conspicuous consumption, with the
religious proscription against worldly things, with the dire predictions of people
concerned about the environment, who warn of the social and environmental
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evils of overconsumption, objects (goods, possessions) have acquired the label
"bad." In reaction, anthropologists and other social scientists have reminded us
of the communicative role of objects and of their necessary functions in holding
together the fabric of society (Douglas and Isherwood 179). Goods in and of
themselves are not bad. Further, owning, possessing, and using goods are not
bad activities. In fact such actions are necessary to our very survival as
individuals and as members of society. W hat is needed in the face of all of this is
a clear definition of materialism. As How ard and Sheth (1969) note, one function
of a good theory is demarcation, to set one construct apart from all others.
The study of materialism, however, like the study of other aspects of
marketing, is hampered by semantics. Terms which have specific meanings in
the discipline have come into common, everyday usage and thereby have taken
on other connotations. For example, the w ord marketing often is used as a
synonym for sales when it appears in an advertisement for employment. Attitude
refers to a specific construct which is different from the meaning of the word in
the contemporary phrase of someone "having an attitude." Similarly,
materialism sometimes is taken to refer to excessive consumption. Yet a
materialist, in the sense of this study, need not necessarily overconsume.
Materialism is often associated solely with negative traits and behaviors. Yet, as
Ger and Belk (1993) and Fournier and Richins (1991) suggest, materialism may be
freedom-enhancing and may motivate an individual to achieve.
The study of materialism is also complicated by hidden agendas. Some
critics of materialism really seem to be objecting to capitalism (c.f., Fromm 1976;
Kilboume 1987,1991). Others criticize the increasing spread of commercial
values and institutions such as advertising (c.f. Galbraith 1958; Halton 1992;
Pollay 1986,1992). Trends toward individualism, self-centeredness, and away
from a sense of community are also denounced (c.f., Boorstin 1973; Halton 1992;
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Mukerji 1983; Rochberg-Halton 1986; Wachtel 1983), as are attitudes which are
not environmentally conscious (c.f. Galbraith 1958; Leiss 1976). Finally, some
critics simply seem not to like popular culture. As George Will writes,
"Contempt for consumer culture is generally an affectation of comfortable people
addicted to the pleasures of condescension" (quoted in Rotzoll 1992, p. 208).
W hatever the reason, the term "materialism" and its many synonyms have been
used in different contexts and to advance many different causes and theories.
The following discussions represent an attempt to sort through the semantics to
arrive at a conclusion about the meaning of materialism.

W hat Materialism Is Not
Perhaps it would be useful to begin with a consideration of what
materialism is not Materialism is not consumerism; it is not conspicuous
consumption; neither is it the same as material culture.
Consumerism. The term consumerism is often employed in social science
disciplines, especially anthropology, sociology, and social psychology. According
to the Oxford English Dictionary, it is the "name given to a doctrine advocating a
continual increase in the consumption of goods as a basis for a sound economy"
(1989, p. 802). While consumerism may lead people to live beyond their means,
potentially leading to financial ruin; while consumerism may lead to an
overconsumption of resources, thereby depleting natural resources and leading
to ruin of another type, neither of these occurrences are what writers such as Belk
and Richins and Dawson mean by materialism. Consumerism is more closely
synonymous with living a materials-intensive existence. Yet living in a world of
goods is not in and of itself materialism. It is for this reason that Bond (1992) can
spend hundreds of dollars acquiring the latest in audio and video technology, yet
still not be a materialist. He may be a consumerist, but he is not a materialist.
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Conspicuous consumption. Along the same lines, conspicuous consumption
is not materialism. Rochberg-Halton (1986) draws the distinction.
[While w]e nowadays in America call a "materialist" someone who
lives for the self-centered pleasure of status prestige derived from
material wealth, it remains true that not only is some level of
material existence inescapable, but that material goods can act as
genuine materials for the cultivation of their possessions, (p. 180).
The prestige factor that Rochberg-Halton mentions is central to
conspicuous consumption, a term coined by Veblen (1899/1979). According to
Veblen, "conspicuous consumption of valuable goods is a means of reputability
to the gentleman of leisure" (p. 75). Additionally, there "must be an expenditure
on superfluities," and, "[i]n order to be reputable, it [the expenditure] must be
wasteful" (p. 96). Mason (1981) updates the concept when he suggests that
conspicuous consumption refers to "ostentatious display of wealth, motivated by
a desire to impress others with the ability to pay particularly high prices for
prestige products" (p. viii). Thus, the dominant motive behind conspicuous
consumption is the desire for status (Mason 1981).
This motivation illustrates the first distinction between conspicuous
consumption and materialism. While the desire for status and prestige may be
part of the motivation behind materialism, it is not dominant. As Belk's (1984)
definition clearly indicates, with materialism, possessions assume a central place
in one's life and represent "the greatest sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction
in life" (p. 291). A materialist's may be motivated to acquire in order to achieve
prestige, but acquiring possessions by also be motivated by the desire for
happiness, for comfort, safety, or security, among others. This is the point which
Schudson (1984) and Douglas and Isherwood (1979) made earlier. Consumption
serves a variety of purposes, only one of which is status.
The second distinction between the two terms comes from the requirement

194

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

inherent in conspicuous consumption for the economic means to engage in it.
Mason (1981) explains that even though people of all economic classes may
desire to consume conspicuously, economics determines if it can be undertaken
and to what extent. While there are examples of people foregoing "necessities"
to maintain a particular level of consumption, such an the unemployed steel
workers buying a new car (Roberts 1991), economic circumstances still are
important. Materialism, however, is not tied to spending on superfluities and
conspicuous waste. A poor person with very few possessions can be a
materialist, depending on how central possessions are in his/h er life.
Material culture. Another term which often appears in the literature is
"material culture," yet this concept also is separate from materialism. A New
Dictionary of the Social Sciences discusses material culture: "artifacts are included

as the 'embodiment' of culture, although they are more usually regarded as its
products. Sometimes anthropologists distinguish artifacts as material culture"
(1979, p. 45). Thus while the concept of material culture certainly is linked with
materialism, the terms are not synonymous.
That we live in a material world, that we use material goods, among other
things, for self-identify and to signify our relationships w ith others as well as our
distinctions from others, and that we often communicate via the medium of
goods are "givens" in a m odem industrial society. These facts are true for
everyone. Yet we do not expect everyone to be a materialist. Hence, w hat is
required is a means of distinguishing between living in a materials-intensive
world and being a materialist.

W hat Materialism M ight Be
One approach to making that distinction w ould seem to lie in an
understanding of people's motivations for possessing objects. If goods are
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desired and possessed as an end in themselves, then that is materialism. If, on
the other hand, goods are desired and possessed to further some other
end—good or bad—then that is not materialism. This idea was first suggested by
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) and later expanded by
Rochberg-Halton (1986). Following the lead of Rokeach (1973), who
distinguished between terminal and instrumental values, Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg-Halton (1981; Rochberg-Halton 1986) suggest that if someone desires
possessions for the possessions themselves, then that is an example of terminal
materialism and is to be abhorred. If, on the other hand, the person views the
goods as the means to achieving some other end, such as a life goal or furthering
some personal value, then that is instrumental materialism and is not as
undesirable. As Richins and Dawson (1992) ask, however, how is one to
distinguish between these two forms? Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg- Halton
provide no clear guidelines. In fact, they seem to contradict themselves when
they decry using possessions to achieve status, which they identify as terminal
materialism, yet that is an example of using goods for some other end. Richins
and Dawson (1992) conclude that "except in extreme cases, it may be difficult to
determine whether the conditions for instrumental materialism are being met"
since the "classification as instrumental or terminal appears to rest on a value
judgment" (p. 305). Consequently, we are still left with the problem of a useful
definition for materialism.
Since many researchers quote Belk's (1984) definition, and since it was
employed in this research, it merits consideration next. Belk defines materialism
as reflecting the "importance a consumer attaches to worldly possessions. At the
highest levels of materialism, such possessions assume a central place in a
person's life and are believed to provide the greatest sources of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction in life" (1984, p. 291). While this definition provides a good
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theoretical base, it does not offer guidance for interpreting what it means. As has
already been noted, in industrialized societies, almost everyone considers some
goods to be important (cars for transportation, labor saving devices for efficiency,
clothing for comfort and self-expression, etc.). According to this definition, then,
by living in a materials-intensive world, we all are materialists. Yet we are not all
"high" materialists, for it is only "at the highest levels of materialism" where
goods themselves are expected to provide life satisfaction. Perhaps, then, the
distinction to be draw n is not between materialism and something else, but rather
lies within materialism itself. Perhaps what is important is to distinguish between
high materialists and the rest of us. This approach leads to the conceptualization
of materialism proposed by Richins and Dawson (1992).

W hat Materialism Probably Is
According to Richins and Dawson, materialism is best thought of as a value
with high materialists ranking materialism near the top of their value hierarchy.1
This approach is conceptually appealing because, as Rokeach (1973; Rokeach and
Ball-Rokeach 1989) has suggested, differences in attitudes and behaviors may be
accounted for not by the differences in people's values, but rather by the
differences in their value rankings. According to Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach
(1989), values are beliefs about desirable means and ends of action and serve as
standards or criteria of conduct. That is, values are beliefs about important life
goals as well as beliefs about appropriate behaviors to attain those goals. As
such, values transcend specific instances; they guide actions, attitudes, and
judgements across a variety of situations, objects, places, and people (Rokeach
1973). Further, values are organized in a hierarchical system (Rokeach 1973). The

1Richins and Dawson are not the only ones to think of materialism as a value. Belk (1987b),
himself, adopted this perspective for a content analysis of material values in the comics.
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hierarchy concept is important because it is the most central values, the higher
ranked ones, which usually guide decision making and behaviors (Williams
1968).
If materialism is a value, then acquiring material goods is a desirable goal.
Further, acquiring material possessions is appropriate conduct to reach other
desired goals. Fournier and Richins (1991) provide an example to illustrate the
beliefs of those who rank materialism near the top of their value hierarchy. Such
people "may believe that it is impossible for them to achieve such desired
end-states as status recognition or happiness unless they have sufficient, or the
right kind of, possessions" (p. 411). Further, high materialists would be expected
to rank materialism above other goals in their value hierarchy. Richins and
Dawson (1992) demonstrated that high materialists ranked "financial security"
higher than low materialists did; low materialists ranked "warm relationships
with others" higher than high materialists did.
Thus, if materialism is defined as a value, the relationship of materialism to
other attitudes and behaviors, even demographics, falls into place. The
understanding of why, while we all live in a materials-intensive society, some
people are high materialists and others are not is made clear. Materialism m ay be
a societal value, but some place it high in their value hierarchy and some rank it
lower. While everyone desires material goods, different attitudes and behaviors
would be expected from those ranking materialism high than from those who
rank it low (or lower). The age differences in materialism which have been
reported in this research, as well as other studies, can also be explained by the
suggestion that younger people rank materialism higher in their value
hierarchies than do older people. One reason for this progression might be that
when one is younger, and has fewer things, possessions receive more of one's
psychic energy. As a person grows older and acquires possessions, attention is
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focused on other matters. Similarly, when a person is younger, s/h e is still
building her/his own identity. To the extent that material objects contribute to
that process, the person may be more or less materialistic. As one grows older,
the process of self construction may receive less attention. The gender differences
in materialism which have been reported by some researchers could similarly be
explained.
While it would seem, then, that the value perspective is not only the most
useful, but also the most consistent with explanations of behavior and attitudes,
there seems to be no general agreement about the definition of materialism. This
situation is not surprising given the almost pre-paradigmatic state of
materialism research. This state is exemplified in the literature by the lack of a
standard, tested and validated measure of materialism. American social science
researchers generally have used the Belk scale—though the Richins and Dawson
scale is beginning to be used, now that it is more widely available. In the UK,
while researchers may refer to these scales, they have employed their own sets of
questions to assess the role of possessions in peoples' lives. Yet none of these
scales has yet been subjected to continual refinement. This statement is not meant
as a criticism; it is simply a fact arising from the relative newness of the research.
Hence there may be room for yet one more approach to materialism, which is
suggested by this dissertation.

An Alternative Conceptualization of Materialism
In proposing an alternative approach to defining materialism, it would be
appropriate to "return to our roots." That is, to return to the philosophical school
which gave the construct its name. According to philosophical materialism,
nothing exists, is real except for matter and its movements, which can be
observed (Lange 1865/1925). Perhaps materialists are those who take this notion
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to heart today. The explanation is as follows.
Several themes have been repeated in the course of this dissertation. One of
the more prominent ones is that people use material objects to construct their self
identities and to assess the identities of others. The explanation for this
seemingly universal aspect of hum an nature comes from the philosophers
Descartes, Kant, and Hume, all of whom suggested that knowledge about
oneself, like knowledge of the world, is inferential. James (1890/1981)
appropriated this tradition for his now famous statement that the distinction
between "me" and "mine" is difficult to make. People learn about themselves as
they observe themselves using, owning, and acquiring possessions. As Solomon
(1983) notes, material objects are "a potent information source from which to
draw inferences" about oneself and others (p. 322). "As the self is dressed, it is
simultaneously addressed" (Stone 1962, p. 102).
Hume, however, cautioned that conclusions from inferential knowledge
(inductive reasoning) can never be certain. Yet w hat people would m ost like to
be certain of is themselves, who they are! Thus, in an attempt to fix identity,
people may come to rely on material objects simply because they are material.
Such a tendency is well documented in other aspects of human behavior, such as
ritual behavior and in ways of dealing with the sacred. Douglas and Isherwood
(1979) explain that the most effective rituals, those which have a strong intention
to fix meaning, are set up with material things (p. 65). Belk, Wallendorf, and
Sherry (1989) note that in an attem pt to understand "the sacred," we objectify it.
That is, by representing the sacred in a physical object, "the sacred is
concretized" (p. 7). For example, elaborate rituals surround the raising and

2

Of course, the irony is that the meaning of goods continually shifts, and one must keep
up with those shifts, but that is for another discussion.
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lowering of the American flag, which is a concrete representation of our
country's ideals. The strong negative reaction to the work of an artist who put
the flag on the floor for people to walk on may be taken as evidence that the flag
is, indeed, a sacred symbol.
So far, then, in this conceptualization of materialism it has been posited that
people construct their identities, in part at least, with the aid of material objects.
An explanation for reliance on these objects has also been developed. The
conclusion is that materialism may be thought of as an orientation not so much
to the external as to the concrete and the certain. This conceptualization of
materialism is analogous to the distinction between visualizers and verbalizers.
Visualizers are more receptive to and more easily remember information
presented in a visual format. Verbalizers, on the other hand, are more attracted to
the written or spoken w ord than to pictorial presentations.
Thus it may be for materialists and non-materialists. A (high) materialist
may have a preference for certainty—a preference which finds reflection in
concrete representations of the self, of others, and of relationships (or
distinctions) between the self and others. Other signs, such as emotions and
ideas, can be ambiguous and ephemeral. Therefore, they are subject to
misinterpretation. Material possessions, on the other hand, evoke constant
responses over time (within a community of shared meaning) and can be more
permanent (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981). The reason for this
preference may be found in a less confident self arising from low self-esteem and
from being less self-actualized. In discussing the relationship between products
and hum an behavior, Solomon (1983) draws a similar conclusion. W hen people
are uncertain about or uncomfortable with their role, he suggests that they are
more likely to use goods to establish their position. Specifically, he contends that
"confidence in one's ability to meet role demands may determine the degree to
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which one must rely upon material symbols to convince others and oneself of
this ability" (p. 326). When people don't have an internal force to guide them,
they tend to rely on external cues which can be validated by others. Solomon
provides two examples. The first is young males who appropriate "macho"
products to "bolster developing and fragile masculine self-concepts" (p. 325).
The other example is members of the lower upper class who demonstrate their
status with the purchase of ostentatious homes, luxury cars, and designer
clothes—consumption which is eschewed by the more confident upper upper
class. In both instances, material objects are used to "stand for" the desired
self-concept. In both instances this use of goods is successful when other people
recognize the objects' meaning and impute it to the individuals in question.
Being a high self-monitor is also consistent with this preference for the
concrete. By definition a high self-monitor assesses the physical cues in the social
marketplace and determines his/her own behavior accordingly (Snyder 1987).
Non-materialists (or low materialists), on the other hand, m ay be more tolerant
of ambiguity and consequently may not require as much material evidence.
Again, higher self-esteem and self-actualization would lead to a more confident
self. The concept of a low self-monitor is consistent-with this idea of a non (low)
materialist marching to and feeling comfortable with an inner drummer.
Overall, then, it might be said that in the search for certainty, materialists
have taken the construction of identity too far. Not being confident selves, they
continue to rely on and require the feedback from other people which comes
from others' interpretations of one's possessions. While some people wean
themselves from this need for external validation, materialists do not. "This
apparent attempt to use the acquisition of material goods to buoy self-image ...
seems notably materialistic" (Belk 1985, p. 272).
This conclusion is not meant to be pejorative, but rather is a statement of
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condition. A low materialist is not "better" than a high materialist. High
materialists do not necessarily neglect their relationships with other people or
neglect spiritual matters in favor of material concerns. Rather the distinction is
that high materialists prefer concrete representations of relationships to enhance
feelings of certainty. Obviously, some materialists may neglect their family and
friends, but so may low materialists. Nothing inherent in this definition makes a
materialist a loathsome creature.
W hether this conceptualization of materialism will be helpful can only be
determined by further research. At this point what can be said is that the
proposed conceptualization is consistent with definitions which have been
suggested by others (see Table 31 for a summary). The value of the approach
suggested here is that it provides an explanation for the materialistic
orientations, values, and personalities suggested by other researchers. For
example, people with a less confident self, who desire concrete representations of
who they are, would be expected to rank materialism high in their value
hierarchies.
Resolution of the definitional issue, however, still leaves open the question
of how to operationalize the construct. Two scales are available. W hat we know
about the relative merits of each is discussed next.

MEASUREMENT CONCERNS
Nunnally (1978), among others, has proposed that measures, such as scales,
should be judged on two criteria: reliability and validity. Reliability refers to "the
extent to which measurement error is slig h t... the extent to which measurements
are repeatable" (p. 191). Validity goes beyond looking for errors and is concerned
with whether a measurement "does w hat it is intended to do" (Nunnally 1978, p.
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Table 31
Definitions of M aterialism

Ward and Wackman (1971)

Materialism is an orientation which views material goods and
money as important for personal happiness and social progress
(p. 422).

Mukerji (1983)

Materialism i s ... a cultural system in which material interests
are not made subservient to other social goals and material
self-interest is preeminent (p. 8).

Belk (1984)

Materialism reflects the importance a consumer attaches to
worldly possessions. At the highest levels of materialism, such
possessions assume a central place in a person's life and are
believed to provide the greatest sources of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction in life (p. 291).

Rochberg-Halton (1986)

[W]e nowadays in America call a "materialist" som eone who
lives for the self-centered pleasure of status prestige derived
from material wealth (p. 180).

Russuli and Hollander (1986)

Materialism is a m in d -set... an interest in getting and spending
that results from the perception of possibilities for acquiring large
sets of desirable goods and services, and the perception that
others are generally also so engaged (p.10).

Hunt, et al. (1990)

In the extreme, materialism is an orientation that equates
symbols with substance and objects with essence (p. 1101).

Richins and Dawson (1992)

Materialism is a value that guides people's choices and conduct
in a variety of situations, including, but not limited to,
consumption arenas (p. 307). Materialism is a set of centrally
held beliefs about the importance of possessions in one's life"
(p. 308).

Ger and Belk (1993)

A consumption-based orientation to satisfaction-seeking (p. 1).

Micken (1993)

Materialism is an preference for certainty reflected in the
accumulation of concrete meaning-fixers.
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86)—in this case, measure materialism. By their nature, both criteria require
assessment over time by different researchers in different settings. This is
especially true of validity, since it "usually is a matter of degree rather than an
all-or-none property, and validation is an unending process. New evidence may
suggest modifications of an existing measure or the development of a new and
better approach to measuring the attribute in question" (Nunnally 1978, p. 87).
The reliability and validity of the Belk and the Richins and Dawson scales will
be summarized next.

Reliability
As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, the Richins and Dawson scale is
the more reliable. Coefficient Alphas for each of the subscales and for the overall
scale are within the acceptable range established by Nunnally (1978) and
Churchill (1979). Richins and Dawson (1992) report that test-retest reliability had
similarly acceptable results. These same statements, however, cannot be made for
the Belk scale. Only two of the four subscales and the overall scale itself have
Coefficient Alphas between .60 and .70. While these Alphas might be judged by
Churchill (1979) to be acceptable for basic research, they would not be by
Nunnally (1978). Indeed, Belk himself refers to the Alphas as "moderately
acceptable." He suggests, however, a willingness to trade some reliability for
cross-cultural applicability. The acceptability of such an exchange to the
discipline given the availability of a more reliable instrument remains to be seen.
No information about test-retest reliability is available for the Belk scale. On the
criterion of reliability, then, the Richins and Dawson scale is judged to be better.
Reliability tests alone, however, are insufficient. A scale could reliably be
measuring nonsense! Validity assessment helps to determine whether the scales
are in fact measuring materialism. That establishing validity is indeed an
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incremental process, as Nunnally (1978) has suggested, is illustrated in the
following discussion.

Content (Face) Validity
The weakest form of validity is content or face validity which refers to a
"rational appeal to the carefulness with which a domain of content has been
sampled and placed in the form of a good test" (Nunnally 1978, p. 110). In
making this assessment, it should first be noted that both scales are indirect
measures of materialism, since materialism itself is a theoretical construct
(Bagozzi 1984). The Richins and Dawson scale assesses materialism by
considering if and to what extent a person uses goods as indicators of happiness
and success, and by assessing how central goods are in that person's life. Of
course, the scale does not directly measure how central possessions are, or if
goods are used to determine happiness and success. What it provides are
responses to scale items, and we make the assumption that high numbers are
indicative of these attitudes and motivations. Still, the scale is designed to
measure three dimensions of materialism.
The Belk scale, on the other hand, is a doubly indirect measure. It assesses
four personality traits: possessiveness (concerned about retaining
control/ownership of possessions), nongenerosity, envy (of the possessions as
well as successes of others), and preservation (preserving experiences in tangible
ways). As above, these traits are not directly measured. The second area of
"indirectness" is the assumption that people with these traits are more inclined
to be materialistic. Thus, the Belk scale is an indirect measure of the construct
itself and employs indirect measures of personality traits in the process.
Perhaps more importantly, however, in measuring personality traits, the
Belk scale is not true to Belk's definition of materialism—that at the highest levels
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of materialism, "possessions assume a central place in a person's life and are
believed to provide the greatest sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction" (Belk
1984, p. 291). While centrality of goods is implied by the personality measures,
deriving happiness and satisfaction from goods are not.
In assessing to the general issue of content validity, then, the Richins and
Dawson scale appears to come closer to measuring materialism. The Belk scale
focuses on whether there is a personality type that is more prone to materialism
and concludes that people who are less generous, who are envious of others'
possessions and possessive of their own, are materialistic. However, an envious
person would not necessarily seem to be a materialist, neither would a selfish
person necessarily be materialistic. Further, the scale provides no means of
assessing the role of possessions in one's life, which is what Belk's definition of
materialism would seem to require.
The more rigorous validity assessment, however, is concerned with
construct validity, which is a closer examination of the relationship between the
scale and the theory which underlies it. Construct validity can be established via
convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity.

Convergent and Discriminant Validity
Convergent validity assesses how well one measure of a construct
positively correlates with other measures of the same construct. In this research,
the correlation between the Richins and Dawson and the Belk scales was .4691
(p = .000) and correlations among the subscales were positive and statistically
significant (see Table 13). That the values of the correlations were not high,
reflects the differences in approaches to materialism (value versus personality
trait). Thus, for both scales, convergent validity can be established.
Discriminant validity, "the extent to which a measure does not correlate
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with other constructs from which it is supposed to differ" (Malhotra 1993, p. 310)
was not addressed in this study. However, the discussion above, which
distinguishes materialism from living in a materials-intensive world, gets at this
issue.

Nomological Validity
Nomological validity, however, was directly assessed with the tests of the
research hypotheses. As noted before, nomological validity refers to a process of
building a network of relationships between the construct of interest and other
constructs which "sensible theories" would suggest are systematically related to
it (Nunnally 1978, p. 103). In this study self-esteem, self-actualization, and
intrinsic motivation were hypothesized to correlate negatively with materialism,
while self-monitoring was hypothesized to correlate positively. For all four self
measures, the correlations with both materialism scales were statistically
significant (p = .01 or better) and were in the direction hypothesized, thereby
providing evidence for the nomological validity of both scales.
However, as Nunnally (1978) has warned, construct validity cannot be
established unequivocally by this means, for the correlations do not "prove" all
the hypotheses on which the correlation tests rest. That is, we have hypothesized:
1. that materialism and self-esteem correlate negatively,
2. that the Rosenberg (1965) scale is a measure of the self-esteem construct,
3. that the Belk scale is a measure of the materialism construct, and
4. that scores on the self-esteem scale will correlate negatively with scores
on the Belk scale.
Demonstrating the truth of the fourth hypothesis still leaves much unproven. For
example, the measures of materialism and self-esteem may be faulty. If that is
the case, then the correlation between the two measures certainly still exists, but
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it does not offer evidence of the relationship between materialism and
self-esteem which was suggested in the first hypothesis. The measures of
materialism and self-esteem might be correlated not because of a direct
relationship between the two, but rather because their relationship is mediated
by some other construct. Simon (1954) refers to this situation as a spurious
correlation. And there is some reason to believe that such may be the case with
the Belk scale, as discussed next.
Spurious correlation. The Belk scale measures materialism indirectly by
measuring personality traits. For this reason alone, some researchers have
objected to its use (e.g. Cole et al. 1992; Williams 1992). However, the scale may
be objected to on other grounds—that several items may be measures of
individualism not materialism. In a cross-cultural study of individualism and
collectivism, Triandis et al. (1988) sought to develop an operational definition of
individualism which was appropriate for the United States. Several of their
findings are relevant here.
One of their primary determinations was that, paradoxically, people living
in an individualistic culture, such as the U.S., had to be more attuned to the
attitudes and behaviors of others than people in collectivistic cultures. The
explanation is that in collectivist cultures one is almost bom a member of various
ingroups; one need not work at becoming accepted. A person in an individualist
culture, on the other hand, generally is not born with many ingroup
memberships and m ust work to become accepted into and retain ingroup
membership. The flip side, however, is that because of the almost a priori
ingroup acceptance in collectivist cultures, people have close ingroup
relationships. In individualist cultures, on the other hand, the distance between
the individual and ingroup is much greater. One final factor, competition, needs
to be added to the situation. In collectivist cultures, ingroups compete with
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outgroups, but people compete as ingroup members and not as individuals. In
individualistic cultures, however, individuals compete with other individuals.
Three consequences relevant to the Belk materialism scale emerge from
these ideas. First, in collectivist cultures individuals take pride in the
achievements and successes of other ingroup members. In individualistic
cultures, however, personal achievement and success as a result of competition
with other individuals is prized. Second, in collectivist cultures not only are
honor and success shared, but so are other items such as money. In fact one way
that Triandis et al. (1988) measured concern for an ingroup was with a "lending
money to ingroup members" scenario. The third consequence is a repeat of the
fact that in individualist cultures people often are emotionally detached from
ingroups. The implication for the Belk scale is that all but three of the
nongenerosity subscale items and one of the envy subscale items measure
characteristics which would be expected of someone living in an individualist
culture. Statements about sharing one's possessions and lending them to friends,
about having people stay at one's home, about friends doing well, and about
buying for oneself instead of a loved one all would seem to measure an
individualistic orientation. This situation, of course, raises the question of
construct validity. What is being measured, individualism or materialism?
If these items are removed from the scale, nongenerosity is measured by
just two items which address donating things to charity and one item which
expresses concern over people taking one's possessions. None of these items
necessarily seem to be connected to materialism. The charity items may be
related more to measures of income, social class, or religion. Concern over theft
of possessions may be related to where one lives and perceptions of the crime
rate in society. Of course, these same concerns might be addressed to all the
possessiveness subscale items which deal with loss of possessions.
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For reasons such as these, Nunnally (1978) cautions against taking
correlation tests as evidence of nomological validity unless the truth of some of
the hypotheses is very evident. Certainly this research, as well as some others,
has been able to demonstrate statistically significant correlations between the two
materialism scales and measures of other constructs (life satisfaction, self-esteem,
self-actualization, etc.). And, by using scales which have been validated by
previous research (such as the self-esteem, self-actualization, and
self-monitoring scales), the hypotheses that these scales are measures of their
respective constructs is warranted. However, similar hypotheses about the
relationship between materialism and the two scales under investigation are not
well established. In fact, the hypothesis for the Belk scale is much in question.
Hence, the conclusion from this lengthy discussion is that, at this point, the
Richins and Dawson scale appears to better meet the validity criteria.

Social Desirability
Before leaving this section, one additional test, social desirability, merits
consideration. Because of materialism's negative image, social desirability may
have a potentially confounding impact. The Richins and Dawson scale was tested
with items from the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale (Crowne and
Marlowe 1960). Correlations with this measure were low, indicating that social
desirability bias was not a problem (Richins and Dawson 1992). The Belk scale,
however, has not been so tested. Certainly some of the items about donating to
charity or not being happy at another's success might be susceptible to social
desirability influences.
Thus a number of important theoretical implications can be concluded from
the research. The definition of materialism has been clarified. An explanation for
why a person may be a materialist has been suggested by the conclusions about
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the materialistic self. Further evidence that the Richins and Dawson scale is the
more reliable and more valid scale has been provided. Possible reasons for the
problems with the Belk scale (lack of sufficiently high correlations among the
items, the double indirect measure, and the influence of individualism, or other
constructs, as possible mediating factors between personality and materialism)
have been suggested. That the results are not more clear cut and precise is
testimony to what Bagozzi and Yi (1988) refer to as the "fickleness of theories
dealing with social science phenomena and the evolutionary nature of
knowledge" (p. 93). Nonetheless, several practical implications are suggested by
the research.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The materialist's search for external validation of the self suggests several
intriguing possibilities for marketing practitioners. The following ideas are not
offered as recommendations. They are suggested as avenues for future
consideration when the knowledge of materialism has advanced.

Advertising
Drawing from the finding that high materialists are also high self-monitors,
high materialists are expected to pay close attention to the symbols and
behaviors required in the situations in which they find, or expect to find,
themselves. This high level of concern for appearances and for the reaction of
others may manifest itself in behavior which has been termed "social
comparison" (Richins 1992). Thus, high materialists are expected to be receptive
to information about fashion and about desirable products and brands. They are
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expected to be constantly scanning the environment for information, reading
magazines, shopping, paying attention to advertising. These activities make high
materialists a high involvement segment. It m ay also make them a more readily
influenced segment if the right appeals are used.
High materialists were also found to have low self-esteem. Further,
research by others has suggested that people may try to bolster low self-esteem
via goods. If this is the case, then high materialists will also be susceptible to
appeals which suggest that buying a particular brand demonstrates "how smart
you are," or that using a certain brand is "the right thing to do." Messages which
show successful people purchasing and owning the brand also should be
successful strategies with this segment. The appeal that using the product will
make "you feel good about yourself" also should be a successful strategy.
Marketers m ay also find that materialists are particularly loyal to brands which
meet their self-esteem needs. Along the same lines, sales personnel might be
encouraged to maintain contact with their clients after the sale to reinforce the
"smart" purchase decision and brand or store loyalty.
The low self-esteem may have another social comparison implication. High
materialists may be more susceptible to the idealized images portrayed in
advertising. Accordingly, advertising would be expected to reinforce the high
materialists' drive to acquire more of the desired goods (which they perceive will
bring their lives more in line with the images portrayed).
The low degree of self-actualization suggests that high materialists have an
other-based reference system. Their sense of accomplishment, success, and
satisfaction is anchored in external signs. Consequently, high materialists would
be likely to respond positively to messages which suggest that a product/brand
w ould bring satisfaction and would be an indication of one's accomplishments.
That high materialists tend to be younger may have an impact on the
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models used in advertising, on the music, and on the settings which are selected.
Certainly if people are looking for validation of their "selves," then all these
aspects of a marketing communication must be authentic.
That high materialists tend not to have a college degree, and that some have
a relatively low household income, has a similar implication. Coleman (1983) has
suggested that middle-Americans strive to be like and to emulate
upper-Americans. However, such is not the case with working-Americans. Once
again, the appeals of accomplishment, success, and satisfaction m ust be set in
surroundings which will ring true for the target. It would be a mistake to assume
that a high materialist wishes to emulate a Donald Trump (at his peak).

Segmentation
The importance of physical objects for materialists may be useful for
segmentation strategies. Marketers could expect to find materialists in the
"heavy half"—the people who account for the greatest percent of the purchases
of a product. High materialists may also be good targets for high prestige or high
fashion products which are socially visible. Their possible role as opinion leaders
would also make them a worthy segment.

Product Design and Benefits
If it is true that high materialists prefer certainty and the concrete, then
marketers may find that written guarantees of quality and of satisfaction may be
attractive. If the display of possessions is important to high materialists as signs
of success and accomplishment, then to attract materialists, product design,
color, and packaging should receive attention. A product with style, which is
offered in fashionable colors, should be more attractive to high materialists.
Marketers may also want to offer more functional models to low materialists.
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Retailing
Implications for the retailer may be that store image and atmospherics m ust
be well planned to attract high materialists who are sensitive to cues in the
marketplace. Store "packaging" can be as important as product packaging. It is
suggested that a high materialist would not be likely to shop at a store whose
image was not consistent with the materialist's own desired self-image.
Additionally, Schiffman and Kanuk (1991) report that female shoppers with high
self-confidence are more likely to feel comfortable shopping at off-price stores,
while female shoppers with less self-confidence may not. The "smart shopper"
appeal offered by many off-price stores may help overcome this feeling.

LIMITATIONS
This research was begun in full knowledge of potential limitations
occasioned by the pre-paradigmatic nature of the study of materialism and the
exploratory nature of the materialism scales being employed. If materialism
research is to advance, however, then studies such as this one are necessary.
Thus, for example, even though inspection of the correlation matrix suggested
that factor analysis of the Belk scale might not be successful, the analysis was still
attempted. Indeed, the results were indeterminate.
A second limitation is the nature of the sample. As discussed in Chapter
Four, in some areas the sample was not representative of the population of the
four Virginia cities which comprise the "Peninsula." Various reasons from a
flawed sampling methodology to shifting population demographics were
proposed to explain the difference. The importance of this difference, however, is
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m itigated by the results of this study which often replicated those reported by
others (scale Alphas, means, and standard deviations, correlations of scales with
demographic characteristics, etc.)- The potential impact of the difference seems to
have been limited to the factor analysis results which are quite sensitive to
differences in samples. Thus while one might wish for, and next time plan more
carefully for, a more representative sample, it does not seem to have negatively
affected the conclusions. It should also be noted that no attem pt was made to
derive population estimates from the sample.

FUTURE RESEARCH
Because materialism research is a relatively new field, m uch remains to be
discovered. Before research is carried too far, however, some basic issues require
attention. For that reason this section is divided into two. First basic issues are
addressed, then the more wide-ranging ones are presented.

Fundam ental Research
If we all use goods to bolster and communicate about our selves, then how
does the materialist use goods differently? In investigating the nature of the
materialistic self this study is a start along that path. This study found strong
correlations between materialism and low self-esteem, lack of self-actualization,
and higher self-monitoring. These all suggest that the materialistic self is a less
self-assured, less confident self. Nunnally (1978) suggests that when measures
which are thought to be related to a construct correlate well w ith the construct,
"this should encourage investigators to keep working with the specified domain
of observables and should encourage continued investigation of theories relating

216

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that construct to others" (p. 102). The first recommendation, then, is that research
which investigates materialism and the self should be continued.
Second, research on the two materialism scales m ust be continued. This is
especially true for the Richins and Dawson scale which is the more reliable and
which seems to be the more valid. With its recent publication, additional studies
should be forthcoming. If the reliability questions about the Belk scale can be
sorted out, then the validity issues can be addressed (for reliability is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for validity). One productive direction might be to
investigate the relationship between the Belk scale and other constructs which
might mediate the relationship between the Belk scale and materialism.
Individualism was suggested here as one such possibility.
Third, conceptual work with the definition of the materialism construct
should be continued. This work certainly will be informed by the various
research projects, but it should not be delayed because of the importance of
demarcation to theory development. At this juncture, it appears that the value
orientation to materialism would be the most productive. If so, then research
which furthers our understanding of values as well as measurement of values is
necessary. Quantitative techniques for comparing value systems (instead of
single values), such as the one proposed by Kamakura and Mazzon (1991) offer
interesting and fruitful pathways.

Additional Research Suggestions
A variety of other projects spring from this research. Because of its
newness, materialism is fertile ground for research. Some of the many potential
projects are briefly presented next along with the rationale for each.
Materialism and emulation. This study did not test how a less confident
materialistic self uses goods in ways which are different from the more confident
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self. One approach to investigating this difference is suggested by the categories
in the original VALS typology. The outer directed group was comprised of
achievers, who were "into" conspicuous consumption; emulators, who wanted
to be achievers; and belongers, who were traditionalists. It might be
hypothesized that materialists are emulators. Rassuli and Hollander (1986)
define emulation as "the desire to copy some respected other(s) in a
superordinate class, fashion leaders, or others.... [it involves] an ability to
fantasize oneself absorbing some of the status of the model" (p. 12). This
definition is consistent with the VALS description: emulators copy achievers, but
really do not "get it right"; they tend to go overboard w ith fads and fashion—or
to come to them belatedly, once the world had moved on to something else.
In Ger and Belk's (1990) Turkish focus group interviews, this idea of
materialists being emulators was explored. A new term "kro" has come into the
language to refer to people who "identify with what they consum e... they
display their new wealth with no regard to subtlety and refined tastes" (p. 22).
Further, these people are seen as engaging in "foolish emulation of others'
consumption choices" (p. 22). The emulation-materialism connection was also
suggested in Ger and Belk's (1990) earlier cross-cultural article. They noted that
as people in emerging cultures developed desires for the comforts and goods of
the industrialized nations, the incidence of materialism increased. They
speculated that the emulation desire ran deeper than a general interest in
acquiring products seen in advertisements. It stemmed from a desire to be like
people in "winning" cultures. Hence, they found that materialism was greatest in
Turkey (whose citizens were members of a vanquished Ottoman empire), and
greater in the U.S. (whose citizens looked to Europe for much of their cultural
heritage) than in Western European countries (whose citizens already had a
strong cultural heritage).
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Materialism and the adoption process. A second hypothesis which flows
from this same idea would be to investigate materialism and the adoption
process. It has already been observed that materialists exhibit behaviors
characteristic of opinion leaders, but that they are more likely to be opinion
followers. Are materialists, then, early adopters, or do they tend to be members
of the early majority? If materialists are early adopters, do they also function as
opinion leaders? If so, when, where, and how?
A final research project which fits this program is whether materialism be
"product-category specific," just as opinion leaders are product-category
specific. That is, can a person be a materialist in some areas but not in others? We
might expect the answer to be "yes." Fournier and Richins (1991) have suggested
that the ways in which materialism manifests itself might depend on the other
central values a high materialist has: "For instance, a materialist valuing status
would try to acquire status signifiers; a materialist valuing recreation might
acquire a portfolio of leisure products such as skis, scuba equipment, and the
like" (p. 411). Thus, while materialism, itself, may not be product-category
specific, the way it manifests itself may be.
Materialism and self identity. Other research might focus on the role of
goods in self identity. If the self is a social construction, then the task is to learn in
what ways the materialist constructs him /herself that is different from the
non-materialist. How does a person select from among all the possible choices
those things, experiences, references, and meanings which make up the self?
William James provides direction. He suggests that we attend to what is of
interest to us. "Millions of items in the outward order are present to my senses
which never properly enter into my experience. Why? Because they have no
interest for me. M y experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I
notice shape my mind—without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos"
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(1890, p. 402). This idea of interest, however, begs the question. We are still left
with no specific means for determining what is of interest and w hat is not—and
how these interests develop.
Of course, there are the usual suspects of culture, family, reference groups,
etc. which influence the individual. These influences, however, are too broad to
be specifically useful in the question of what separates high from low materialists.
Valuable insight could be gained from research which would ascertain the sorts
of things that are of interest to the high materialist but which are not of interest to
the low materialist. Perhaps after an initial study, which would assess
materialism, researchers could go back for personal interviews with people in
each group (high, medium and low). The purpose would be to see how the
houses were furnished, how the people were dressed, to learn how they made
decisions about purchases (what, how often, etc.). Of course such a study would
be confounded by numerous items (income, etc.), which probably could be
controlled. There is precedent for this sort of study. Belk has often asked people
to note which items on a list are necessities and which are luxuries as a way of
distinguishing between the goods of high and low materialists.
A related study might investigate when the use of goods for self identity is
constructive and when it is no longer constructive. What determines the line of
demarcation? The answer to this question may facilitate a deeper understanding
of materialism.
A final self identity project flows from the idea that high materialists prefer
certainty and the concrete. A study of materialism and dogmatism and or
authoritarianism might be be warranted. Like the materialist, a highly dogmatic
person is not comfortable with the unfamiliar and unknown (Rokeach 1960).
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FINAL THOUGHTS
It would be a grave mistake if readers of this research were to conclude that
because there are serious questions about the reliability and validity of the Belk
scale, that his work with materialism should be dismissed. At almost every turn,
the ideas and hypothesis proposed by Belk have been important guides to this
work. The connections among disciplines and the resulting insight into consumer
behavior, which his articles make, are also reflected in this study. Desphande
(1983) makes an interesting and telling point about the importance of not
confusing the logic of discovery with the logic of verification. While it is not my
wish to engage in the qualitative/quantitative debate, I do want to emphasize
that good ideas and insights should not be rejected because of methodological
problems which attend their operationalization. Put more prosaically, let's not
throw out the baby with the bathwater.
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CONSUMER SURVEY

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. We are interested in your opinions and ideas about
possessions, other people, and yourself. The information you provide will be kept strictly confidential.
In each section contains a number of statements which represent commonly held opinions. There are no
right or wrong answers. You will probably disagree with some of the statements and agree with others.
We are interested in the extent to which you agree or disagree.

SECTION I
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement by circling the
number at the end of each sentence. The numbers and their meaning are indicated below.
If you agree strongly, circle 5
If you agree somewhat, circle 4
If you neither agree nor disagree, circle 3
If you disagree somewhat, circle 2
If you disagree strongly, circle 1
First impressions are usually best. Give your opinion on every statement. If you find the numbers do not adequately
indicate your own opinion, use the one which is closest to the way you feel.

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I’d be happier if I could afford to buy more things.
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even if it has
little monetary value.

2

3

4

5

I don’t pay much attention to the material objects other people own.

2

3

4

5

Some of the most important achievements in life include acquiring
material possessions.

2

3

4

5

My life would be better if I owned certain things I don’t have.

2

3

4

5

I enjoy having people I like stay in my home.

2

3

4

5

I enjoy spending money on things that aren’t practical.

2

3

4

5

I don’t like to lend things, even to good friends.

2

3

4

5

The things I own say a lot about how well I’m doing in life.

2

3

4

5

When friends do better than me in competition it usually makes me
feel happy for them.

2

3

4

5

I worry about people taking my possessions.

2

3

4

5

I try to keep my life simple, as far as possessions are concerned.

2

3

4

5
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Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I like to own things that impress people.

2

3

4

5

I don’t mind giving rides to those who don’t have a car.

2

3

4

5

Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure.

2

3

4

5

When friends have things I cannot afford it bothers me.

2

3

4

5

I do not enjoy donating things to the needy.

2

3

4

5

I have all the things I really need to enjoy life.

2

3

4

5

There are certain people I would like to trade places with.

2

3

4

5

I don’t like to have anyone in my home when I’m not there.

2

3

4

5

I don’t seem to get what is coming to me.

2

3

4

5

If I have to choose between buying something for myself versus for
someone I love, I would prefer buying for myself.

2

3

4

5

I usually buy only the things I need.

2

3

4

5

I am bothered when I see people who buy anything they want

2

3

4

5

I enjoy sharing what I have.

2

3

4

5

I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, and clothes.

2

3

4

5

I don’t get particularly upset when I lose things.

2

3

4

5

I don’t place much emphasis on the amount of material objects
people own as a sign of success.

2

3

4

5

I wouldn’t be any happier if I owned nicer things.

2

3

4

5

I tend to hang on to things I should probably throw out.

2

3

4

5

I enjoy donating things for charity.

2

3

4

5

I have a number of souvenirs.

2

3

4

5

I like a lot of luxury in my life.

2

3

4

5

I am less likely than most people to lock things up.

2

3

4

5

I like to collect things.

2

3

4

5

The things I own aren’t all that important to me.

2

3

4

5

I put less emphasis on material things than most people I know.

2

3

4

5

People who are very wealthy often feel they are too good
to talk to average people.

It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can’t afford to buy all
the things I’d like.
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SECTION n
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement by circling the
number at the end of each sentence. The numbers and their meaning are indicated below.
If you agree strongly, circle 6
If you agree somewhat, circle 5
If you agree slightly, circle 4
If you disagree slightly, circle 3
If you disagree somewhat, circle 2
If you disagree strongly, circle 1
First impressions are usually best. Give your opinion on every statement. If you find the numbers do not adequately
indicate your own opinion, use the one which is closest to the way you feel.

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I do not feel ashamed of any of my emotions.

2

3

4

6

I feel I must do what others expect of me.

2

3

4

6

I believe that people are essentially good and can be trusted.

2

3

4

6

I feel free to be angry at those I love.

2

3

4

6

It is always necessary that others approve what I do.

2

3

4

6

I don’t accept my own weaknesses.

2

3

4

6

I can like people without having to approve of them.

2

3

4

6

I fear failure.

2

3

4

6

I avoid attempts to analyze and simplify complex domains.

2

3

4

6

It is better to be yourself than to be popular.

2

3

4

6

I have no mission in life to which I feel especially dedicated.

2

3

4

6

I can express my feelings even when they may result in
undesirable consequences.

2

3

4

6

I do not feel responsible to help anybody.

2

3

4

6

I am bothered by fears of being inadequate.

3

4

6

I am loved because I give love.

3

4

6
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SECTION m
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement by circling the
number at the end of each sentence. The numbers and their meaning are indicated below.
If you agree strongly, circle 7
If you agree somewhat, circle 6
If you agree slightly, circle 5
If you neither agree nor disagree, circle 4

If you disagree slightly, circle 3
If you disagree somewhat, circle 2
If you disagree strongly, circle 1

First impressions are usually best. Give your opinion on every statement. If you find the numbers do not adequately
indicate your own opinion, use the one which is closest to the way you feel.
Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree
When I read a magazine, listen to the radio, or watch television, I always
know what I expect to get out of it.

2

3

4

5

6

I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.

2

3

4

5

6

At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that
others will like.

2

3

4

5

6

I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.

2

3

4

5

6

I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost
no information.

2

3

4

5

6

?When I take a walk I always like to have a specific destination.

2

3

4

5

6

I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.

2

3

4

5

6

Winning isn’t eveiything, it’s the only thing.

2

3

4

5

6

When I fix something or do chores around the house, I am just puttering
around for the fun of it.

2

3

4

5

6

In playing cards, board games, or video games, winning matters less than
how you play the game.

2

3

4

5

6

I would probably make a good actor.

2

3

4

5

6

I would keep doing the things that I do for a living even if I won the lottery.

2

3

4

5

6

In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.

2

3

4

5

6

When I read a magazine, listen to the radio, or watch television, I just
appreciate the experience on its own terms.

2

3

4

5

6

When I perform some creative activity such as writing, drawing, or
playing a musical instrument, I set a goal for myself to try to achieve.

2

3

4

5

6

In different situations and with different people, I often act like very
different persons.

2

3

4

5

6

I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.

2

3

4

5

6

When I engage in noncompetitive sports like skiing, jogging, or
body-building, I tend to view the activity as an end in itself.

2

3

4

5

6
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Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree
I am not particularly good at making other people like me.

2

3

4

5

6

I would not throw a party or take someone out to dinner unless I expected
to enjoy the companionship of the people involved.

2

3

4

5

6

I’m not always the person I appear to be.

2

3

4

5

6

I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please
someone or win their favor.

2

3

4

5

6

I have considered being an entertainer.

2

3

4

5

6

When I perform some creative activity such as writing, drawing, or playing
a musical instrument, I am aware that the process is inherently its own reward.

2

3

4

5

6

I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.

2

3

4

5

6

I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and
different situations.

2

3

4

5

6

At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.

2

3

4

5

6

When I play a competitive sport such as tennis, golf, or ping pong, my
primary motivation is to enjoy the game for its own sake.

2

3

4

5

6

I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.

2

3

4

5

6

I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).

2

3

4

5

6

SECTION IV
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement by circling the
number at the end of each sentence. The numbers and their meaning are indicated below.
If you agree strongly, circle 4

If you disagree somewhat, circle 2

If you agree somewhat, circle 3

If you disagree strongly, circle 1

First impressions are usually best. Give your opinion on every statement. If you find the numbers do not adequately
indicate your own opinion, use the one which is closest to the way you feel.

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.

1

2

3

4

I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

1

2

3

4

All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.

1

2

3

4

I am able to do things as well as most other people.

1

2

3

4

I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

1

2

3

4
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Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I take a positive attitude toward myself.

1

2

3

4

On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.

1

2

3

4

I wish I could have more respect for myself.

1

2

3

4

1 certainly feel useless at times.

1

2

3

4

At times I think I am no good at all.

1

2

3

4

SECTION V
Finally, we would like some information about you.This information will be used for research purposes only and will not be
used to identify you in any way. Please put an “X”in the appropriate space.

Clerical

Skilled Labor

Thank you for participating in this survey!
The Survey Administrator will be back shortly to pick up the survey.
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